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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the 
British civil and military officials in 
African recruits for the King's African 
ancillary units. The scope of the thes 
the Second World War although reference 
recruitment of East Africans before the 
criteria by which 
East Africa selected 
Rifles and its 
is is limited to 
is made to the 
war. 
The first chapter sets out to ascertain why some East African 
peoples were recruited in large numbers while others were 
not. This raises the question of the extent to which the 
racial composition of the army was determined by official 
policy, by the informal opinions of British officers or 
by the willingness of particular African peoples to come 
forward as recruits. An attempt has therefore been made 
to examine tribal stereotyping by British officials in East 
Africa and to assess the reasons why certain African peoples 
were thought to possess qualities which gave them an apti- 
tude for soldiering. At the same time-African incentives 
for joining the army are considered as well as the reasons 
why the KAR was more attractiv9 to some groups than others. 
The thesis traces 
Africa during the 
Africans first in 
and Labourers in 
combatants in the 
how the expansion 
the development of recruitment in East 
war when the War office deployed East 
the Abyssinian campaign, second as Pioneers 
the North Africa campaign, and lastly as 
Madagascar and Burma campaigns. It examines 
of the KAR altered the character of the 
ii 
regiment and how the pattern of recruitment changed. It 
sets out to demonstrate the changes in the criteria which 
were used in the choice of recruits in response to an urgent 
need for African manpower as the war progressed. 
The second chapter deals with recruitment for the North 
African campaign and balances the introduction of conscrip- 
tion for non-combatants against British efforts to make 
the Pioneers and the KAR more attractive to Africans. The 
third chapter discusses the need for a new type of African 
soldier, capable of handling more sophisticated weaponry 
in the struggle against the Japanese in Burma. British 
reviewal of traditional tribal stereotypes in the light 
of new military circumstances is evaluated and an explana- 
tion is given as to why certain African peoples now joined 
the KAR when they had not previously done so. 
A further theme examines the conflict between military and 
labour recruitment and the choices available to Africans 
as a result of the alternative employment available to them. 
An attempt is made to analyse the ways in which official 
industrial, agricultural and military priorities affected 
recruitment in certain areas. 
The fourth chapter deals briefly with demobilisation, showing 
how this became a concern of the British civil and military 
authorities at an early stage in the war when they were 
still recruiting. It aims to establish a link between the 
tribal composition of the KAR and the comparatively smooth 
resettlement of ex-askaris. 
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The epilogue draws certain parallels between recruitment 
in East and West Africa during the Second World War. Although 
there is no detailed, in-depth examination of recruitment 
in West Africa, it is possible to note similarities between 
British recruiting policies and tribal stereotyping in both 
regions of the continent. 
Because of the insuperable difficulties encountered in trying 
to visit East Africa, it was impossible to interview Africans 
whose views on recruitment to the KAR may have differed 
markedly from those of the British officials involved. Nor 
is there available any documentation which can throw direct 
light upon African opinion. This limitation is fully 
appreciated by the candidate who has, therefore, felt it 
necessary to focus the thesis upon British views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The King's African Rifles was the military force which served 
the British dependencies in Eastern Africa. The thesis 
title refers to the recruitment and service of troops within 
this Regiment. It is not intended to write a detailed study 
of the military campaigns in which the Regiment took part 
during the Second World War. The only references to service 
are those which relate to the effects of living conditions 
in the KAR upon recruitment. 
The official inauguration of the King's African Rifles took 
place on 1st January 1902 but troops had been raised and 
Regiments established independently in each territory long 
before that date. The Regiment was called 'Rifles' because 
all the original Regiments were so-called: the Central African 
Rifles which served British Central Africa (later Nyasaland), 
the Uganda Rifles and the East African Rifles which served 
British East Africa (later Kenya). The KAR was an infantry 
regiment originally including several Indian officers and 
troops. By the time of the Second World War it was officered 
by Europeans and its rank and file were Africans. It re- 
cruited in and served Nyasaland, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika 
and British Somaliland. 
The first Africans to be organised into a KAR infantry 
battalion were the Nyasas. Their history as members of 
a British armed force dates from shortly after the discovery 
of Lake Nyasa by David Livingstone. This famous missionary 
and explorer believed that the best way to spread the 
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Christian gospel in Africa was to bring to the people the 
material benefits of European civilization because without 
the security they provided, his audiences, harrassed by slave 
raiders, would be unreceptive to Christ's teachings. Missions 
must be stationed in the interior of the continent where 
the missionaries could make an impact on the remoter African 
peoples. Linking the mission station to the coast by means 
of a safe river route would help to serve Africans in two 
ways, he thought. They could be provided with medical 
supplies, trade goods and implements to improve food pro- 
duction and at the same time evangelists could use the same 
route into the interior. With this plan in mind, he set 
out to explore the Zambezi River in 1858. 
In Britain there was considerable philanthropic support 
for Livingstone's aims to overcome the Arab slave trade 
in East Africa. He also received financial sponsorship 
from the British government. Although Livingstone experi- 
enced many difficulties in navigating the Zambezi, his 
exploration of one of its northern tributaries, the Shire, 
led him to Lake Nyasa. In 1861 a group of missionaries 
under the leadership of Bishop Mackenzie arrived at the 
mouth of the Zambezi. Here they were met by Livingstone 
who guided them inland to the area of the Nyanja tribe, 
a people who were subject to frequent attacks by Yao slavers 
and were ripe for missionary influence. Sickness and poor 
supply routes forced the missionaries to abandon the area 
but British interest in the slave trade had been awakened 
and successful missionary activity followed. The Church 
Mission Society encouraged the British government to control 
3 
the slave trade in the Indian Ocean and plans were made 
to provide settlements for freed slaves which would also 
serve as bases from which missionaries could go out and 
make new converts. 
Geographers too were interested in Livingstone's discoveries 
and urged him to continue his exploration of East Africa. 
In August 1866 Livingstone arrived at Lake Nyasa once more 
and came across lakeside villages which had suffered greatly 
at the hands of the Arab slave traders. Although Livingstone 
died before he could combat the slave trade in this area, 
his diaries revealed its horrors and in 1874 the Free Church 
of Scotland took up his scheme to station a mission near 
Lake Nyasa. 1 A year later their representatives arrived 
at Mandala, at the southern end of the lake. They were 
the pioneers of permanent British settlement in Nyasaland. 
Commercial interests soon followed. The Livingstonia 
Central Africa Trading Company was founded to supply the 
Mandala mission station. A road was built to connect the 
north of Lake Nyasa to the south of Lake Tanganyika. A 
few coffee planters and traders began to settle in the Shire 
highlands and in 1883 a British Consul was appointed. In 
1884, the African Lakes Company, the successor to the 
Livingstonia Central Africa Trading Company, built a trading 
station at Karonga on the northern shore of Lake Nyasa. 
2 
A steamer service linked Karonga to the River Shire. 
Both missionary and commercial activities came into contact 
and conflict with the Arab and Yao slavers, resulting in 
the 'Slavers' War'. For the first time white entrepreneurs 
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attempted to train the indigenous Nyasas as troops. In 
the war against the Arabs and their allies, the Yao and 
Ngoni, the British enlisted the Nkonde to fight for them. 
They chose this group deliberately because they were con- 
stant victims of the slavers and had good reason to take 
up arms in defence of their people and villages. Although 
the Arabs were defeated on this occasion, the traders, 
missionaries and white settlers in Nyasaland were neverthe- 
less pleased to take the advice of Captain F. D. Lugard3 
who came to offer his services as a military leader. Lugard 
expanded the Nyasaland native force to include the Tonga, 
Jawa and Mbwe, all victims of the warlike Ngoni. He gave 
them simple drill and musketry training but after some fail- 
ures and successes against the slavers, Lugard recognised 
the need for a properly armed and disciplined force. He 
proposed that 1000 troops should be raised locally and 
officered by Indians. His plans were put into effect when 
Nyasaland became a British Protectorate in 1891. 
Captain C. M. Maguire of the 2nd Hyderabad Lancers was on 
the staff of the first Commissioner of Nyasaland. Maguire 
raised 70 volunteers from the Indian Army, 40 Sikhs from 
the 23rd and 32nd Pioneers and 30 Moslem cavalrymen from 
the Hyderabad Lancers. Their HQ was at Zomba which was 
to become an important KAR recruiting centre in later years. 
Maguire's force soon saw action against the Arab slavers 
to the North of the Lake and Yao to the South. The British 
came to terms with the Arabs but the Yao continued to be 
a threat and in 1893 the Protectorate forces were reorganised 
and strengthened by enlisting Africans as regulars. Local 
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men were preferred because they were cheaper to employ than 
those brought in from elsewhere; the Zanzibaris and Makua. 
The Sikhs still remained as the mainstay of the force although 
the Government of India expressed concern because the best 
men were being drawn away from the Indian Army by the more 
attractive wages offered to them in Nyasaland. In 1896 
the remaining Makua were replaced by locals and the force 
began to enlist the Yao when the war against the Arabs 
reopened. By this time there were six companies of the 
Central Africa Rifles, consisting of three Tonga companies, 
two Yao and one Rimba, and it was hoped that before long 
the Regiment would be able to dispense with the services 
of the Sikhs. 
In December 1898 the existing troops of the Central Africa 
Rifles were designated the 1st Battalion and on 1st January 
1899 the 2nd Battalion was formed from Yao, Nguru, Tonga 
and Rimba recruits. 
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While 1CAR became involved in the 
pacification of the Ngoni, a people whose military qualities 
were noted, 2CAR went abroad to Mauritius and then to 
Somaliland. There they replaced a force from the Indian 
Army and became the first Africans to serve abroad in that 
territory. Alongside local levies of Somalis they took 
part in the campaign against the 'Mad Mullah'. This was 
the beginning of the traditional mix of Somalis and Nyasas 
in the KAR. It established the custom too, of Nyasaland 
keeping two battalions, one to serve at home and one abroad. 
In discussions on future requirements it was decided that 
both battalions should be obliged to serve abroad and should 
relieve one another periodically. When the British acquired 
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the mandate of Tanganyika in 1921, the tradition began of 
one of the Nyasaland battalions serving in that territory. 
Nyasaland was also building up its traditions regarding 
the peoples it recruited its soldiers from. By 1901 the 
Yao were quickly becoming the most frequently recruited 
group, followed by the Tonga. 
In 1902 the first battalion of the King's 
was formed. The eight companies of 1CAR 
the six companies of 2CAR became 2KAR. 
ethos of the Nyasas was based on their be 
the first battalions of the KAR, the most 
in the Regiment. 
African Rifles 
became 1KAR and 
Much of the fighting 
ing members of 
experienced group 
The third battalion of the KAR was formerly the East African 
Regiment. Its origins can be traced to the need for a 
military force to protect the interests of the Imperial 
British East Africa Company in the area between Lake Victoria 
and the coast. The company was formed in 1888 from the 
British East African Association, which was granted the 
right to administer areas covered by treaties of protection. 
The Company was based at Mombasa on the coast but it had 
various outposts including one at Machako's, 250 miles inland. 
It had a reluctant commitment if not an active interest 
in safeguarding lines of communication and developing a 
safe route from Buganda to the coast through hostile terri- 
tory. At first the River Tana seemed a likely route but 
it was discovered to be unhealthy and the Company opted 
for the direct route across the arid Taru Desert. 
Developments in Buganda itself overshadowed those in the 
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area which was to become the Protectorate of British East 
Africa. The latter was important as a region to be travelled 
through on the way to Lake Victoria rather than for its 
own sake. It was much later that the fertility and climate 
of Kikuyuland was widely recognised as suitable and desirable 
for European farmers. The British Prime Minister, Lord 
Salisbury, urged Parliament to finance the building of a 
railway which would link the interior to the coast. 
To the British East Africa Company, Buganda sometimes seemed 
more trouble than it was worth and the task of controlling 
political developments there was impossible from the Company 
base at Mombasa. The Company therefore contemplated with- 
drawing from Buganda altogether, but was restrained from 
doing so because the only commodity from the interior on 
which a profit could be made was ivory from Toro, Bunyoro 
and the Upper Congo and the route to these areas passed 
through Buganda. The Company was thus a trading enterprise 
which became unintentionally involved in political and 
administrative commitments beyond its financial capacity. 
The Company Chairman, Sir William MacKinnon, saw the need 
for an organised military force to protect his Company's 
interests but was unable to finance a centrally controlled 
army. Instead, a miscellaneous selection of soldiers was 
employed including-mercenaries belonging to the Sultan of 
Zanzibar. MacKinnon considered the use of troops from 
Sierra Leone and Zululand but dismissed the scheme as costly 
and impractical. He then turned to India and received per- 
mission to recruit in the Delhi neighbourhood where he raised 
a police force to help garrison some of the Company's out- 
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posts. The Company also sought the assistance of British 
naval patrols in areas which were reasonably accessible 
from the coast. 
In Britain, Liberal opinion thought it was beyond Britain's 
brief to interfere in the suppression of East Africa's slave 
trade as East Africa had only been claimed as a British 
'sphere of influence' to prevent the intervention of other 
European powers. However, there were those in Great Britain 
who wanted more the positive acquisition of African land 
for its own sake and to counter German advances into the 
interior. As in Nyasaland there were those who took an 
altruistic interest in the suppression of the slave trade 
and who considered British naval patrols on the East coast 
were inadequate. A land force was needed as well. 
Lieutenant Lloyd Mathews R. N., serving in one such anti- 
slavery patrol, took the initiative and raised 300 Zanzibaris 
to combat the slavers5. In 1878 he became Brigadier General 
in charge of a new army under the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
Gradually his force expanded and was reorganised under the 
command of Captain G. P. Hatch when Mathews became First 
Minister to the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
In 1893 Sir Gerald Portal was sent to inquire into the 
commercial viability of the Imperial British East Africa 
Company's activities in Buganda and the current political 
situation there. To escort him on his journey into the 
interior he took a group of Hatch's Zanzibaris. They led 
him through Kamba and Kikuyu territory, the prairies of 
the Masai and northern Kavirondo. Originally Portal had 
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admired Hatch's work in disciplining and organising the 
Zanzibaris but he soon changed his mind and replaced them 
with Sudanese, recruited by Captain Lugard, when he reached 
Uganda. The Sudanese remained very popular as soldiers 
throughout the history of the KAR. Portal also expressed 
his horror at the defence arrangements for the Company's 
up-country stations where troops were enlisted on an ad 
hoc basis, if at all. At a Company base at Machako's in 
March 1894, the Company representative, John Ainsworth 
gained Company permission to raise Kamba to protect his 
activities from the Kikuyu and Masai. The Kamba were to 
dominate the ranks of the KAR's Northern Brigade in future 
years. 
The following year the Company surrendered its rights, find- 
ing the extent of its obligations too vast. The British 
government then took over the Protectorate of Buganda and 
in due course extended the Protectorate to cover all the 
East African territory from Buganda westward, northward 
and eastward to the coast. This was done in most instances 
without any formal agreement between Britain and the people 
of the region which was now the Protectorate of British 
East Africa because there was no African political structure 
formal enough to provide chiefs with whom negotiations could 
be conducted. It was also deemed a matter of urgency that 
Britain should assume responsibility for the territory which 
linked the Lake Victoria region to the coast to ensure a 
link with areas of strategic interest in the interior. 
At the time of the establishment of the Protectorate, the 
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British East Africa Company's troops numbered 866 of which 
6 255 were Sudanese. Arthur Hardinge, the new Commissioner 
of the Protectorate, formed these into a single unit with 
Hatch as Commandant, to be known as the East African Rifles. 
Their HQ was at Mombasa. During the reorganisation the 
Indian troops were dispensed with but the Sudanese remained. 
Hardinge was keen to recruit more Sudanese but the Khedive 
of Egypt objected to his subjects giving their allegiance 
to a foreign power in such numbers. 
Following the successful use of the Aden Camel Corps in 
punitive expeditions in Jubaland in 1901, the East African 
Rifles acquired its own Camel Company, able to travel 50 
miles a day without water. In 1902 the Camel Company and 
seven infantry companies of the East African Rifles became 
the Third Battalion of the KAR. 
The Fourth and Fifth Battalions of the KAR were formerly 
the African and Indian battalions of the Uganda Rifles. 
This Regiment's history begins with the expedition of Captain 
F. D. Lugard to the Kingdom of Buganda in 1890. 
Lugard left Mombasa in August of that year with seventy 
Sudanese soldiers recruited in Egypt by Captain W. H. Williams, 
to serve the British East Africa Company. On arrival in 
Buganda in December 1890, Lugard had 50 men left, armed 
with rifles and a single maxim gun with eleven rounds of 
ammunition7. To add to the insecurity of his position, 
Lugard had poor lines of communication with Mombasa and 
lacked specific directives from the British East Africa 
Company. The Kingdom of Buganda was in an unstable state 
11 
at that time and the restoration of the recently-exiled Mwanga 
as Kabaka only served to exacerbate the situation. During 
this period in power up to 1888, Mwanga had harshly persecuted 
Chritian and Moslem alike. A rebellion against him in 1888 
caused him to flee the country and in his absence, first a 
Moslem, then a pagan faction became dominant. Following the 
murder of his younger brother and successor as Kabaka, Mwanga 
turned to the French Roman Catholic missionaries stationed 
at Bukumbi. The French White Fathers believed that the rest- 
oration of Mwanga would bring stability to Buganda and along 
with the more hesitant Anglicans, pledged him their support. 
On his restoration Roman Catholics gained considerable influ- 
ence in Buganda, but the Anglicans remained resentful. The 
Moslems, too, were looking for an opportunity to return to 
power and mutual fear of the Moslems, who had taken refuge 
in Bunyoro, was one factor which kept the increasing friction 
between the two Christian missions under control. 
Lugard's position at Mwanga's capital was uncertain. At one 
stage during his exile, Mwanga had made contact with a British 
East African Company expedition to Kavirondo, led by F. J. 
Jackson and Ernest Gedge8. By the time Jackson was aware 
of Mwanga's plea for help in his restoration, it had already 
been accomplished. Under an obligation to the French Fathers, 
Mwanga complied with their request to sign an agreement 
with Lugard. The treaty was very fragile and meanwhile, 
the Moslems were preparing an attack on Buganda from Bunyoro. 
Lugard realised he needed a force of his own to establish 
order and give him status and recognition in Buganda. Without 
military backing he was powerless to establish a safe trade 
route through Mwanga's territory, for the ivory from Toro, 
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Bunyoro and the Upper Congo. 
On 31st January 1891, Lugard received reinforcements of 
75 Sudanese soldiers and 100 Swahili porters under the command 
of Captain Williams. This gave him the temporary respite 
he needed to recruit more troops. Lugard's first move was 
to rally the Christians of Buganda against their common 
enemy, the Moslems, and their ally, Kabarega of Bunyoro. 
The consequent defeat of the Moslems freed Williams to man 
the fort at Kampala in Buganda while Lugard went West in 
search of an independent military force. 
After the rebellion of the Mahdi, Egyptian power in the 
Southern Sudan declined. Its only vestiges were the positions 
held by Emin Pasha, Egypt's representative in her one-time 
Equatorial Province. An expedition under the explorer and 
journalist, Henry Stanley, had gone to relieve Emin Pasha 
who was clinging precariously to his position on the Albert 
Nile. Abandoned by the Khedive, Emin Pasha, after accompany- 
ing Stanley to the east coast, took service with the Germans 
who were beginning to take an interest in the region. Some 
of his troops also went with Stanley to the coast. It was 
Emin's Sudanese troops who had not joined Stanley but had 
stayed behind at Kavalli's, near Lake Albert, that Lugard 
hoped to recruit into the service of the British East Africa 
Company. They had the reputation of being the finest 
soldiers in Africa and they were to become the founder 
members of a Regiment which rated highly the belief in the 
warrior traditions of its members. 
Lugard met Selim Bey9, the leader of the Sudanese, at Kavalli's. 
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Initially Selim Bey protested that his men could not serve 
Lugard without the consent of the Khedive of Egypt, but 
until that consent arrived Selim Bey agreed to ally himself 
with Lugard. As in later years, the Sudanese only paid 
lip-service to their status as subjects of the Khedive. 
They were not reluctant to give their allegiance elsewhere 
and were to become renowned for their loyalty to the King's 
African Rifles. 
Although Emin Pasha's troops had earned themselves a reputa- 
tion as good soldiers, the Sudanese at Kavalli's were dis- 
organised and encumbered with families and possessions. 
Lugard visualised an efficiently run force of some 500 men 
to accomplish his aims in Buganda. He left Kavalli's with 
an entourage of nearly 9,000 men, women and children. 
As Lugard returned south he stationed the Sudanese in new 
forts along the route. In doing this he aimed to protect 
the Kingdom of Toro from the menace of Kabarega of Bunyoro. 
Lugard had backed the restoration of Kasagama to the throne 
of Toro with the dual purpose of thwarting Kabarega's 
ambitions in that area and advancing those of the British 
East Africa Company. Though the Sudanese proceeded to 
create their own troubles for Toro, Lugard had succeeded 
in opening up a safe trade route to the West. He had also 
armed himself with the personal means to impose civil order 
in Uganda even if the aims of the Company remained nebulous. 
On his return he was able to put a stop to the faction 
fighting, to ally himself with the Protestants and to 
persuade Mwanga to sign an agreement dividing the administration 
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of Buganda between the Protestants and Catholics. The 
Moslems were also temporarily pacified and Lugard felt 
safe to leave for England. Although there were criticisms 
of Lugard's political methods and the behaviour of his 
troops, he had provided the nucleus from which a proper 
armed force could be expanded to serve British interests 
in Buganda and the surrounding areas. When Portal, the 
British Commissioner appointed to inquire into events in 
Buganda, arrived there in 1893, he was able to enlist some 
of Lugard's Sudanese directly into British service. Those 
who remained unenlisted were in an anomalous position and 
so was their leader Selim Bey, whom the British suspected 
of conspiring with the Moslems. When civil war did break 
out again in Buganda in 1897, the Sudanese did not side 
with the Moslems and the treatment of Selim Bey seemed 
somewhat harsh in retrospect. The Moslems were once more 
defeated and the Sudanese forces were reorganised to include 
those from the forts established by Lugard, men who had 
previously been unenlisted. 
In 1893 the British East Africa Company was preparing to 
withdraw from Buganda because it was unable to find suffici- 
ent financial incentives to enable its presence to continue. 
Following Portal's recommendations, the British government 
planned to proclaim a Protectorate over Buganda and its 
provinces to counter Arab ambitions in the African interior. 
Before the Protectorate was announced, a series of wars 
during the period 1893 to 1895 led to the extension of 
Buganda's original boundaries. In June 1894 a formal 
Protectorate was declared over Buganda and this was extended 
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to include Bunyoro in June 1896. On 1st September 1895 
Uganda's Sudanese soldiers were organised into a Regiment 
of 17 companies to be known as the 'Uganda Rifles'. This 
10 
was the first attempt to formalise the troops of the new 
Protectorate. 
The future of the 'Uganda Rifles' was not to be without 
its troubles, not least the Uganda mutiny of 1897. After 
the mutiny began the tradition of mixing the tribes within 
the battalions; a custom which was to continue in 4KAR and 
5KAR, the Uganda Rifles' successors in the King's African 
Rifles. The idea was to prevent any one group becoming 
too dominant as the Sudanese had become in Uganda's military 
forces during the 1890s. After 1897 the authorities enlisted 
an Indian contingent and also extended their recruitment 
of local peoples, who were thought to be particularly suitable 
for soldiering. The Uganda Rifles was the largest of the 
KAR's original Regiments although it served a smaller area 
than the East African Regiment. However, it had to deal 
with incessant internal strife and the territory's problems 
did not cease with the establishment of the British Protect- 
orate. The Uganda Rifles' domestic commitments meant that, 
unlike the Central African Regiment and the East African 
Regiment, it was not called upon to serve abroad. 
In 1902, when the KAR was formed, the Uganda Rifles' nine 
companies of Africans became 14KAR and its four companies 
of Indians became 5KAR. Centralised control of military 
forces in East Africa came about in 1902 following a similar 
move in West Africa. In 1901 West African forces from the 
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various territor}es were merged into the Royal West Africa 
Frontier Force (RWAFF). A summary of the five battalions 








3 EA R 
the African Uganda Rifles 
the Indian Uganda Rifles 
There were also plans to form a Sixth Somaliland battalion 
from the three infantry companies, Camel Corps, militia and 
mounted infantry of the local forces in British Somaliland 
but these plans were postponed. 
It was intended that financial support for the new Regiment 
should come from the countries it served but in the event 
Britain had to make extra money available. The KAR expanded 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. Lieutenant 
W. H. Manning produced the first Inspector General's report 
on the KAR in 1902. He noted the enthusiasm of the Yao and 
Ntonga in Central Africa and the high rate of re-engagement 
of NCOs from Nyasaland. Many began to replace Sikhs as drill 
officers. An experiment to recruit Ngoni in 1903 was success- 
ful and training of signallers also began in that year. 
The large number of Sudanese in 3KAR were gradually replaced 
by Kenyan Africans, including a controversial Masai Company 
which had to be disbanded in 1907. 
Despite the popularity of the KAR, it was largely unprepared 
for the event of war. In 1911 2KAR had to be disbanded in 
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the interests of economy and the establishment of the Regiment 
reached a record low point. In 1912 the remaining Indian 
contingents were withdrawn from East Africa and steps were 
taken to increase the recruitment of Africans to cover this 
loss. By 1913 the policy of cutting back the Regiment was 
reversed and the Nyasaland forces were once more strengthened. 
During the First World War, the KAR came under the control 
of the War Office and was expanded. A Signal Company and 
nineteen new infantry battalions were formed. This included 
the formation of 6KAR, not from Somaliland troops but from 
Tanganyikan Africans after the lengthy and hard-fought East 
African campaign had resulted in the defeat of the Germans 
in East Africa. In 1917 at Morogoro in former German East 
Africa, the KAR began to recruit men who had once been subjects 
of their enemy. The Sixth Battalion was formed partly from 
recruits originally intended for extra battalions of 3KAR 
and partly from experienced ex-enemy askaris in the prisoner 
of war camps. This explains how some Tanganyikan Africans 
were able to have fought in both World Wars, in the first 
for the Germans and in the second for the British. 
When the First World War was over, further reorganisation 
of the KAR took place. Responsibility for the Regiment was 
once more transferred to the Colonial Office and the War 
Office relinquished its war-time control of the Empire's 
forces. Garrisons were retained in the newly conquered 
Tanganyika Territory which became a British mandate after 
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The KAR continued to have 
an internal role subduing tribal unrest in Kenya's Northern 
18 
Frontier District and in British Somaliland. Economies and 
reductions were made but after demobilisation the KAR still 
had six battalions with a total of 25 infantry companies. 
Financial stringency in the 1920s prevented such an establish- 
ment being maintained and further reductions had to be made 
in the interests of economy. In Kenya there were few tasks 
of a military nature to be undertaken apart from the trouble- 
some Northern Frontier District which required further fort- 
ification after the cession of Jubaland to the Italians in 
192511. Tanganyika proved surprisingly quiet, and fortunately 
for the British, less troops were needed to hold the former 
German territory than had been anticipated. Tanganyika was 
divided into two areas for military administration; 6KAR, 
the locally raised battalion, was given responsibility for 
the coastal district, and the two Nyasaland battalions took 
alternating service in the interior. In 1923 the KAR was 
relieved of its commitments in Zanzibar, where troops from 
3KAR and 5KAR had been stationed, and the Zanzibar police 
force assumed control of the island's military matters. In 
Nyasaland, the KAR flourished in the 1920s. Annual marches 
and field exercises were a regular feature and roused the 
enthusiasm of the local people in the many areas visited. 
This tradition was to be revived in a new form during the 
latter years of the Second World War, as an aid to recruit- 
ment. 
Uganda too, remained comparatively peaceful in the 1920s. 
As in Kenya, troops were stationed by platoons in different 
parts of the country. 
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By 1928 a KAR reserve of officers (KARRO) had been formed 
in all territories and the Somaliland Camel Corps had been 
brought under the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of 
the KAR. A year later a complete reorganisation of the KAR 
took place to try to lessen the impact of severe financial 
cutbacks caused by the economic disaster which first hit 
America, then Britain and then her colonies. The KAR was 
divided into two brigades: a Northern Brigade to be based 
in Nairobi and a Southern Brigade to be based in Dar es Salaam. 
Each brigade had three battalions and a Signals Section. 
A Supply and Transport Corps was also created. The Northern 
Brigade consisted of 3KAR, 14KAR and 5KAR and the Southern 
of 1KAR, 2KAR and 6KAR. 
In September 1931 the establishments of the battalions were 
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reduced and by 1933 the Regiment had a total of 2,400 men. 
This was the state of affairs as war became increasingly 
likely in the late 1930s. In 1936 the Italians invaded Aby- 
ssinia with Hitler's approval and threatened to create an 
empire between Kenya, the Sudan and British Somaliland. 
British East Africa was in a potentially precarious situation. 
Cuts in civil administration within East Africa meant that 
the KAR had to assist the police in their role. From 1936 
their task was made increasingly difficult because of the 
influx of bandits and refugees crossing the border into Kenya 
from Abyssinia. Locust control, famine relief and roadmaking 
were among the peace-time tasks of the battalions of the 
Southern Brigade. While coping with internal matters, the 
KAR's resources had to stretch to meet a potential Italian 
invasion and 1KAR was moved to British Somaliland to support 
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the Camel Corps if the need arose. It was apparent that 
the force would have to be expanded and in 1936 the East 
African forces came under review as part of the overall defence 
programme of the British Empire. 
In the face of a potential external threat it became nec- 
essary to make the employment of KAR forces for internal 
security purposes a secondary concern. Tanganyika was except- 
ed because of the presence of Germans with pro-Nazi sympathies. 
There were three main areas of priority; Kenya's Northern 
Frontier District, the coastline and Tanganyika. To begin 
with, these were the places where the authorities expected 
difficulties and troops were deployed accordingly. 
The serious deficiencies of the KAR for anything other than 
normal internal security duties were pointed out by Major 
General G. J. Giffard who was appointed Inspector-General 
of African Forces in 1936. The Regiment was short of men 
and equipment. In addition, the part-time or territorial 
units were generally under-manned and in Nyasaland were non- 
existent. Although the KARRO had expanded in. Kenya it had 
been reduced in Uganda. Apart from the Coast Defence Unit 
at Mombasa, there was no artillery. There was no airforce 
and no navy. Heavy Vickers guns were gradually being replaced 
by Bren guns, but financial limitations meant that the KAR 
was destined to remain primarily an infantry force. It would 
consist of African askaris under British leadership and 
mechanisation would be minimal. Men had fewer machines to 
fight with in Africa because it had always been thought that 
large resources of manpower would compensate for a lack of 
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sophisticated weaponry. In any case, at that stage few 
Africans were thought capable of handling complicated equip- 
ment or carrying out skilled tasks. The only specialised 
sections were the Signals, the Coast Defence Unit and the 
Supply and Transport Corps. Giffard's review of East African 
forces revealed these inadequacies and provided the basis 
for change and expansion. 
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Giffard decided on two types of battalion; first-line bat- 
talions of full strength and cadre battalions with lower 
establishments which would serve as nuclei for expansion. 
The latter were to absorb and train reservists in the event 
of war. The initial role of the first-line battalions would 
be the defence of Kenya. As this task would involve the 
Uganda battalion, 24KAR, a further battalion was formed to 
safeguard the internal security of Uganda. This was 7KAR, 
a territorial battalion with headquarters at Bombo. A Coast 
Defence Rifle Company was also formed in 1938 from reservists 
and the Signals Sections were expanded. 
By October 1939 nearly all Giffard's plans for the KAR had 
been put into effect and the Regiment's total strength had 
risken to 517 British officers, 1,020 British other ranks 
and 11,091 Africans 
14. In 1933 the total strength of the 
Regiment had been 2,400 men including British and African 
ranks. In six years it had grown considerably in preparation 
for war. In the next six years it was to expand even more. 
In May 1945 there were 46,050 East African troops in Asia, 
30,000 in the Middle East and 150,000 in the Home-Command15. 
Between October 1939 and May 1945 the KAR increased its 
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manpower by nearly a quarter of a million. Such rapid and 
massive expansion had an effect on the African populations 
from which the askaris were recruited. The troops made a 
useful contribution to the Allied victory in the Second World 
War in various fields of conflict - in Abyssinia, North Africa 
and the Middle East, and in Madagascar and Burma. That con- 
tribution has subsequently been ignored or understated as 
has that of black troops from other parts of the British 
Empire, notably West Africa, the High Commission Territories 
and the West Indies. At the time, their role in the war 
effort was simply taken for granted in Britain. 
A Regiment whose origins were associated with the recruitment 
of a motley band of Sudanese to-add authority to Lugard's 
activities in Buganda, grew in size and importance to fight 
outside the continent of Africa and to play a significant 
part in a World War. 
2j 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE FIRST PHASE OF RECRUITMENT 1939 TO 1941 
In the months following the Munich settlement it became 
increasingly apparent that Hitler was not to be restrained 
by Western protests. Before appeasement was abandoned in 
the face of a Nazi threat to Poland, British forces had the 
chance to reorganize, expand, rearm and train. In East 
Africa the KAR had time to prepare to meet an Italian invasion 
from. Abyssinia in the event of Mussolini joining in the war 
on the side of Hitler. The British government had displayed 
little interest in the East African territories during the 
1930s and had accepted the Italian conquest of Abyssinia 
in the Hoare-Laval pact of 1936. Chamberlain's appeasement 
policy had gone to such lengths that colonials in East Africa 
even feared that Tanganyika might be returned to Germany, 
as Hitler demanded. On the abandonment of these policies 
in September 1939, the British colonies were now expected 
to make a full contribution to the Empire's war effort. 
Their precise role was not indicated. The government in 
Whitehall and the military authorities in the War Office, 
hesitated to define their demands because long term strategies 
could only be determined as the war progressed. A loosely- 
stated policy had the advantage of being easily reversed 
and less vulnerable to criticism. Moreover, the political 
activities of the Congress Party in India were an irritation 
which, it was feared, might well spread to Africa, so the 
British government preferred to tread cautiously. East Africa 
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had its own Indian population particularly in Kenya and 
Tanganyika. Although relations between the Indian and indig- 
enous communities were not altogether harmonious, there was 
the possibility that Indians might become infected with anti 
British beliefs and pass these on to Africans. Gandhi's 
Satyagraha was well publicised in Tanganyika in the Tanganyika 
Herald. Critics of the British Empire might also criticise 
the use of African troops to fight a war for freedom and 
self determination when no concessions were being made to 
African participation in government. It was safer therefore, 
for the British to pursue a vague policy regarding the use 
of African manpower, for the time being. 
In 1939 there were three areas where African efforts were 
needed; in the armed forces, in producing food on their own 
farms and as a labour force. The labour force was required 
to work the European owned farms, estates and plantations 
and by the military authorities to do vital back-up work 
for the troops. 
In Kenya the situation was especially controversial. The 
Governor of Kenya urged that Kenya's part in the Imperial 
war effort should be one of food production. His request 
reflected the viewpoint of the white farmer settlers who 
were well represented in Kenya's Legislative Council. Farming 
remained the prime commitment of many whose forebears had 
been pioneer settlers. Although white Kenyans felt some 
affinity with Britain many were reluctant to leave their 
farms to fight a war in Europe. It was considered dangerous 
to leave wives in charge of farms. In the remoter districts 
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the police force was inadequate and Europeans took the law 
into their own hands to try and curb the criminal tendencies 
of the local population. On some farms it was thought women 
1 
might have difficulties in getting sufficient work out of 
the labour force. The Kenyan settler farmers also feared 
that all their best workers might enlist in the armed forces. 
Their most important consideration, however, was an economic 
one. If Kenya were selected to provide food for the war 
effort, they would have access to a world market and would 
be able to export their produce profitably. 
On April 14th 1939, the Goveror of Kenya spoke to the Legis- 
lative Council; 
'Wars are won, not only by using a rifle in the 
firing line but by keeping up the supply of food and material. ' 
1 
Military requirements would have a detrimental effect on 
the productive capacity of the colony especially if the best 
agricultural officers went into the army. When war approached 
in 1939 the Kenyan farmers were left to wait and see what 
emphasis would be placed on the military recruitment of both 
European and African manpower in the colony.. In the other 
East African territories, general rather than specific instruc- 
tions were given regarding the full contribution to be made 
to the Empire's war effort. In response, military authorities 
welcomed volunteers into the KAR and civil authorities 
encouraged African war gifts. A spontaneous gesture came 
from the Chagga tribe of Moshi, Tanganyika, who offered a 
proportion of their harvest to the war effort. It was their 
custom for those at home to send food to warriors and their 
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contribution was duly distributed among the African ranks 
of the KAR at Moshi. 
2 
During the 1930s British policies towards East Africa had 
sometimes been vague, indecisive and indifferent. A variety 
of civil and military authorities affected East Africa. 
The main civil authorities comprised the Colonial Office, 
the Governors of the East African territories and their Pro- 
vincial and District administrators. The hierarchy of 
military authorities comprised the Army Council, the War 
Office, Middle East Comman, GOCEA - (General Officer Commanding 
East African Forces) and other military officers within East 
Africa itself. In 1939 it was necessary to clarify the 
responsibilities of these individuals and bodies and to dele- 
gate emergency powers. A complicated but apparently effective 
decision-making process evolved. 
In September 1939, control of British forces in East Africa 
was transferred from the Colonial Office to the War Office. 
In future any amendments to the Field Service Manual, African 
Forces, 3 had to be endorsed by both the Army Council and 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies so that although 
the War Office had overall control, it still had to consult 
with the civil authority before passing new legislation affect- 
ing African forces. The Secretary of State for the Colonies 
also had the right to sanction or refuse financial demands 
from the colonies. This was despite the official War Office 
financial responsibility for military expenditure to cover 
the pay and allowances of personnel and capital expenditure 
on accommodation and military works. The East African civil 
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governments were to pay pensions and gratuities, cover the 
cost of their own naval and civil defence and make a contri- 
bution to His Majesty's Government's defence budget. 
The Governors of the East African territories were granted 
the power to recruit Africans and form new units because 
the needs of the military situation were more readily under- 
stood by the men on the spot. Officials in Westminster had 
more pressing needs to attend to. The Governors might dele- 
gate their recruiting powers as they saw fit. Thus the major 
policy decisions were made in London but their detailed 
implementation was left to the authorities in Africa. 
Requests and suggestions made by the Governors and the KAR 
to the British government were usually approved, though often 
with the proviso that the East African governments must meet 
a proportion of the costs themselves. For example, in Sept- 
ember 1939 the Secretary of State for the Colonies gave his 
approval to the request of the Governor of Kenya to bring 
3KAR up to full strength but sanctioned a treasury advance 
to cover costs of mobilisation only. 
5 Recurrent costs had 
to come from the Kenyan budget. All such requests were 
referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies via the 
Army Council, and because of the power of the Governors to 
delegate, the requests originated from the military authority, 
GOCEA. 
Later in the war when the KAR was expanding more rapidly 
a Military Units Ordinance (1942) gave further details of 
the Governors' responsibilities. He was to have control 
over any units established or present within his territory 
co 
and was to determine pay, allowances, rations, terms of ser- 
vice, gratuities, the appointment and promotion of officers 
and the suspension of members from units. He also had the 
right of delegation of these powers. 
6 
Despite the co-ordinating role of the Governor of Kenya, 
through whom all requests were framed from the outset of 
the war, negotiations were lengthy and the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies was often tardy in replying. Thus the GOCEA 
was forced at times to act before an official reply had been 
received, on the assumption that London would comply, as 
it usually did. Provided the colonies caused no problems, 
did not cost too much and helped to win the war, Britain 
was content not to be involved in the intricacies of the 
recruitment of East Africans to the KAR. 
There were three major phases of recruitment in East Africa 
during the Second World War. Each phase was designed to 
meet specific needs. The initial recruiting period in East 
Africa, from 1939 to 1941, was for the defence of Kenya and 
the East African campaign. During this phase the most rapid 
expansion took place in 1940. 
In June 1939, while the British were unsuccessfully attempting 
to negotiate An Anglo-Soviet alliance to defend Poland, the 
East African Governors' conference met at Dares Salaam. 
Permission was given, by the Governors, for Giffard's defence 
plans, first submitted in 1936 and first implemented in 1938, 
to continue to go ahead. It was decided that, on the outbreak 
of war, the Northern Brigade of the KAR should become the 
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1st East African infantry Brigade and the Southern Brigade 
should become the 2nd East African infantry Brigade, ready 
to mobilise within a month of the outbreak of war. It was 
agreed that there should be cross-posting of battalions with- 
in the brigades and that a central headquarters for East 
African forces should be established. It was noted that 
the battalions which Giffard had designated first line bat- 
talions, were already up to strength and that the commander 
of the Southern Brigade had completed the arrangements to 
form two new battalions; 2/2KAR and 2/6KAR, 2KAR and 6KAR 
having been designated as cadre battalions based at Zomba 
and Dar es Salaam respectively. The reserve battalions, 
at this stage, were under strength. However, two new units 
had been formed; the territorial Uganda battalion, 7KAR, 
for Uganda's internal security if 4KAR were needed in Kenya's 
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Having set up a war time decision-making process and have 
reorganised the KAR in good time, the Regiment was well 
prepared for the first major military exercise of the war, 
to round up and intern the 3,205 Germans, resident in Tang- 
anyika, 1,858 of whom were male. 
8 
In 1931 there had been 
only 400 German farmers in Tanganyika and the more recent 
arrivals were a serious threat to the British Governor and 
his administration. Nazi propaganda had encouraged German 
settlement in Africa and General Ritter von Epp, Chief of 
the German Colonial League, explained that other countries 
would have to sacrifice a share of their own Empires so that 
Germany could receive a larger colonial domain. 
9 A series 
of films was being shown in Germany during May 1939, entitled 
German Land in Africa. These demands made Britain more 
anxious to guard Tanganyika which was an important link be- 
tween Britain's dependencies in north-eastern and in central 
and southern Africa, and because of its sisal and cotton 
resources. British settlers need no longer fear abandon- 
ment, as they had done in the 1930s. War with Germany 
increased the significance of Tanganyika to Britain. 
Air raid practices took place in Dar es Salaam and 'black 
out' arrangements were made in April and August 1939. These 
preparations and the recall of all officers of 2KAR from 
leave in August 1939, suggest that war was a real and immediate 
threat to Tanganyika. At the same time the KAR had to deal 
with civil disorder at Tanga, which had been a permanent 
military station since April 1938. In August 1939 two KAR 
platoons were called in to deal with a labour strike and 
looting in the native quarters. The infantry fired to 
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disperse the crowd and a further company of soldiers moved 
from Moshi to Tanga. 10 With a substantial German pop- 
ulation, some of whom belonged to the extremist German 
Colonial League, the escalation of civil disorder was not un- 
likely. It was essential that the King's African Rifles 
should be prepared. 
On August 22nd all units were notified to 'stand by'. On 
August 26th they were mobilised. On September 3rd the 'War 
with Germany' telegram was received and the arrests of 
Tanganyika's aliens began. 
11 The other East African terri- 
tories had a longer breathing space. Such an extensive 
internal operation had never previously been undertaken by 
the KAR and Tanganyika was the largest of the territories 
it served. Only 14 Germans escaped arrest and the rest were 
escorted to Dar, es Salaam to be interned. Headquarters 
and 'A' Company of 2KAR were based in Mbeya province for 
the operation and 'D' Company of 6KAR in Iringa province. 
The plan was carried out swiftly and successfully and was 
aided by the non-resistance of the Germans who foresaw a 
speedy Nazi victory and had therefore been advised by their 
leaders to co-operate. Within a week of the outbreak of 
war there was no further threat of disturbance from within 
Tanganyika. The efficiency of the internment programme was 
thought to have impressed the African population, many of 
whom expected an imminent re-occupation of the Territory 
by the Germans. This strengthened morale in Tanganyika and 
the KAR was now free to concentrate on the defence of East 
Africa. By this stage, the small number of aliens in the 
other territories had also been rounded up and interned. 
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The use of East African troops outside East Africa had been 
discussed but no decisions regarding the future role of the 
KAR had been reached. However, provision was made for troops 
to serve outside their own country but within East Africa, 
as had already been the practice of the two Nyasaland Bat- 
talions which served alternately in Tanganyika. 
The Northern Brigade took up positions in the Northern Front- 
ier District of Kenya. The two First Line. battalions to 
be used were 4KAR, less 'A' Company in Turkana, and 5KAR. 
The third battalion remained in reserve in Nairobi, training 
and recruiting to the full strength of a 'First Line' bat- 
talion. The Southern Brigade was able to leave Tanganyika 
and undertook training at Namanga in October before going 
to Nanyuki to guard the western section of Kenya's N. F. D. 
So far the posting of units went smoothly and the speed and 
sequence of events did not disrupt the expansion of the 
KAR. 
East Africa, like Europe, had its own 'phoney war' after 
the initial panic to maintain order in Tanganyika was over. 
While French troops patrolled the Maginotline, waiting for 
something to happen, Africans patrolled the Kenyan border 
with Italian East Africa, waiting to see what the Italians 
would do next. Italian neutrality made it possible for the 
KAR to have a breathing space and to embark on an intensive 
training programme. The Regiment also had valuable time 
in which to speed up its recruitment of infantry and to ex- 
pand its barely adequate ancillary services and mechanised 
units. 
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The 1st East African Light Battery was formed on 21st Sept- 
ember 1939, shortly after the arrival of the 22nd Mountain 
Battery from India. This was the first mobile artillery 
unit to be raised in East Africa and was placed under the 
command of Major W. W. Mackinlay R. A. at Mbagathi. The unit 
consisted of 38 British N. C. Os from the Kenya Regiment, a 
section of Africans from the Coast Defence Battery (the only 
unit previously to use artillery) and a section each from 
1KAR and 2KAR: The Light Battery trained with the 22nd Mount- 
ain Battery from India on 3.7 inch howitzers. 
The East African Reconnaissance Squadron12 was also formed 
in 1939 and as there were no armoured cars, the unit operated 
with Ford one ton pick-up trucks with open backs and a machine 
gun in the cab. The Squadron was divided into three sec- 
tions, each of which had just two trucks. Improvisation 
characterised East African units at this stage when severe 
shortages of equipment existed. 
Other ancillary units legalised by military ordinance during 
the later months of 1939 comprised; the 1st Field Survey 
Company of East African Engineers, 1st Field Company of East 
African Engineers, the East Africa Army Service Corps, the 
East Africa Medical Corps, the East Africa Pay Corps, a 
Military Audit Unit, the 1st Donkey Company of East African 
Pack Transport Corps, the 1st Battalion East African Pioneers 
and the 2nd Battalion East 'African Pioneers. 
13 The Pioneers 
were recruited to maintain and improve the unmetalled roads 
of the forward area. 
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In November 1939, with the agreement of the Governor of Kenya, 
it was decided to reorganise 3KAR as a machine gun battalion 
by withdrawing the machine gun platoons from the other bat- 
talions. They were armed with Bren guns which replaced the 
heavier Vickers guns. 
Alongside the rapid development of the mechanised and auxiliary 
units, the infantry expanded and reorganised. In October 
1939, plans were laid for the creation of a Colonial Divi- 
sion by Brigadier D. P. Dickinson, Inspector General of the 
KAR. It was envisaged that the KAR and RWAFF would contri- 
bute units to the Division, a formation which would serve 
both within and outside the African continent. Those units 
selected as components of the Division were 1KAR, 14KAR, 5KAR 
and a machine gun company of 3KAR. Of these units, three 
had already been designated first line battalions by Giffard. 
In October 1939 the use of the Colonial Division was fore- 
seen as being in Iraq, Iran, Aden, Somaliland and Abyssinia. 
The responsibility for the defence of Kenya would then de- 
volve onto 1/6KAR, 2/6 KAR and 7KAR. If necessary, another 
brigade for the defence of Kenya would be made available 
from the RWAFF. 
The Italians were thought to have nearly a quarter of a 
million men in Abyssinia in September 1939.14 The KAR needed 
infantry to defend Kenya in the event of an Italian invasion. 
To prepare to meet this onslaught, methods of recruitment 
were used which had proved effective before the war. Because 
they continued to meet with success they were used throughout 
the first phase of recruitment from 1939 to 1941. Quotas 
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were allotted to individual areas or to particular tribes 
and notification of a recruiting safari was sent to the 
chiefs, via the District Commissioners. A centre was chosen 
where the chiefs were expected to send those men they thought 
suitable for army life. The recruiting safari 'team' usually 
included a white recruiting officer and sergeant and often 
an African N. C. O. from the area where recruitment was to 
take place. Sometimes civil officials took honorary military 
rank for the duration of the recruiting campaign and searched 
the remoter districts for potential recruits. On one safari 
in Nyasaland, in 1940, the local commissioner of police lent 
four African sergeants, who had previously served as N. C. Os 
in the KAR, to help with recruiting. 
15 A medical officer 
or doctor usually accompanied a safari. 
When the would-be soldiers came into the base they were 
medically examined and given a simple physical fitness test 
such as running or jumping over a fence. Keen eyesight and 
the ability to close one eye independently of the other were 
prerequisites for all recruits. Many Africans suffered 
from poor eyesight, possibly due to malnutrition, and a large 
proportion of recruits were rejected on these grounds alone. 
Those with sight defects could hardly make effective use 
of a rifle. Right forefingers (trigger fingers) were also 
checked but at least one eager recruit, in this case with 
a missing finger, slipped through the net and learned to 
fire his rifle with his middle finger instead. 
16 Men aged 
18 to 45 and over 5'8" in height were eligible, although 
shorter men were accepted from certain tribes, particularly 
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in Nyasaland. Good general physique was essential and un- 
suitable men were rejected after a preliminary examination, 
or at a later stage when they were more thoroughly tested. 
Evidence for this is found in the KAR War Diary for the Train- 
ing Centre at Jinja from which the following extracts are 
taken: 
16 July 1940 9 Nubi recruits arrived from Lira - 
1 medically unfit. 
20 July 1940 18 Nubi recruits arrived -1 medically 
unfit. 
25 July 1940 3 Wakamba and 13 Acholi discharged as 
medically unfit. 
26 July 1940 23 Acholi arrived from Kitgum of whom 
8 were medically unfit. 
29 July 1940 26 recruits discharged as medically 
unfit. 17 
On a recruiting safari, shortly after the outbreak of war, 
to the Mount Elgon region in Uganda, enough Sebei volunteered 
for it to be possible to select only one in ten, after two 
medical examinations. 
18 Though this was an indication of 
the extent to which the KAR could afford to pick and choose, 
many volunteers were turned down on health grounds. Major 
R. D. West of 4KAR recalled that some recruits had to be 
rejected because scar tissue on their feet meant that they 
could not wear boots. 
19 
Although Major General Giffard's Report on the Northern Brig- 
ade at the end of 1938 praised the 'excellent physique' of 
the recruits, the actual health statistics were less promis- 
ing. The Brigadier of the Northern Brigade reported; 
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Average daily strength 
Average daily sick 
Number of deaths 
Admissions to hospital 
(including V. D. ) 
1528 
35.24 
12 (all due to Lobar 
pneumonia) 
866 
V. D. Number of fresh cases 115 
V. D. Number of relapses 84 
V. D. Number of men 
affected 199 
Total number of days of 1707 duty lost through V. D. 
Well might the Brigadier conclude that V. D. was the chief 
source of inefficiency. 
20 Cases of the disease were not 
always obvious among new recruits but anyway it is more likely 
that they contracted it after leaving their homes and families 
to join the KAR. Venereal disease affected a significant 
proportion of the Northern Brigade during 1938 but so did 
other illnesses. Even allowing for the fact that individual 
men might have been. admitted to hospital more than once in 
that year, an alarming 866 admissions were recorded, suggest- 
ing that perhaps half the Brigade needed hospital treatment 
at sometime during 1938. If this was the state of health 
of those already in the Regiment, it was a poor reflection 
on those who had been discharged as medically unfit. 
In addition to the traditional methods of recruitment, a 
variety of new ideas were put into effect. The recruiting 
authorities kept in close touch with African Secondary schools. 
Although the infantry required physical strength rather than 
academic qualifications, promising youngsters with some level 
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of literacy and numeracy were needed for skilled tasks. 
For example, Brigadier C. H. Stoneley21 of the Northern Brig- 
ade's Signal Section kept in touch with the headmaster of 
the government school in Machakos and visited the school 
a few months before he needed a new batch of recruits. 
Stoneley was able to select the best candidates to attend 
his small Signal School in Nairobi, boys who were almost 
exclusively Kamba. Stoneley had a pool of twenty young 
trainees at any one time who were posted to signal detachments 
for field experience after their initial training at the 
school. Lieutenant Colonel H. P. L. Glass, 
22 
who served with 
2KAR from 1937 to 1940, commented that the mission boys of 
above average intelligence tended to go into the Signals, 
mortar platoons or become drivers. Other educated Africans 
became clerks or joined the medical section. 
23 The large 
number of askaris whose professed religion was Christianity 
suggests that many recruits had had contact with Christian 
mission schools. In the Southern Brigade, in October 1938, 
there were 702 professed Christians out of a total 1,195 
combatant ranks. 
24 In the Northern Brigade in December 1938, 
there were 942 professed Christians out of a total 1,673 
combatant ranks. In the Signal Company of the Northern 
Brigade, 77 out of 85 Africans were Christians. The battalion 
with the greatest number of Christians was 4KAR25 which re- 
cruited mainly in Uganda, where there were a large number 
of missions. Although there was a predominance of Christians 
in the infantry as well as the skilled branches of the KAR, 
they were not always preferred by the recruiting authorities, 
particularly if they were educated. In the KAR infantry, 
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pagans and Mohammedans were thought the best soldiers and 
Roman Catholics were thought easier to discipline than Prot- 
estants. However, recruiting large numbers of Christians 
into the infantry was unavoidable. 
Recruits were also found among carriers or porters who had 
served in the First World War. Alexander D. Shireff, 
26 
one-time commander of 'B' Company, 5KAR, wrote of the Meru 
and Embu in his battalion who had C. A. R. numbers, indicating 
former service of that kind with the British in war time. 
A number of N. C. Os and constables from the Uganda police 
volunteered for service with the KAR in 1939 and were seconded 
to 4KAR for the duration of the war. 
27 The Uganda police 
were an armed force and had received appropriate weapon train- 
ing and parade work to make them suitable transfers to the 
armed forces. 
Another acceptable 'back door' method of enlisting was open 
to Africans who had served as batmen or as second-line trans- 
port drivers with the East African Reconnaissance Squadron. 
When the Squadron became the East African Armoured Car Regi- 
ment in 1941, these servants and drivers were given the 
option of joining the infantry. 
28 
In 1939 white Kenyans were requested to encourage their 
domestic servants and employees to listen to propaganda 
broadcasts in the Kikuyu, Kiswahili and Luo languages. 
29 
A tour by the KAR band in Tanganyika during April 191W was 
also considered to have a positive effect on recruitment. 
The band toured Tanga, Moshi and Dar es Salaam and the 
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Commanding Officer of 2/6KAR agreed to arrange for the KAR 
band to play at any function the provincial authorities might 
choose. The Tanganyika Standard commented: 
"It is considered the presence of the band will stimulate 
recruiting and be of great propaganda value amongst the 
native chiefs. "3° 
One method of recruitment to the KAR had, traditionally, 
varied from the normal procedure. One of the most respected 
groups recruited to the KAR were the Nubi of Bombo, 30 miles 
north of Kampala in Uganda. These were the descendants 
of the so called 'founder members' of the KAR recruited 
by Captain F. D. Lugard in 1891. The procedure for enlisting 
the Nubi recalled their origin as former subjects of the 
Khedive of Egypt in the southern Sudan and gave them a special 
status among other askaris. The Nubi did not volunteer 
but they did not mind being press-ganged. In their settle- 
ments at Bombo and other large towns in Uganda, the Command- 
ing Officer held a beer party where he provided drink, 
drumming and dancing for the local community. At about 
seven o'clock in the evening the older people and women 
quietly left while the young men continued to enjoy them- 
selves. At midnight, at a given signal, they were surrounded 
by soldiers and 'persuaded' to enlist. In this way they 
were absolved from their loyalty to the Khedive. 
31 The 
Nubi swore allegiance to the King just as their ancestors 
had sworn allegiance to Queen Victoria. They regarded them- 
selves as having a type of mercenary status and therefore 
as being superior to the indigenous recruits. 
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The Nubi were looked upon as the backbone of the KAR before 
the Second World War. In return for their good service 
a settlement for retired Nubi was set up in Bombo in 1937 
and ex-soldiers were given pensions and plots of land. 
In 1939 and 1940 they continued to form a substantial element 
in the Regiment, many of them serving as N. C. Os. Retired 
soldiers were recalled at the outbreak of war to assist 
in drilling and training the mass of raw recruits pouring 
into the recruiting centres at this time. When Major C. F. 
Broomfield joined 4KAR in 1941 he noticed many Nubi in the 
Battalion, including the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM), 
several African Company Sergeant Majors (CSM), corporals 
and privates. The RSM, Mustapha Kamis, was much admired 
by Broomfield and his fellow officers who saw how he comfort- 
ed the askaris in their troubles and was an excellent discip- 
linarian. 32 It was often the case that British officers 
preferred the assistance of African N. C. Os to that of 
European N. C. Os who were sent out to nearly all the infantry 
platoons in 1939. 
There were several Nubi on the KAR reserve in 1939 and one, 
Hassan Alijabu, who had been awarded the D. C. M. in 1921, 
was recalled as RSM to 5KAR. Another Nubi N. C. O., Sergeant 
George Mpabesi, became a battalion transport sergeant and 
in 1944 was mentioned in despatches for bravery after being 
ambushed by the Japanese in Burma. 
Not all Nubi were admirable characters. Some were even 
prison inmates, released by being conscripted to 7KAR in 
1940.33 The Nubi CSM of 'C' Company 7KAR, Ramadan Mudari, 
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went absent without leave and was reduced to the ranks and 
publicly flogged. The notorious Idi Amin, later President 
of Uganda, whose mother was a Nubi, was also enlisted to 
the KAR in 1948 by Major Charles Broomfield. 34 On the whole, 
however, the Nubi proved extremely useful to the KAR and 
their status as semi-foreigners kept them apart from the 
men they helped to train and drill. 
The initial response to these methods of recruiting and 
to the war effort in general was enthusiastic and in certain 
areas the momentum was maintained throughout the first phase 
of recruitment from 1939 to 1941. Sir Philip Mitchell, 
Qovernor of Uganda, wrote to Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, in July 1939, 
"The initial response to the appeal for recruits has 
been more than encouraging and no less than 800 volunteers 
came forward for the first 100 vacancies in the Kampala 
Company (7KAR).,, 35 
This prompted Mitchell to raise a second company for the 
same battalion. In Tanganyika, the GOCEA claimed that 
thousands of first-rate African recruits could be produced, 
"of the class used by Lettow von Worbeck in the 
last war. "36 
However, a telegram dated 20th June 1940 from the Governor 
of Tanganyika to Malcolm MacDonald expressed doubts as 
to whether recruits would continue to come forward: 
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"We could recruit good quality men up to 2,700 without 
difficulty and the present indications are that it would 
be unsafe to rely on any number greatly in excess of this 
unless methods of recruiting are to be radically altered. "37 
The Governor of Tanganyika was correct in forecasting the 
need for the new methods of recruitment which led to the 
expansion of 2/6KAR and 3/6KAR for service in South East 
Asia later in the war. He was also right in noting in the 
early stages of the war the initial enthusiasm for joining 
the KAR. A representative of the Tanganyika Standard visited 
the training depot for KAR recruits earlier in 1940 and 
reported: 
"Before the war when 6KAR was at Dar es Salaam the 
intake of recruits was 60 a year, now it is 1,000 a year. "38 
The Tanganyika Herald published a telegram from Malcolm 
MacDonald concluding that there would be no difficulty in 
obtaining recruits and that there would be no need to release 
men from certain, occupations so that they might join the 
army. It would be possible to maintain all public services 
so that the colonies could support and defend themselves. 
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MacDonald had reason to be optimistic and his view was con- 
firmed by the constant flow of volunteers to the KAR. 
The War Diaries of the KAR also provide supporting evidence 
that recruits flocked to join the KAR in 1939 and 1940. 
At the Jinja Infantry Training Centre in Uganda in June 
1940 there were up to 1,434 African ranks on parade each 
45 
day. New recruits were constantly arriving while those 
who had completed their initial training were despatched 
to units. 
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The War Diary for the newly formed 7KAR shows 
an intake of 150 Africans in-'November 1939, to form 'C' 
Company and 310 Africans from the Nile areas in January 
1940, to form 'B' and 'D' Companies. In August 1940 a re- 
cruiting safari set off to tour the Eastern Province and 
part of the Western Province of Uganda to recruit 1,000 
men. These extracts are examples of what was a fairly common 
occurrence in the lives of the battalion's recruiting 
officers. 
A Nyasaland battalion was recruited in 1940 at Namweras, 
a camp in the bush, 1,600 miles from the Kenya border. 
There the men came flocking in such numbers that it was 
only by over-crowding that they were got under cover. One 
teenage boy had walked 80 miles through lion infested country 
to enlist. Despite being below the minimum age he was accept- 
ed. On this occasion most of the recruits were youthful 
and at the end of October 1940 the battalion received a 
draft of 34, badly needed, experienced soldiers, from the 
Somaliland Camel Corps. From these older men a nucleus 
4 
of N. C. Os was found to help train the new recruits. 
1 
In Nyasaland the keen response to such safaris was encourag- 
ing in view of the alternative and equally remunerative 
form of employment which existed in the mines of the Rhodesias 
and South Africa. Colonel Fowkes, the Commanding Officer 
of the Southern Brigade, had predicted a less positive res- 
ponse to recruitment back in December 1938 when he wrote; 
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"Doubt has been expressed whether the martial tribes 
of Nyasaland will continue to come forward for enlistment. 
Though I do not believe the situation is yet really serious, 
well paid employment in the Rhodesias and South Africa does, 
without doubt, attract a number of young Nyasas who would 
otherwise satisfy their urge for adventure by enlisting 
into the King's African Rifles. "42 
His forecast, similar to that of the Governor of Tanganyika 
as regards immediate wartime recruiting in that territory, 
also proved incorrect and the KAR held its own against the 
rival claims of employment in the mines, at least until 
1941. 
As well as enthusiasm to join the KAR, some Africans demon- 
strated a willingness to aid the war effort in other ways. 
Generous contributions to the Red Cross were received in 
Tanganyika, especially from the Chagga Chiefs of the 
Kilimanjaro region, who had already shown their loyalty 
in donating food for the consumption of the KAR at Moshi. 
A Meru tribesman from Arusha presented approximately 50-lbs 
of tobacco for the use of KAR troops at Arusha. The Bena 
people of Ulanga, Tanganyika, gave 100 bags of rice weighing 
10 tons to the KAR. African interest in the progress of 
the war was apparent and two new Swahili papers were set 
up to meet the demand for war news. 
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Some Africans were intensely loyal and took their duties 
very seriously. The Chief Secretary of Uganda, addressing 
the Legislative Council, commended the spirit of 7KAR in 
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October 1939, and spoke of the compliant alacrity of one 
particular askari; 
"All sorts of people are serving in the ranks who 
are in a state of society which might well have caused 
them to do otherwise ..... a Muganda gentleman who owns 
most of the land around Bombo is now serving in the ranks, 
and one of his first duties was to be put on a grass 
cutting fatigue, which he did willingly and which shows 
the spirit of the Regiment. " 
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The major requirement in 1939,1940 and 1941 was for infantry 
and for this, traditional recruiting methods sufficed. 
The real difficulty was in finding enough African drivers, 
hence the frequent appeals in the newspapers for employers 
to release their African drivers for military service. 
Often, accidents occurred because of inexperienced drivers 
unused to travelling in a convoy system. In November 1940 
the GOCEA laid plans for a Motor Transport Depot and driving 
school to turn out 750 drivers a month. Along with a stores 
depot, heavy repairs shop and light repairs section they 
formed the East African Army Service Corps which was formal- 
ly approved by the War Office on 20th January 1941.45 Such 
an institution solved the problem of a lack of trained 
drivers for the KAR. 
The eagerness of many Africans to join the KAR in 1939, 
1940 and 1941 is not surprising. There were certainly 
material advantages in doing so. The most obvious was that 
an askari was guaranteed at least one substantial meal a 
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day and a diet which included meat. A typical day's menu 
consisted of a mug of tea and a slice of bread at reveille 
(tea during war time included milk and sugar, whereas peace- 
time rations were solely of tea); a mid-day meal of meat 
with rice and beans and an evening meal of 'posho' (maize 
porridge) and vegetables. When the askaris were in camp, 
rations of tea, sugar, meat, vegetables and flour were issued 
but varied according to the locality. In Tanganyika war 
time rations for troops included meal, rice, groundnuts 
or dried peas, pitted dates, ghee, sugar, salt, meat, chilli 
peppers, rice, guinea cornflour, maize-flour, vegetables, 
sweet potatoes, tea, tobacco and soap. 
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Meals were cooked 
by the wives who often accompanied their husbands and lived 
in the 'lines'. Each man was entitled to keep a maximum 
of one wife and three children in the camp. Sometimes askaris 
would go home on leave and return with a different wife. 
On active service or during training exercises askaris had 
to live on 'hard tack', but usually a hot meal was provided 
in the evening by the cook. 
Rates of pay were good compared with manual labour and 
domestic service wages within East Africa. In June 1940 
















In comparison, agricultural wages in 1935 varied from 10 
shillings to 15 shillings a month. Even allowing for inflation 
over the five year period, agricultural labourers were still 
poorly paid in 1940 in relation to what men could earn in 
the KAR. Average domestic wages in Uganda in 1935 were 
as follows; 
Head boy 35 shillings 
House boy 20 shillings 
Cook 40 shillings 
Kitchen boy 14 shillings 
Dhobi 25 shillings. 
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Neither agricultural labourers nor domestic servants received 
the rations and benefits which an askari was entitled to 
and most agricultural labourers preferred to take work in 
the vicinity of their family plot of land which could provide 
them with essential food stuffs. 
Rates of pay for drivers in the KAR in 1940 were also good. 
First class drivers received 60 shillings a month, second 
class drivers received 50 shillings a month and learners 
up to 30 shillings. Drivers' pay had had to be increased 
in order to draw more African recruits. 
Apart from incentives of increased pay through promotion, 
KAR askaris could also earn proficiency pay. This was only 
granted to men with one year's service in the ordinary ranks, 
either as a private or as an unpaid lance corporal. As 
from April 1940,1st class proficiency pay was an extra 




Before the war askaris were encouraged to enlist for 7 years 
in the colours and 5 in the reserve or 3 in the colours 
and 9 in the reserve. They could re-engage for further 
periods of 3 years. Those recruited during the war were 
taken on for the duration of hostilities plus a further 
12 months. Before the war promotion was fairly slow and 
a sergeant would generally have at least ten years' service, 
a CSM, fifteen. During the war further opportunities for 
promotion presented themselves. English-speaking Africans 
on whom new British officers relied for'translations, were 
promoted quicker than most. At the beginning of the war 
learning an African language was part of an officer's train- 
ing, but as the war progressed it became official policy 
that African recruits should learn English. 
On retirement after 15 years, service and a good conduct 
record, the ex-askari was exempted from hut tax. This ex- 
emption became unacceptable to the civil authorities and 
it was later abolished. Although tax examptions did not 
apply to Africans who enlisted during the Second World War, 
a retired askari at that time was a privileged and respected 
member of the community and his status may well have influ- 
enced those who chose to sign up for the duration of host- 
ilities. 
Ex-askaris with good conduct records, which, incidentally, 
were difficult to acquire, were entitled to a firearms licence. 
These licences were hard to come by and a useful asset for 
those who sought to supplement their income-and vary their 
diet by game hunting. Ex-askaris were also preferred as 
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messengers and game scouts, especially if they were already 
firearms licence holders. 
The askari was entitled to a family remittance, payable 
directly to his wife, or if he were unmarried, to his mother 
or sister. Many askaris married on their first leave because, 
by that time, they had accumulated enough money to buy cattle 
for a bride payment. The remittance made a substantial 
difference to the standard of living of army wives, compared 
to other women in a village. A family man would, in most 
cases, wish to safeguard the livelihood of his kinsfolk 
before embarking on a career of active service in the KAR. 
The family remittance reassured the askari that the welfare 
of his family was catered for. 
For those fit enough to be recruited, the KAR provided medi- 
cal services. Each battalion had its own British Medical 
Officer and its team of African Medical Orderlies. Their 
task was not easy, particularly with the prevalence of venereal 
disease which threatened the efficiency of the KAR during 
the Abyssinian campaign, despite attempts at health education. 
Although askaris ran the risk of being killed or maimed 
in action, in general they were healthier than the civilian 
population. Army diet and training kept them well nourished 
and fit and they had better access to up to date medical 
supplies and attention than did other Africans. An askari. 's 
spiritual welfare was also catered for if he was inclined 
to Christianity. The second Nyasaland battalion had a Roman 
Catholic priest and a Church of Scotland minister whilecam- 
paigning in British Somaliland and Abyssinia. L19 Other 
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battalions were similarly staffed. 
On the material side each askari was provided with a uniform 
allowance which was probably the most extensive wardrobe 
he had ever possessed. Some recruits were enlisted, clad 
only in blankets. As from November 1939 the uniform provided 
was; 2 khaki drill blouses, 1 pair of boots, 1 slouch hat, 
2 pairs of khaki drill shorts, 4 pairs of socks and 1 blue 
jersey. This issue was renewed every 18 months. 
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Askaris were entitled to a fortnight's leave per annum but 
this could pose logistic problems. Although he was officially 
allowed "fourteen clear days at his home", travelling time 
could mean that a man was absent for several months. This 
was one disadvantage when recruiting tribes from outlying 
areas and it led to men being posted absent without leave 
when there was no justification. The amount of leave was 
hardly an enticement for most who joined the KAR and right- 
ful leave of absence was not always forthcoming because 
of the ruling during war time that only 5% of a unit could 
be absent at one time. When the KAR began to serve abroad 
it became increasingly difficult for askaris to receive 
the home leave they were entitled to. However, similar 
circumstances existed for many British troops. While on 
leave the askari had to make do without his army rations 
and meals. To keep their men fighting fit, each askari 
on leave was given an extra ration allowance of 25 cents 
a day. The askari was to travel in uniform but he had to 
leave arms and equipment at the base. 
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An interesting exception to the general pattern of entitle- 
ment to leave was made for the Kalenjin and Elgeo tribes 
who practised adult circumcision rites every seven years. 
These tribes had two months circumcision leave written into 
their contract. The concession removed an obstacle which 
might have prevented recruitment from these peoples. They 
were considered useful soldiers and their tribal customs 
were respected. 
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The dietary requirements of Moslems were also taken into 
consideration so that their religion could not provide an 
impediment to recruitment. Leibigs canning factory in Nair- 
obi held a demonstration for Moslem chiefs, to show that 
animals were slaughtered in the appropriate way before the 
meat was cooked and canned. Each tin carried a label explain- 
ing that it contained meat from an animal that had had its 
throat cut. The chiefs were able to report back to aspiring 
askaris among their peoples, that it was acceptable to eat 
the tinned 'bully beef' provided by Leibigs for the KAR. 
While the KAR offered many rewards to a loyal and long-serving 
askari, the Regiment maintained a strict discipline which 
reflected the public school upbringing of many of its 
officers. The discipline did not have a detrimental effect 
on recruitment among the type of men which the Regiment 
wanted to recruit. All army recruits were assessed for 
their amenability to discipline and were given strong warnings 
that it must be accepted. This applied as much to the 
Africans who joined the KAR as it did to those British 
civilians who joined British regiments. 
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Certain punishments existed in the KAR which had been out- 
lawed in the British army. Up to 1942 a rhino rawhide trunch- 
eon or 'kibokb' was used to inflict corporal punishment. 
This was supposed to be carried out by the African RSM in 
front of the whole battalion. It had to be authorised by 
a court martial, except in the Tanganyika battalion where, 
on active service, it could be awarded at the discretion 
of the Commanding Officer. The Governors' Conference at 
Nairobi was urgently requested to bring the other territories 
into line with Tanganyika because it was inconvenient for 
COs to hold courts martial on active service. Other pressure 
groups, such as the League of Coloured Peoples based in 
London, and the War Office and the Army Council, also dis- 
agreed. West Africans serving in East Africa were not subject 
to flogging without a court martial and critics of the 
arbitrary powers of 6KAR's Commanding Officers, pointed 
out this inconsistency. In January 1941 it was ruled that 
floggings in all battalions could only be awarded after 
a court martial. 
52 This did not put an end to the practice. 
Other punishments included extra fatigues, extra parades, 
showing articles clean, confinement to barracks, detention, 
pay stoppages (which proved most effective) and, ultimately, 
dismissal. Many of these were standard practice in the 
British army. 
The effectiveness of a punishment was best judged by its 
recipient. ' The use of confinement to strong stone cells 
during the East African campaign was not always a deterrent. 
These cells were built specially for the purpose in the 
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area near Mandera, but the East African askaris loved them; 
they were good, stone built houses which, above all, were 
cool and a welcome relief from the hot, dry climate of the 
Hargeisa plateau. 
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Conditions of service in the KAR were, on the whole, attrac- 
tive to Africans. There was no need to alter them even 
to satisfy the Ganda, who complained that the KAR rations 
were rough on their stomachs because they were more used 
to a diet of soft foods such as steamed plantains. Sufficient 
men came forward during the first phase of recruitment, 
1939 to 1941, and there was no need to reassess conditions 
of service and make sweeping alterations during that period. 
At this time the KAR was as yet unable to accommodate every 
hopeful recruit in its ranks and the British maintained 
their pre-war policy of recruiting from what were considered 
the traditionally martial tribes. Convenient theories 
existed which connected martial qualities with tribal customs, 
physical build, diet or local environment. Individual 
Africans rarely had the education or opportunity to defend 
themselves against stereotyping. Their response tended 
to perpetuate their tribe's attributed martial or non-martial 
characteristics because they strove to live up (or down) 
to their reputation. Only occasionally could individuals 
defy tradition and refuse to submit to the pressure to con- 
form. Then a man from a non-martial tribe could prove himself 
a good soldier or a man from a martial tribe get himself 
dismissed from the KAR as 'unlikely to become efficient'. 
However, it was more often the case that Africans took a 
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pride in belonging to a traditionally martial tribe and 
consciously tried to be typical. 
In Uganda the British linked martial qualities to diet. 
The traditional recruiting areas were those inhabited by 
people who ate grain. People whose main diet was plantains, 
a coarse form of banana, were thought to be less suitable 
for the army. This dietary distinction existed in the minds 
of the recruiting officers because their predecessors had 
found suitable infantry among the grain eaters and had con- 
sequently attributed fighting qualities to them indiscrim- 
inately. Whether or not individuals within the groups had 
those military qualities was unimportant; what mattered 
was the reputation attributed to them. 
The simple stereotype of the banana-eater was that he was 
a product of his environment. The ready availability of 
food together with an easy climate had made him lazy, while 
the brewing of banana beer ('pombi') made him a drunkard. 
Missionary activities too, had contributed to his downfall. 
He had been given an education which made him arrogant and 
unwilling to accept army discipline. But if the banana- 
eater had little to offer the KAR, the Regiment had little 
to offer him in return, other than hard work and a reduction 
in his leisure time. 
By contrast the grain-eater was believed to have developed 
stamina through hard work. He was physically robust from 
a diet of millet supplemented by meat. He was considered 
more primitive, more economically backward, but eminently 
more suitable for recruitment to the KAR. He was uneducated 
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and so more amenable to army discipline. Free from mission- 
ary influence, he could be moulded into a smart and obedient 
soldier. To the grain-eater, so it was thought, the KAR 
offered a life of adventure and an improvement in living 
standards. Flattered by the recruiting officer's picture 
of his people, the grain-eater would usually react by doing 
his utmost not to detract from this favourable image. 
For the British, these convenient categories were reassuring. 
The army could be confident that it was on safe ground while 
it recruited the majority of its soldiers from traditional 
areas. Generalisations about African peoples were passed 
on to new British officers as they arrived in East Africa. 
Over-simplifications meant that officers accepted as self- 
evident the differences between African societies and took 
less notice of differences between individuals. Lieutenant 
Colonel H. P. L. Glass, M. C., who commanded 'B' Company 2KAR 
in 1939, quoted a fellow officer as saying; 
"The blacker their face, the huskier their voice, 
the thicker their neck; the darker their skin and the more 
remote parts of Africa they came from - the better soldier 
they made. "51 
Such views were widely held. 
Patterns of recruitment from 1939 to 1941 were based on 
the belief that certain tribes had martial characteristics. 
In Nyasaland nearly all the peoples were popular with the 
KAR, though the greatest number of recruits came from the 
Yao, the Ngoni, the Nchewa, and the Nguru. In Tanganyika 
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the Nyamwezi were easily the most popular recruits but the 
Yao, Ngoni, Sukuma and Hehe also ranked highly. In Kenya 
the Kamba, Nandi, Elgeo and Luo were most frequently re- 
cruited. In Uganda peoples believed to possess martial 
characteristics were the Acholi, the Langi, the Nubi, the 
Teso and those from the West Nile district. 
Each separate battalion of the KAR had a predominance of 
particular tribes in its combatant ranks. The tribal compo- 
sition of each battalion altered during the course of the 
war as new areas of recruitment were tapped and less emphasis 
was placed on recruiting from the traditional areas. 
In 1938 the official statistical returns55 for the racial 
composition of the Southern Brigade reveal that the Yao 
were the most favoured tribe. In 1KAR, of 554 African ranks, 
146 were Yao and in 2KAR, of 267 African ranks, 71 were 
Yao. They were the largest tribal group in each Nyasaland 
battalion and composed nearly a third of the Nyasaland con- 
tingent. Major R. W. Kettlewell, C. M. G., 56 who was with 
the KAR Reserve of Officers (KARRO) at Zomba from 1938 to 
1939 wrote that; 
"There were undoubted preferential and traditional 
influences in the choice of tribes for recruitment. " 
He argued that tribes of the Southern Province of Nyasaland 
predominated because of their proximity to Zomba. Zomba 
had a relatively high population and there was less alternative 
employment. He praised the Yao as "outstanding", a tribe 
with a war-like tradition and a long association with the 
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KAR. By nature they were thought to be a soldiering people 
who had stood up well to their rivals in the slave trade, 
the Ngoni. The Yao had also shown hostility towards Living- 
stone's missionary activities in the Zambezi area in the 
1860s. The Yao chief, Matschemba, had resisted German exped- 
itions into the hinterland of German East Africa in the 
1890x. 57 Such aspects of Yao history may have been known 
to individual British Officers and their knowledge might 
have been the original basis for labelling the Yao as a 
tribe with a war-like tradition. Once the Yao had acquired 
the reputation they could only live up to it. They were 
expected to make good soldiers and they made good soldiers. 
However, in Tanganyika far fewer Yao were recruited to 6KAR; 
only seven out of a battalion of 317. The Yao came from 
the south of Tanganyika and this was possibly too far from 
Dar es Salaam for them to be recruited in large numbers 
in 1938. During the war, recruiting officers were forced 
to go into the outlying areas. 
In Nyasaland the Yao maintained their position as a strong 
quarter of 1KAR during the war, as noted by Colonel D. J. 
58 Bannister. one-time Company Commander in that battalion. 
His statistical breakdown of 1KAR in July 1941 shows that 
there were 213 Yao in a greatly expanded establishment of 
919 African ranks, including 29 Yao N. C. Os. Bannister himself 
described the Yao and also the Nyanja, as "steady types" 
who had a calming influence on the Somali element of the 
Somaliland Camel Corps in*peace-time. Lieutenant Colonel 
H. P. L. Glass59, Company Commander of 'B' Company 2KAR in 
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1939, put the Yao at the top of his list of good soldiers. 
He claimed that askaris in his Company at Masoko and at 
the Regimental Depot in Zomba were recruited from the follow- 
ing tribes in order of priority; Yao, Ngoni, Ncheu, Nguru, 
Nyanja and Ntonga. Colonel J. H. S. Martin, 
60 
who served 
with 1/1KAR and 1/6KAR from 1940 to 1942, confirmed these 
viewpoints and listed the Yao, Awemba and Ntonga as the 
major fighting tribes of Nyasaland. 
Second to the Yao in 1938, in both Nyasaland battalions, 
were the Nyanja, also from the south of Nyasaland, who formed 
one of the larger tribal groups of central Africa. In 1/KAR, 
in October 1938, there were 97 Nyanja out of a total strength 
of 554 Africans. The statistics confirm the proportions 
recalled by Colonel Humphrey Williams who served with 1KAR 
and 6KAR in the 1930s just before the war. Colonel Williams61 
believed that the Yao and the Nyanja together composed two- 
thirds of the Nyasaland tribes recruited in the 1930s and 
that the remaining third consisted of a mixture of tribes 
of whom the Ntonga, Ngoni and Nchewa (a sub-tribe of the 
Ngoni) were the most important. These men came from villages 
where there was little chance of alternative employment. 
During the war, Colonel Williams maintained, the idea of 
tribal quotas was abandoned and recruiting officers were 
encouraged to think of their recruits as Nyasas. This helped 
to foster a spirit of unity in the Nyasaland battalions. 
Because tribal quotas were not strictly applied, the number 
of Nguru in 1KAR greatly expanded. In December 1938, they 
were well represented with 90 men in a battalion of 554 
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Africans. By July 1941, Bannister's statistical analysis 
indicates 281 Nguru out of a total of 919 Africans. The 
Nguru overtook the Yao and the Nyanja in the ordinary ranks 
though not in the non-commissioned ranks. The Nguru were 
considered brave but less intelligent than the Yao, Nyanja, 
Ngoni and Ntonga. They were thought more stable than the 
Ntonga in particular, whom Colonel Martin described as 
"volatile" and more ruthless and difficult to control. Such 
opinions, passed on from one officer to another, eventually 
t 
became accepted as fact and a-tr. ibaLh. group gained a reputation 
which events did not always justify. 
In Tanganyika too, tribal stereotyping existed. Recruitment 
to the sixth battalion followed a traditional pattern for 
the country of Tanganyika despite a comparatively short 
British presence there. British judgement of martial qualities 
inherent in certain tribes coincided with German opinions. 
It was no secret as to which tribes had fought well for 
the Germans during the East African campaign of World War 
One. In recruiting to the sixth battalion the British opted 
for the same tribes as those which had reputedly fought well 
for the Germans. So-called martial qualities were rated 
more highly than the fragile loyalty which Tanganyikan Africans 
might offer their former colonial masters, the Germans. 
Strength, physique and a soldiering tradition remained the 
most important criteria. When 25KAR, a Tanganyikan battalion 
formed during the war, embarked for Madagascar in 1942, 
one old NCO possessed the iron cross awarded him for bravery 
in the service of the Germans in World War One. 
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The Germans, during their colonial period in East Africa, 
had recruited both native and foreign troops. In 1889, 
when they first raised their "Schutztruppe" there were large 
numbers of Sudanese and Zulus. Both British and Germans 
held high opinions of the Sudanese but the Germans were 
forced to abandon their recruitment because of the political 
problems arising from the enlistment of subjects of the 
Khedive of Egypt. Unlike the British they did not turn 
to 'press-ganging'! By the outbreak of the First World 
War the Germans recruited the majority of their men from 
Tanganyika itself. 
The tribes recruited to the German Protectorate Force were 
the Nyamwezi, the Sukuma, the Hehe, the Ngoni, the Yao, 
the Ha and some Nyasaland tribes. The Masai were considered 
useful as auxiliaries and irregulars. Of the Nyamwezi it 
was said: 
"Their toughness in toil and privations, their power 
of resistance to climatic conditions, their great knowledge 
of the country and of European customs, make the Nyamwezi 
good fighters. " 
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The British author of this comment in 1916 might just as 
well have been writing in 1938. Those who fought well for 
the Germans also fought well for the British. The.. -Nyamwezi 
and Sukuma were the best represented tribes in the German 
forces of World War One. Between the wars they had been 
frequently used as porters by traders and people on safari. 
In December 1938 they were similarly represented in the 
sixth battalion of the KAR. Eighty-four of the 317 Africans 
in the battalion were Nyamwezi, 46 were Sukuma. 63 
63 
Because 6KAR was formed during World War One, there may 
have been individuals who fought under von Lettow Worbeck 
and then enlisted for the KAR immediately afterwards in 
1917. The original intention of the British was to recruit 
tribes native to Tanganyika for 6KAR, in accordance with 
the terms of the League of Nations mandate. This proved 
impossible during the inter-war period but the policy was 
once more adopted and implemented in the Second World War. 
The Germans deliberately encouraged the askari to see himself 
as belonging to a unique tribe through having joined the 
army. A feeling of superiority was inculcated and care 
was taken that soldiers should not be quartered where they 
could mix easily with the civilian population. The predomin- 
ance of Nyamwezi and Sukuma in both the German Protectorate 
Force and the KAR could be attributed to good German propaganda 
in the first instance which maintained the interest of re- 
cruited tribes in a military lifestyle. However, the Sukuma 
were the tribe with the largest population in Tanganyika 
and this fact needs to be taken into account when considering 
why they enlisted in the army in such great numbers. 
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The Nyamwezi too, were numerically strong and again this 
needs to be balanced against other factors which influenced 
their recruitment such as the temperament attributed to them. 
Brigadier G. H. Cree, 65 who served with 6KAR in Tanganyika 
from 1931 to 1936, described the Nyamwezi as "good solid 
yokels" who had a good physique and were amenable to discip- 
line. He likened them to the Sukuma but opinions on tribal 
temperament were not always concurrent. Colonel Fowkes, 
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Commander of the Southern Brigade in 1938, felt that the 
proportion of Sukuma in 6KAR was too high; 
"I am not certain that the prosperity of the land they 
live in has not slightly weakened their morale", 
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he wrote. 
A relationship between martial qualities and climatic, economic 
or geographical conditions was often drawn. The Chagga from 
the foothills of Kilimanjaro were thought too prosperous 
to be recruited. The better soldiers came from the poorer, 
infertile areas, it was thought, and consequently they had 
a more positive and appreciative attitude. The local people 
around Dar es Salaam were not recruited because they were 
too sophisticated. The British RSM with 6KAR in 1935 
recorded; 
"The local people from around D. S. M. were not enlisted 
- too 'fly' and fond of town life ... nor the Wachagga from 
the foothills of Kilimanjaro who were comfortably off at 
home and had no wish to submit themselves to military dis- 
cipline. "67 
Both British and Germans tended to rate tribes on the basis 
of how well they had stood up to the Masai in the past. 
Smaller tribes such as the Pare, Mbugu, Digo and Shambaa 
had been reluctant to confront the Masai and became labelled 
as cowardly. The Hehe, a reasonably large tribe, were thought 
to be brave because those from Izega on the Ruaha had taken 
part in the rising of 1905 to 1906, against the Germans. 
The British RSM, J. D.. Thomson, who was serving with 6KAR 
in 1935, explained; 
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"The recruits were selected from areas where the men 
were reckoned to be good soldiering material. When I arrived 
in 1935 we had a batch of Wahehe from the Iringa District. 
Although rather small physically, they made excellent soldiers. 
The Germans, during their occupation of the country before 
the First World War, had never been able to subdue this tribe. " 
68 
Despite this, the Germans enlisted the Hehe as soldiers and 
later in the century they served the British. Once again 
a soldiering tradition outweighed any sense of loyalty to 
particular European governments. In October 1938, there 
were 32 Hehe. in 6KAR, out of a total of 317 men. Major Gen- 
eral R. S. N. Mans, 
69 
who served with 1/6KAR, included the 
Hehe in his list of martial tribes; the Nyamwezi, Ngoni, 
Hehe, Tende and Luo. Mans wrote that the Hehe were known 
for their hatred of the Germans and Cree emphasised their 
pride and warrior tradition. To Major Henry A. Walker, 
7° 
who served with 6KAR, the Hehe were first class in attack 
and the Nyamwezi were first class in defence. If such sim- 
plistic conclusions were passed on to the men themselves, 
no doubt they did their best to excel themselves in the approp- 
riate role. 
Most British officers built up their own list of martial 
tribes and their special characteristics. Opinions differed 
as to which tribes made the very best soldiers. For Lieut- 
enant Colonel George Gordon Robson7l who served with 1/6KAR 
and 3/6KAR the Ngoni were the best askaris followed by the 
Nyamwezi, Hehe and Yao. The Ngoni were connected with the 
famous Zulus from South Africa, who were renowned for their 
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warrior tradition and their opposition to European settlers 
in the early 19th century. Robson found the Sukuma 'ponder- 
ous and slow-witted', the Luo full of bravado with a tendency 
to 'pack up' in times of stress and the Tende 'scruffy but 
quite courageous'. Major G. B. Whitworth 
72, 
who served with 
5/6KAR and 6KAR from 1945 to 1946, compared the Luo to the 
Kikuyu of Kenya, of whom he had had experience in the East 
African Civil and Military Police from 1944 to 1945. The 
Luo, he believed, were rather too difficult and he attributed 
this to their diet, as they were 'fish-eaters' from Lake 
Victoria. In his view they made good clerks and orderlies. 
The Luo had 18 men in 6KAR in October 1938. Cree did not 
rate the Luo very highly either and those he recruited in 
1936 did not turn out to be particularly satisfactory. It 
seems the Luo were the nearest equivalent the Southern Brigade 
could produce to the supposedly arrogant Kikuyu and Ganda 
of the Northern Brigade. 
For Tanganyika and Nyasaland the problem was to encourage 
men into the army in the face of alternative employment. 
Those thought to have the necessary aptitude for skilled 
tasks such as signalling were from the Tukuyu and Lindi areas 
of Southern Tanganyika. The Tukuyu had the double advantage 
of being both intelligent and healthy because their area 
was malaria-free. The Lindi were reputed to have served 
the Germans well in World War One. 
In October 1938 Colonel Fowkes expressed his concern that 
the martial people of Nyasaland were being attracted away 
from the army by well-paid employment in Rhodesia and South 
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Africa. 
73 The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association re- 
cruited in Nyasaland for short-term contracts in the Rand 
gold mines. Mine work had debilitated many of the Ngoni 
and Ntonga so that they became unfit to serve as soldiers. 
With this problem in mind, though the main emphasis continued 
to be upon recruiting from the traditionally martial peoples, 
previously untried groups such as the Nchewa, were tested 
for their martial qualities. In September 1939 in Tanganyika, 
Hugh S. Senior, an officer of 6KAR, was sent to recruit 
another tribe new to the KAR. Senior went to Musoma and 
North Mara on Lake Victoria to enlist Tende for a second 
battalion. The Tende, hitherto an unknown quantity as far 
as the KAR were concerned, proved to be an 'unqualified 
success'. They flocked into the recruiting camp and after 
the medical selection process, were issued with uniforms. 
After a month's squad drill they were ready to march to 
Musoma and then travelled by steamer and train to the Depot 
in Dar es Salaam. The new recruits, 150 strong, were met 
there by the KAR band. Later they went on to excel them- 
selves in the East African campaign and in Burma. Expecta- 
tions were high and the Tende fulfilled the expectations. 
The choice of tribe may have been inconsequential. In con- 
trast however, those with a more timid temperament did hide 
in the bush at the prospect of labour service in the East 
African campaign. The 'backward and suspicious' Ha of Kimoga 
District in Tanganyika took alarm despite the measures taken 
to reassure them that they were not required as combatants. 
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Other tribes in Tanganyika could not be recruited on medical 
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grounds. The Zarumu of Temeke District suffered so much 
from malnutrition that they did not have the energy to do 
a day's work. The Gogo were thought to have a 'congenital 
lack of initiative' and to be too wild to mould into 
soldiers despite their attempts to ape the Masai hair- 
style and custom of painting their bodies with red earth. 
Medical tests for the army remained stringent and when labour 
conscription and a stricter quota system were introduced 
in 1941, many men were found to be unfit. Figures kept 
at Ufipa for November 1940 to January 1941 reveal that more 
than one in three applicants were rejected at local examina- 
tions and more still at the Depot after further tests. 
This was among the Fipa, a tribe which was considered fairly 
healthy. For the Ha the situation was far worse, with only 
one man fit in ten. 
75 In Britain only 5% of the population 
was unfit when conscription was introduced. Such medical 
facts were disquieting and suggested that the authorities 
were only concerned with the physical fitness of Africans 
when they were needed as soldiers and labourers. The War 
brought the poor state of African health in general to the 
attention of the. authorities and the white press in East 
Africa. The latter did not hesitate to comment on the need 
to provide better health services for the African population 
whether there was a war on or not. 
There was, then, a variety of reasons why certain tribes 
were selected for service with the KAR's Southern Brigade; 
military tradition; reaction to the Masai; reaction to the 
Germans; physical strength and build; temperament; 
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geographical position; diet; prosperity; availability of 
alternative employment; knowledge or lack of knowledge of 
European customs; education or lack of education; all these 
and other factors were considered when selecting tribes 
for recruitment. 
There was very little overlap between the tribes recruited 
for the Northern and Southern Brigades. Only the Luo were 
represented in both, 18 in the Southern Brigade in October 
1938 and 179 in the Northern Brigade in December 1938. 
The Luo were more popular with the recruiting authorities 
of the latter but their more extensive recruitment is not 
surprising as there were far more Luo in Kenya than there 
were in Tanganyika. During the 15th and 16th centuries 
the Nilotic Luo had migrated southwards and some of them 
had eventually settled on the shores of Lake Victoria, mainly 
the north-eastern shore. 
Tribes recruited to the Northern Brigade were divided into 
collective groups of Nilotic Sudanese, Nilotic Congo, Bantu, 
Nilo-Hamitic and Hamitic. There were no restrictions on 
3KAR, 4KAR and 5KAR recruiting outside the countries in 
which they were based and they even recruited as far afield 
as Tanganyika, the Congo, the Sudan and Abyssinia. 
The third battalion was based in Nairobi and recruited most 
of its men in Kenya, with a fair proportion from Uganda. 
The largest tribal group in the battalion in December 1938 
were the Nandi from Nyanza province in the west of Kenya. 
There were 61 Nandi out of a total 330 African combatant 
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ranks. 
76 The Nandi were also well represented in 5KAR and 
in the Transport Corps. They were chosen for their physical 
qualities and Major G. B. Whitworth described them as athletic, 
good at bush craft and tracking and very fleet of foot. 
The Nandi were also praised by Major T. R. King who served 
with 5KAR throughout the Second World War. 
77 They had a 
warlike tradition and had stood up well against the Masai 
from the vantage point of their escarpment overlooking 
Lake Victoria. They were also a tribe which the British 
had found difficult to subdue around the turn of the century. 
Their territory was just to the north-east of Lake Victoria 
and their hostility-, endangered the communications links 
between Uganda and the coast. 
the Nandi to be subjugated. 
It took several years for 
In 5KAR the Nandi were resentful 
because none of them was promoted to the non-commissioned 
ranks. These were mostly filled by Somalis, who considered 
themselves superior to Kenyan Africans. The Nandi too, 
had their own ideas about tribal hierarchy and thought it 
beneath their duty to do domestic chores which were more 
fitting for lesser peoples than themselves. The Nandi proved 
to be competent soldiers in the KAR and in a pamphlet from 
the series 'The Peoples of Kenya', published for the education 
of British officers in 1944, they were described as 'people 
in whom there is much good'. Unfortunately they gained 
a poor reputation later in the war when less tribal control 
resulted in a deterioration of morals and an increased 
indulgence in alcohol. Allegations of this sort were made 
by Alexander D. Shireff, Company Commander with 5KAR in 
the Burma campaign. 
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Shireff was not alone in his opinion that the quality of 
the Regiment deteriorated during the war. G. Elcoat, who 
served with 3KAR believed that the battalion was a fine 
body of hand-picked men until it was divided into 1/3KAR 
and 1/2KAR in 1940, when its quality was diluted. 
Before this dilution occurred, 3KAR had consisted mainly 
of Nandi and of Acholi from the Gulu and Chua provinces 
of northern Uganda. There were also large numbers of Kamba, 
Lumbwa, Luo, Elgeo and Sudanese. Of these the Kamba, just 
40 miles from Nairobi, were easily the most popular with 
Europeans. They did not have a great military tradition 
like some other African tribes but they were 'good fighters 
with an effective military organisation. '78 They were employ- 
ed in many occupations in addition to the army, including 
the railway, the Post Office and as craftsmen and mechanics. 
They had a high reputation for loyalty to the government 
and had proved this by serving in their thousands during 
World War One. Like the Nandi, the Kamba had at first proved 
troublesome to the British by resisting attempts to swallow 
their territory into the British East Africa Protectorate. 
Then they had been renowned for their wile and their venomous 
arrow tips. Opinions changed and by the Second World War 
it was thought that the Kamba temperament made them good 
soldiers. They were held to be cheerful in adversity, 
constantly ready to help those in difficulties and amenable 
to military discipline. Such aptitudes made them the best 
all round soldiers in East Africa and the constant acknowledge- 
ment of this helped to mould the individual Kamba. Kamba 
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ambushes of unwary nineteenth century European travellers 
were not dwelt on by those who sought to build and maintain 
a new image of the tribe, consciously or sub-consciously. 
A Kamba askari had an ideal to live up to and had to demon- 
strate the excellent qualities attributed to him. The Kamba 
were promoted quickly and found skilled employment in the 
ancillary services - the Royal Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineers (REME), the East African Armoured Cars, the artillery 
and the Signals. Of the 85 Africans in the Northern Brigade's 
Signal company in December 1938,61 were Kamba. 
There were also large numbers of Kamba in 5KAR, based at 
Meru; 91 out of 518. Major T. R. King commended the Kamba 
as 'cheerful, intelligent, good all round soldiers and the 
backbone of both 3KAR and 5KAR. ' His view of the Somalis, 
ofchom there were 57 in 5KAR and 29 in 3KAR, was that they 
were fanatical fighters but needed good management. They 
had shown considerable aggression in defying an extension 
of British power in Jubaland Province, Kenya at the close 
of the nineteenth century. The Somali were considered to 
be people of a volatile nature. Certainly the Camel Corps 
was diluted with Yao and Nyanja as a steadying influence 
on the Somali. It was thought necessary to impress on these 
latter the idea of the KAR as a tribe in itself and this 
was done through the Somali N. C. Os. 
British officers developed their picture of an African tribe 
through personal experience of individuals, and for some 
the individual proved the quality of the whole tribe. Shireff 
showed particular admiration for his Somali sergeant, Korah, 
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who became a Warrant Officer Platoon Commander and served 
as such in Burma, later winning an M. M. Shireff believed 
that the Somalis, as Moslems, did not have the same weakness 
as the Nandi and never drank. In this instance a racial 
stereotype was based on rules of religion which demanded 
strength of character. Sergeant Korah too had his own ideas 
of the martial tribes of East Africa. Obviously he rated 
his own people highly, secondly the Samburu (a Masai off- 
shoot) and next the Nandi. Korah reckoned that of all the 
tribes in 5KAR only these would go forward under fire. 
However, that would be a daunting experience for any soldier, 
regardless of race or nationality. Korah spoke from experi- 
ence as he had served with the battalion in northern Kenya, 
Madagascar and then Burma. Although Korah praised the Kamba 
in defence, he claimed they were reluctant to go forward 
under fire, an understandably human characteristic. Korah 
rated the Luo as good on parade but useless in war. 
The Luo districts were full of old soldiers and they had 
a strong military tradition in Kenya. In practice it was 
thought that many Luo did not live up to their reputation 
as good fighters. For Shireff, the exceptions proved the, 
rule about the tribe and he recalled many outstanding indiv- 
idual Luo askaris such as Corporal Raguti whose merits proved 
to Shireff that he was not typical of his tribe. Thus, a 
good soldier could represent a good fighting tribe or he 
could be the 'odd man out' from a bad tribe. For Major 
T. R. King, who held the Luo to be 'good stolid men all round', 
his Luo RSM was the perfect example of an able veteran of 
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the First World War who drilled the battalion as competently 
as a European. King also recalled a badly wounded Luo 
Corporal in an air-raid on Wajir, who was more concerned 
with retrieving his rifle than with his own personal injury. 
At the end of the Abyssinian campaign many Kavirondo tribes, 
including the Nilotic Luo, were replaced by Kamba, Nandi 
and Samburu. This suggests the wide availability of the 
preferred martial tribes even at this later stage in the 
war and shows that the KAR could afford to discard unsuitable 
men. However, new mechanised units formed at this time 
accounted for the transfer of some Luo whom Brian Kirwan 
maintained were also well-suited to the handling of artillery. 
Clearly, there was some disagreement over the Luo and most 
British officers held strong opinions of them. 
Many officers had their favourites and Shireff preferred 
the Samburu. He claimed their recruitment was originally 
due to David Kemble, Commander of 'C' Company 5KAR, who 
arrived in East Africa in 1936 and went hunting in the Samburu 
district. This led him later to recruit Samburu and Turkana 
for 5KAR and it was the Samburu who proved the better soldiers. 
Like the Nandi, Samburu men were brought up to hide any 
feelings of fear and made excellent soldiers. The Turkana 
were believed to have been outstanding warriors before the 
British colonisation of Kenya, but they did not adapt to 
army life and were susceptible to bronchial diseases. Many 
of them became scouts or guides for the KAR instead of sold- 
iers. Unlike other platoons in 5KAR's 'B' company, the 
Samburu platoon consisted entirely of men from that tribe. 
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Usually the policy was to spread each tribal group through- 
out'the battalion to avoid any one tribe becoming too domin- 
ant in a particular unit. This suggests that the Samburu 
were more trustworthy than other tribes which might plan 
sedition when united. 
The Kikuyu were not recruited to the KAR infantry in large 
numbers. They did not choose to join the army and mix with 
tribes they regarded as their inferiors. However, they 
did join up as stretcher bearers, medical orderlies and 
office clerks, roles which seemingly had more status. The 
Jinja War Diary for June 1940 recorded; 
"Lieutenant D. Anderson left to recruit 150 Kikuyu 
stretcher bearers at Nyeri. " 
The British judged the Uganda equivalent to the Kikuyu to 
be the Ganda. Even so there were 77 from that tribe in 
Uganda's 14KAR at the end of 1938. When recruiting was under- 
taken for the new territorial battalion 7KAR, just before 
war broke out, one of the first two companies was largely 
of Ganda composition. The Ganda were thought typical of 
the easy living banana-eaters and their proximity to the 
main towns of Uganda made them more sophisticated than the 
askaris from the remoter areas. Their mission school educa- 
tion meant that many became clerks and orderlies. Educational 
standards at that time were much higher among the Ganda 
than any of the other East African peoples. In the army, 
educated recruits were not particularly necessary but the 
Ganda volunteered for the few skilled tasks available. 
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Although there were 77 Ganda in 14KAR at the end of 1938, 
there were nearly twice as many Acholi. These were an 
extremely popular tribe in the KAR and they had a strong 
family and tribal custom of joining up. Major C, F, Broomfield, 
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Company Commander with 14KAR, described the Acholi as 'of 
fighting stock', men who had followed their fathers' and 
grandfathers' footsteps to fight for 'King Georgi'. The 
Acholi were quickly promoted to N. C. Os once the supply of Nubi 
N. C. Osdwindled. A tradition of family success in the Regiment 
encouraged younger sons to enlist, such as Daniel 0tim80 
whose father had been a corporal in 5KAR. The boy had been 
to secondary school and his knowledge of English helped 
him to enter as a company clerk. He soon became a lance- 
corporal and by 1941 he was the African RSM with 7KAR. The 
Acholi were not so keen on the promotion of certain other 
tribes. They would not accept orders from Langi although 
they accepted Teso and Lugbara N. C. Os. Attempts to promote 
Langi N. C. Os nearly always failed. 
At the end of the colonial period in East Africa the Acholi 
still comprised the bulk of the Ugandan armed forces along 
with the West Nile tribes, such as the Alur, Lugbara and 
Madi and the Langi and Teso. The West Nile was a non- 
productive area, 
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remote and infertile. During the war 
it was thought more politic to recruit from such areas which 
were not involved with vital food production or cash crops. 
African farmers were needed at home to produce food, despite 
the bulk of the heavy work being done by women. In Kenya, 
African chiefs and headmen soon complained if all their 
young men were called into the KAR. When Captain R. A. Malyn 
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arrived in Africa in 1940, his first assignment after leaving 
the officers' training unit at Nakuru, was to go on a recruit- 
ing safari to the West Nile and recruit the strength of 
two battalions. When 7KAR was formed in June 1939, recruiting 
began in these traditional northern provinces and among 
the Teso and Sebei from the east. On one recruiting safari 
in 1940 to the Acholi, Langi and Lugbara regions, a large 
number of Lugbara from the Belgian Congo joined up. It 
was only when family remittances were sent out months later 
that it was realised that 50 men in one company alone were 
from the Belgian Congo. 
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African loyalty to particular 
European governments meant very little. 
In Uganda, the frontier with Congo was potentially a danger 
area. The King of the Belgians had surrendered to the Germans 
by 1940 and there was speculation that the Belgian Congo 
might receive a German military mission. The British Consul 
in Leopoldville 
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at that time feared that the surrender 
of French colonies might be followed by the surrender of 
Belgian colonies. In the event, a British military mission 
under Colonel Mackenzie was despatched to the Congo to give 
the government support. Thus, the Congo Lugbara who had 
'defected' to the KAR, unaware of artificially imposed colon- 
ial borders, ended up on the same side as their fellow Congo- 
lese. 
In Uganda, the idea that certain tribes were suitable for 
specific tasks, was also applied. The Konjo from the Ruwenzori 
mountains, south of Lake Albert, were recruited to REME 
because of their small build, which made them unsuitable 
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as infantry. The Ganda were recruited to the Ambulance 
Corps because numbers of them had had the opportunity of 
learning to drive. Some enterprising Ganda took the ambu- 
lance driving test in another man's name, for a fee of five 
shillings or so. Thus some totally incompetent drivers 
got into the Ambulance Corps. 
Not every new recruiting venture was equally successful 
during the first phase of recruitment, 1939 to 1941. The 
experiment of recruiting. numbers of Karamojong from north- 
east Uganda had to be abandoned. Thirty men were enlisted 
into 7KAR when the new battalion was formed but they had 
to be returned to their homes after a few months. They 
were only prepared to take discipline from British N. C. Os 
and ignored orders from African N. C. Os. Their cards were 
stamped U. B. E. - unlikely to become efficient. A similar 
reaction was found among the Kurya, who had previously fought 
successfully against the Masai but refused to accept army 
discipline. 
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Similarly, the recruitment of Nyoro for 2/1IKAR 
by Major Channer was based on the idea that they had fought 
well against the British at the time when Uganda was being 
brought under British protection, but many of his recruits 
had to be discharged because they seemed unlikely to make 
good soldiers. 
It was then, predominantly men from the districts tradition- 
ally regarded as martial, reinforced by a number of previously 
untried groups, who made up the strength of the battalions 
expanded and formed between 1939 and 1941. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Second Phase of Recruitment 1941 to 1943 
In July 1941 the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC) was 
formed. It marked the beginning of a new phase of extensive 
recruitment to meet the demands of the campaign in North 
Africa. The foundations of the AAPC lay in the East African 
Military Labour Service (EAMLS). This unit was formed shortly 
after the Italian declaration of war and undertook important 
work in the East African Campaign. The EAMLS was basically 
a unit of African labourers who worked as a back up team 
for the KAR infantry, digging fortifications and building 
roads. The AAPC was slightly different and had a much wider 
range of duties. While the East African campaign was still 
underway Middle East Command looked to East Africa to supply 
'trained and disciplined labour' for building railways and 
bridges, unloading stores, mending roads and other similar 
duties in North Africa. The AAPC was formed to meet this 
need. Limits on the supply of U. K. manpower in the spring 
of 1941 forced the War Office to allot quotas of British 
troops to all overseas commands. Subsequently Middle East 
Command drew up a comprehensive programme for the use of 
Africans who would be recruited to the AAPC. 
This meant a reassessment of the role of East Africa in 
the war effort and the position of the KAR. Major General 
A. J. K. Pigott, 1in his report on Army Manpower Problems 
suggested three reasons for limits on the number of East 
Africans available as pioneers in 1941. First, Pigott 
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stressed that African labourers were needed in Africa to 
produce the food and raw materials which had formerly been 
produced elsewhere. Second, it was difficult to obtain 
sufficient British officers and N. C. Os of adequate quality. 
The number of British officers available determined the 
number of units which could be formed, but every British 
officer allocated to an African unit meant one less for 
a British unit. Last, there were vast problems in transport- 
ing African units from the colonies to Egypt and the only 
practical route was by sea. This method of transport had 
an adverse effect on recruiting because unlike overland 
transport, it made Africans more conscious that they were 
travelling further from their homes than ever before and 
because delays in embarkation meant that there were large 
numbers of inactive recruits in the ports when the govern- 
ment was hoping to impress on the local populace the urgency 
of the cause for which their help was requested. 
In order to avoid large scale recruitment in Africa, which 
might reduce the availability of labour for vital civilian 
work, alternative suggestions were considered, but dismissed 
as impractical. For example, an idea to employ Italian 
prisoners of war, captured in large numbers during the East 
African campaign, was abandoned because of the expense of 
providing guards and because the Geneva Convention forbade 
the use of prisoners of war in forward areas. But the supply 
of volunteers from the High Commission territories of Basuto- 
land, Bechuanaland and Swaziland had run dry so that recruit- 
ing authorities simply had to turn their attentions to East 
and West Africa. 
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However, East Africa still had military commitments elsewhere. 
Gondar did not fall until November 1941. Then the KAR had 
the task of providing 'a military presence to safeguard the 
newly conquered territories. This commitment continued 
even after the restoration of Haile Selassie in January 
1942. When the KAR finally withdrew from Ethiopia in August 
1942,12(African) Division, consisting of two infantry brig- 
ades and attached troops, had to remain in occupation of 
French Somaliland, whose Governor was a strong supporter 
of vichy. 
These considerations indicate that it was a bold project 
to look to East Africa as a major source of recruits for 
the AAPC. 
The first recruits for the AAPC were drawn from the EAMLS. 
These men were volunteers who transferred to the new unit 
and reattested for a longer period of overseas service. 
This method of recruitment could only be a temporary one 
because there were no plans to disband the EAMLS entirely, 
but transfers from the EAMLS provided an experienced nucleus 
of men to give guidance to the rest of the AAPC recruits 
drawn from the civilian population. Eventually the transfer 
of members of the EAMLS to the AAPC was prohibited. 
The two units continued to recruit in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanganyika until October 1941 when the situation changed. 
During this period the military authorities came into conflict 
with other organisations and employers who were also staking 
a claim upon African manpower. In Kenya, the protests of 
the white settler farmers were a symptom of their discontent 
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over a related issue. The African climate made farming 
a risky business and it was not unusual for a farmer to 
lose an entire crop if the rains came at the wrong time. 
Disease too affected plants and animals and a farmer had 
to take care to guard his stocks from predators. Settler 
families spanning generations had sunk funds in enterprises 
which had not always paid off and had sometimes sacrificed 
a comparatively luxurious life-style in Britain to the hope 
of one day striking'-it rich in Africa. For those who had 
made a profit there was still the threat of financial ruin- 
due to adverse weather conditions or an epidemic of disease 
among livestock. Those who had sufficient capital to save 
their farms from natural disasters if the need arose were 
the envy of those who had devoted their lives to agricultural 
projects only to see them ruined. The coming of the war 
was the ideal opportunity for the farming entrepreneur to 
make money. The armies of an Empire at war would need food 
and raw materials. Who better to provide them than the 
Kenyan farmers, who could expand their farms and find new 
markets for their products backed and sanctioned by official 
government policy. At the beginning of the war it looked 
as if such hopes could become a reality when the Governor 
of Kenya urged that Kenya's part in the Imperial war effort 
should be one of food production. This was reiterated in 
the East African Standard which voiced the opinions of white 
settler farmers. 
The white farmers had a further problem which was aggravated 
once the KAR began to expand. Their employees were of a 
different culture from their own and had their own attitude 
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towards physical work. Many Africans regarded agriculture 
as the task of women who did the back-breaking work tending 
crops while young boys looked after the animals and the 
men gossiped, smoked and discussed local business. For 
those who did not consider it demeaning that a man should 
do farm work, there was sometimes the attitude that he should 
only work when his employer was watching him and not when 
his back was turned. Employers could solve this by paying 
their men for the amount of work done rather than the number 
of hours. However some African cultures rated leisure time 
above money payments and preferred an easy life to working 
on a settler farm for wages. 
Although there were individual employers who built good 
relationships with individual employees, many Kenyan farmers 
believed that there was a 'labour problem'. This is illus- 
trated by their continual letters of complaint to the East 
African Standard about lazy servants, the lack of good farm 
workers and, most important of all, the problem of competing 
with army rates. of pay in order to attract employees. As 
the East African campaign drew to a close in 1941, the farmers 
hoped for a respite from army recruiting so that they could 
find the labourers to develop their farms more effectively. 
Ostensibly they were complaining about a labour shortage. 
In reality they were making the assumption that food produc- 
tion was a priority in Kenya before the government had come 
round to that idea itself. When the government did come 
round to that idea, it was not because of the demands of 
the vociferous settlers but because other sources of food 
were no longer available. The German U-boats attacking 
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American cargo ships in the Atlantic prevented supplies 
reaching Europe. Kenya was asked to provide food for the 
armies in the Middle East, to relieve the burden on Britain 
where rationing had been introduced and to reduce the pressure 
on the dangerous Mediterranean supply route. The food would 
be mainly meat, canned at Leibigs' factory in Nairobi (where 
one cow made 110 tins) and transported to the Middle East 
by sea. 
Once food production was an official government priority 
in Kenya, the white settler farmers stepped up their demands 
for a better quantity and quality of farm labourers. Clearly, 
Kenya could not provide extra men for the EAMLS and AAPC 
as well as unlimited supplies of food and raw materials. 
In July 1941 a leader in the East African Standard2 complain- 
ed that Kenya's resources of men, money and experience were 
already 'slender' and the war was, as yet, hardly under- 
way. In 1941 a meeting of the Kenya Farmers' Association 
at Nakuru suggested that pressure should be brought on the 
government to introduce forced labour. They called on the 
government of Kenya to inform the African chiefs that their 
people should support the war effort by coming forward as 
farm labourers. In response the government took prompt 
action in recognition of the pressing need for Kenya's raw 
materials. That same month (October) they suspended recruit- 
ing for the EAMLS and the AAPC in Kenya until early in 1942. 
The military authorities also agreed to suspend the recruit- 
ing of drivers for the East African Army Service Corps 
(EAASC) as soon as certain urgent commitments had been met. 
85 
Almost immediately the labour situation improved, suggesting 
that similar types of Africans were required by both military 
and civilian employers of labour. 
In 1941 Kenya had an estimated population of 550,000 able 
bodied male Africans. Of these, 221,000 were already in 
civilian employment and 47,000 in military employment. The 
total number of able bodied male Africans in paid employment 
was 268,000, that is about 49 per cent3. Many Africans 
preferred to work their own land and could get a good price 
for their food in the local markets. Being employed on 
their own land they did not feature in official employment 
statistics which tended to mislead those Europeans who knew 
little about the structure of the African economy. After 
November 1942, an African who was thought to be working 
his own land usefully could not be conscripted for military 
labour service. 
The Africans whom neither the military nor the farmer employ- 
ers wanted were those from very backward areas who were 
too frightened to leave their homes in time of war or those 
who preferred a life of apparent leisure to exerting them- 
selves for remuneration. 
Kenya was not the only country in East Africa to provide 
recruits for the EAMLS and AAPC during 1941. By the end 
of the year the official strength returns for these two 
units were as follows 
4; 
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KENYA UGANDA TANGANYIKA 
AAPC 4700 3800 2900 
EAMLS 1200 300 1700 
TOTAL 5900 4100 4600 
Despite the suspension of recruitment for both units in 
Kenya during the last few months of 1941, that country still 
provided the most recruits. Apart from the demands of the 
military all three territories had to provide 6,000 labourers 
on six month contracts for the construction of the Thika- 
Ngomeni railway. In Tanganyika recruitment of labour for 
the K. U. R. * began in December 1940. Tanganyika's mining 
industry also required African labourers and it was decided 
that it should not be disrupted by the war. 
5 The other 
major competitors for Tanganyikan labour were farmers and 
sisal estate owners. One Tanganyikan farmer wrote to the 
East African Standard shortly after the suspension of recruit- 
ing to the EAMLS and AAPC in Kenya. He claimed to have 
no difficulties in finding labourers and had turned down 
applicants for work. He had 200 men from the Belgian mandated 
territories of Ruanda and Burundi in his-. employ, as well as 
Mahiwa from Portuguese East Africa, large numbers of whom 
had been trekking to Dar Es Salaam in search of work. 
6 
Kenya did not have the same influx of-migrant workers. 
Africans native to Tanganyika also came forward for work 
on the farms and estates, but not as eagerly as the sisal 
growers might have hoped. The chairman of the Sisal Growers 
Association, Mr Hitchcock, complained that 50% of Tanganyika's 
adult males did no work for themselves or for anyone else. 
* K. U. R. - Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours 
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The industry was forced to recruit in the Belgian Congo, 
Portuguese East Africa, Nyasaland and Rhodesia. However 
the recruiting operations of sisal estate owners in Tangan- 
yika and elsewhere had to be curtailed during 1941 and quotas 
were fixed to limit sisal production. This gave the KAR 
and the EAMLS and AAPC a freer rein in Tanganyika. In Feb- 
ruary 1941 there was a steady flow of men from Ufipa and 
southern Kigoma to join the KAR. Here quotas were maintained 
and desertions were few.? Meanwhile sisal estate owners 
had to rely more on local labour, whereas before they had 
recruited from remoter districts. Most estates coped with 
a reduced work force by making the men already in their 
employment work harder. 
From January 1942 the balance between military and labour 
recruitment altered in Tanganyika following the expansion 
of the Japanese hold in the Far East. Sisal was a good 
substitute for manila fibre which was now less widely avail- 
able. Sisal was used for binder twine, camouflage netting, 
slings and packaging pads for the transport of bombs, shells 
and ammunition. It was also used to make dart boards for 
the troops! In January 1942 sisal became an official priority 
and all restrictions on its production were lifted. The 
American government offered to buy all Tanganyika's surplus 
sisal for use in the Far East. 
Although labour problems were less acute in Tanganyika than 
in Kenya, measures were taken to safeguard the production 
of sisal. Unfortunately for the manpower situation, extra 
demands for military labourers coincided with an increased 
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demand for native crops and an increased demand for sisal. 
Traditionally, most labourers for Tanganyika's European 
farms in the Northern province, came from the Central Prov- 
ince. By November 1942 however, Africans could get more 
money from selling their own crops than by working on Europ- 
ean farms. As in Kenya, an African working his own land 
usefully was exempted from military or labour conscription. 
Also in Tanganyika, Africans employed on European-owned 
estates were exempted from military labour service, but 
there was no suspension of military labour recruitment in 
Tanganyika as there was in Kenya. This was because the 
AAPC and EAMLS had not made such stringent demands on Tang- 
anyika during 1941. 
Another claim on African labour in Tanganyika arose after 
February 1942. The loss of rubber producing territories 
to Japan in the Far East meant that Tanganyika's wild rubber 
had once again to be utilised. This led to little conflict 
with other competitors for labour since the task of rubber 
tapping was mainly allocated to the Gogo, a tribe considered 
too primitive to perform any other task with efficiency. 
The Gogo were from the traditional recruiting ground for 
agricultural labourers, the Central Province, but they were 
thought to have a 'congenial lack of initiative'8 which 
suited them for rubber tapping. The KAR showed no interest 
in recruiting them. 
In Uganda there was even less conflict between military 
and labour recruitment. In comparison to Kenya the number 
of settler farms was small and the difficulty of exporting 
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Uganda's main agricultural crop, cotton, meant a fall in 
prices and less demand for African cotton workers. Uganda 
had alluvial gold and copper mines but not of significance. 
As in Tanganyika, Uganda's sources of wild rubber were tapped 
and there was a demand for food. However, in 1943 famine 
measures were necessary in Uganda because of the failure 
of the maize crop, a staple food, owing to drought and a 
plague of locusts. 
9 Coffee was also an important cash crop 
in Uganda but it was not in sufficient demand for it to 
become an official priority, over-riding recruitment to 
the armed forces. In fact, the rivalry between military 
and labour recruitment in Kenya, and to a lesser extent 
in Tanganyika, was brought about when the government inter- 
vened and made Kenyan food and Tanganyikan sisal, official 
priorities. As a result, certain restrictions were placed 
on military recruiting. 
In Nyasaland, the fourth of the countries where the KAR 
recruited, there was initially no recruitment to the AAPC 
or the EAMLS. This was in spite of the offer of Sir Donald 
Kennedy, Governor of Nyasaland to raise two pioneer bat- 
talions immediately in January 1941. Speaking at the 
Governors' conference, he explained that he was shortly 
to meet with the South African Gold Producers' Committee 
to discuss the re-opening of labour outlets to the Union 
and Southern Rhodesia. 
1° If his offer of pioneers was to 
be accepted this would affect his attitude at the talks 
with the gold producers. He had already made concessions 
to the mine owners by offering to replace the pioneer units 
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which had previously been raised on the mines. At the begin- 
ning of 1941 there was no manpower problem in Nyasaland 
and its Governor could offer recruits to the military 
authorities. It was a false situation because labour out- 
lets to the mines were restricted. A year later further 
steps were taken to limit the access of Nyasas to this altern- 
ative employment when the Witwatersrand Native Labour Assoc- 
iation had to accept a reduced quota of 8,500 men. On the 
strength of this, the Governor of Nyasaland was able to 
offer further garrison and ancillary troops. 
11 Nyasaland 
also provided many of the 15,000 strong work force which 
mined the Lupa gold fields in the southern highlands of 
Tanganyika. 
In Nyasaland alternatives to the KAR were more lucrative 
and it was necessary to curb the activities of the labour 
recruiters in order to encourage more men into the KAR. 
In the territories of Kenya and Tanganyika, the opposite 
situation prevailed and restrictions had to be placed on 
military recruitment. 
Any assessment of the extent to which Africans preferred 
one form of employment to another must take into account 
whether they really had a choice in the matter. Since 1940 
conscription had existed in a disguised form. The Defence 
(Native Personnel) Regulations 1940 gave the Governors of 
the East African Territories the right to enforce quotas 
through the District Commissioners. According to the quota 
system each selected area had to supply a certain number 
of men. Enforced quotas for the EAMLS and AAPC did not 
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1% 
contravene the International Forced Labour.. Convention because 
of the military nature of the work. In practice the quota 
system left the task of choosing 'conscripts' to the chiefs 
who made up the quotas and the British could fend off any 
accusations of 'unlimited conscription' on their part. It 
was also possible to claim that the Africans who came forward 
were volunteers even if they had been pressurised by their 
chiefs. The quantity of the recruits depended very much 
on the power of their chief to compel men to come forward 
Or, if compulsion proved unnecessary, to persuade sufficient 
men of healthy physique to stay behind. Quotas were exceeded 
as often as not and if one area failed to meet its quota, 
the surplus could be made up elsewhere. By spreading the 
load between the East African territories it was possible 
to avoid concentrated recruitment in any one place. Initially, 
it would appear that the quota system did provide sufficient 
volunteers with a genuine desire to belong to the KAR. If 
there had been a strong element of compulsion in the system, 
it would also have been used to supply labourers for the 
non native farms and estates of Kenya and Tanganyika. As 
it was, conscript labour had to be used for the farms, and 
it came under increasing criticism from Labour M. P. s at 
Westminster. In 1940 Hitler's plans to conscript British 
males for labour in the Baltic were thwarted by the RAF 
victory in the Battle of Britain. Forward thinking social- 
ists might have drawn parallels between the two areas of 
conscription. Anti-British propagandists could accuse the 
British of hypocrisy in claiming to be the enemy of facism. 
Such views were voiced even if they were not widely held. 
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In the summer of 1942, Labour M. P., Mr Sorenson, 
12 
questioned 
Harold Macmillan, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
on the topic of native conscript labour. Macmillan defended 
the current situation, stating that conscript labour had 
only been approved in Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Northern 
Rhodesia, Nigeria and Malta. In the 1940s, Hitler did not 
have the monopoly on racialist philosophy. After all, it 
was argued, the Jews were white. The majority view in Britain 
was that Hitler's treatment of Jews could not be compared 
to British treatment of Blacks in Africa. 
In Tanganyika, sisal producers sought to justify labour 
conscription by war time necessity. Mr Creech-Jones, Labour 
M. P. for Shipley, Yorkshire, 13 was informed by the Colonial 
Under-Secretary that recruitment to the Pioneers and Trans- 
port Corps was temporarily suspended in 1942, to avoid 
competition with the programme of increased production for 
war purposes. This made it simpler to find civilian labourers 
and intense labour conscription could be avoided. The measure 
stemmed the rising tide of adverse criticism against con- 
script labour in the British colonies and indicated quite 
clearly that Africans preferred military service to work 
on the estates and settler farms. When they had a choice 
Africans opted for a branch of the KAR. 
In 1941, an official report claimed: 
'No difficulty has been found in providing natives 
for military service. The more adventurous are only too 
keen to join the fighting forces, while the attractive 
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conditions offered by the EAMLS, have, in some areas, very 
largely resulted in the avoidance of conscription for this 
service. ' 
14 
The Report argued that the best men went to the EAMLS, not 
the farms and that if full military conscription had been 
employed instead of the present quota system supplying volun- 
teers, then some of the better workers might have missed 
being conscripted and could have worked on the farms. The 
military had the first choice of the best men and the African 
chiefs had few problems in fulfilling their quotas. 
A monthly quota system was in force in 1941. The Governors 
of the territories from which the recruits were drawn, hoped 
to provide the following quotas for that year; 
15 
1941 KENYA UGANDA TANGANYIKA 
January 1000 1600 1750 
February 1000 1600 2000 
March 2000 2000 
April 2000 2000 
May 2000 2000 
These figures refer specifically to recruits for the EAMLS 
and AAPO: Their training was to be carried out locally 
and then the men were sent to the Middle East as units, 
not as drafts, where they were used as Company sub-units 
within a British unit, such as the Royal Army Service Corps, 
in order to dilute European manpower. 
The term 'labourer' was emphasised as opposed to 'carrier' 
as many Africans recalled the sufferings of the Carrier 
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Corps in the First World War. The issuing of a uniform 
helped to overcome this problem. Recruits to the AAPC learnt 
rifle drill, bayonet practice and bomb throwing, just as 
the combatant troops of the KAR infantry. These conditions 
helped to increase the popularity of the military labour 
units. In 1941, the attractions of the Pioneers had not 
waned. The Governor of Uganda, Sir Philip Mitchell, was 
confident that he could recruit Ganda to a new Uganda garri- 
son battalion. The Kingdom of Buganda was not one of the 
traditional recruiting areas. In the opinion of recruiting 
officers the Ganda were classified as lazy, semi educated, 
soft stomached banana eaters. At this stage they could 
afford to turn down Mitchell's offer, despite his protest- 
ations that the 'wrong type' of Ganda had enlisted at the 
beginning of the war, thus creating a misleading impression 
of their-, capabilities and attitude. In 1941 they were sup- 
erflous to recruiting requirements because the traditionally 
martial people were still coming forward in sufficient numbers. 
There were roughly 200 Ganda in 8999 Company, one of the 
first Pioneer Companies raised in Uganda. The rest of that 
Company came from Ankole. 
16 The GOCEA (General Officer 
Commanding East African Troops) believed that it was not 
necessary to recruit further in Buganda because it was poss- 
ible to get so many men 'about whom there were no doubts'. 
This seemed to be borne out by the Governor of Tanganyika, 
speaking at the Governors' Conference in Nairobi in January 
1941. He reported that unless he was given orders to raise 
another battalion, he would have to reduce his monthly in- 
take of men from 230 a month to 100 a month. Although these 
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Tanganyikan volunteers had come forward as combatants, the 
Governor offered to transfer the surplus to the Labour 
Service. 17 The conclusion of the Conference was justifiably 
optimistic regarding the popularity of the KAR and its labour 
units. 
In contrast, an incident in Central Kavirondo in 1942, shows 
the reluctance of Africans to do roadwork for the civil 
authority. The chiefs of this part of Western Kenya, produced 
the 200 men required but when a District Officer questioned 
them as to whether they were volunteers he found himself 
addressing only 125 men. Another 75 went home on being 
asked if they were volunteers, and the remaining 50, who 
claimed they wanted to work, changed their minds and went 
home after being taken to Kisumu in lorries. 
The chiefs in Central Kavirondo wielded enough power to 
produce labourers for the civil authority but, unlike their 
military counterparts, genuine volunteers were hard to find. 
Similarly, the suspension of recruitment to the EAMLS and 
AAPC in Kenya, early in 1942, indicated African preference 
for well-paid military service as opposed to agricultural 
labour but as a result of that suspension the situation 
on the Kenyan farms improved temporarily. 
However, in April 1942, Middle East Command stepped up its 
demands for East African manpower. The chief secretary 
to the Governors' Conference informed the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies that East Africa Command was now being 
asked to provide a further 18 companies of pioneers for 
garrison duties and a further 3 companies of cooks and 
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servants. The situation in North Africa had become more 
desperate because of the withdrawal of Australian troops 
due to the Japanese entry to the war and Africans were needed 
to release as many Whites as possible for the fighting units. 
In North Africa the role of the Pioneers became increasingly 
significant, and although they were not technically combatant 
troops Middle East Command saw fit to adopt a wide inter- 
pretation of their duties. There was no possibility of 
immediate reinforcements of white South Africans and the 
loss of a whole division of South Africans at Tobruk exacer- 
bated the problem. 
The Japanese advance in the Far East had many implications 
in East Africa, not least the threat of Japanese submarines 
to the East coast. Demands for Africans to serve in North 
Africa coincided with an increased need to fortify and defend 
the coastline. By May 1942 Mombasa had been partially 
evacuated and plans were prepared in case such measures 
were necessary in Dar es Salaam. 
18 The townsfolk there 
had already been involved in air raid precautions and prac- 
tice blackouts. Civil defence plans became more important 
with the imminent danger of Japanese planes from aircraft 
carriers in the Indian Ocean. In Kenya it was decided to 
widen the scope of the Defence Forces to incorporate both 
'native and non-native personnel'. Provision for non-whites 
was made in the 1st and 2nd Auxiliary Defence Force Battalions 
which would be called upon to defend Nairobi in an emergency. 
19 
This allowed a kind of African Home Guard to be attached 
to the Kenya Defence Force, which had previously been for 
those of European descent only. Regular units, such as 
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the Kenya Coast Defence Battery, continued to train and 
expand. At the time of the fall of Singapore, African scouts 
were raised as coast irregulars from the Songea area of 
Tanganyika. 20 Their knowledge of the East African bush 
was considered important when Japanese invasion of the East 
coast seemed possible. 
As more Africans were recruited for service within East 
Africa and in the Middle East, the authorities drew their 
recruits from a wider field. An official report read; 
'Tribes which have not been called upon to any great 
extend should now be required to provide a proportion of 
the requirements. 121 
This aggravated the labour problems on the farms in Kenya 
and on the sisal estates in both Kenya and Tanganyika. In 
1942 pressure from the white settlers finally persuaded 
the government to allow labour conscription. Although this 
arrangement helped the farmers, it also had an adverse effect 
on the labour supply as volunteer labourers handed in their 
notice in order to return to the reserves and look after 
the homes and families of relatives who had been conscripted. 
22 
The threat of conscription did cause a rapid increase in 
those seeking voluntary employment. These measures affected 
military and military labour recruitment and the KAR had 
to be satisfied with a smaller proportion of men from the 
traditional areas. A British officer with the pioneers 
in North Africa recalled; 
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'After the fall of Tobruk (June 1942) the KAR was 
expanding enormously and accepting recruits from tribes 
which were regarded as unsuitable in the old days. '23 
There was a deliberate policy of recruiting in new areas 
for the pioneers so as not to rival the KAR infantry in 
the traditional areas. 
24 For example, the Toro, Teso, Soga 
and Gwere of Uganda were recruited to the pioneers, as were 
some Ganda. In Kenya the majority of pioneers came from 
Nyanza province, an area which did not usually supply farm 
labour either. This raises suspicions that the Kenyan employ- 
ers of farm labour exaggerated their difficulties in finding 
good workers because of the rival attractions of the military. 
In Tanganyika, a number of recruits came from the Arusha 
area near Mount Meru. They were members of the Rusha tribe, 
a branch of the Masai. 
25 
The Chief Secretary to the Governors' Conference described 
the tribal composition of a Ugandan Company of the EAMLS; 
'The company is made up of Bateso, Batoro, Basoga and 
Bagwere. These tribes took some time to accustom themselves 
to conditions in the Western Desert at this time of year. 
They required very careful handling and Major Badger's 
experience in Uganda was of invaluable assistance. At Tobruk 
they experienced bitter cold and sandstorms. They were 
employed alongside an RAF unit and made rapid progress, 
culminating in a bomb loading record! ' 
26 
The widening scope of recruitment is illustrated in the 
enlistment of men who needed careful handling. Africans 
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from the traditionally martial tribes would have been more 
predictable to the British officers. They would have been 
in less need of supervision by a man with local experience 
who 'knew the African'. 
In some quarters it was felt that Kenya had supplied more 
than its fair share of recruits for the armed services. 
A leading article in the East African Standard27 pointed 
out that Kenya had already provided approximately half of 
the East African manpower for military service and military 
labour units. It was certainly correct that Kenya had pro- 
vided the largest proportion of men for the AAPC but not 
more than half. 
28 The article urged the Kenyan government 
to put pressure on the military authorities to expand their 
recruiting in Uganda and Tanganyika. Once again the Kenyan 
settler farmers were making their concerns known with the 
hope of an improved labour situation. 
In the meantime, Middle East Command kept up a constant 
demand and men had to be kitted out and trained quickly. 
The proposed strength of the AAPC for June 30th 1942 amounted 
to an African establishment of 48 companies of 400 men each, 
atotal of 19,200 men. This took into account reinforcements 







These quotas were 650 short of the target 19,200 men. The 
Director of Pioneers and Labour, Lieutenant Colonel E. Brooke 
Anderson, suggested that Tanganyika should take up this 
deficiency and also take over the Uganda draft of 600 men 
for the month of May, to equalise the quotas, approximately, 
between the territories. 29 This would be a slight concession 
to Kenyan protests. Nevertheless, the expansion of the 
labour units for service in North Africa continued in Kenya 
with no redress for the previous imbalance of recruitment 
between the territories. 
Plans were also made in 1942, by Brooke Anderson, for an 
EAMLS reserve in case large numbers of labourers were needed 
at short notice in an emergency. These would be drawn from 
retired members of the EAMLS rather than from 'raw material' 
and District Commissioners in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika 
were asked to prepare lists of all ex-EAMLS in their dis- 
tricts. 30 
Another major change in recruiting came about in 1942 when 
Government ordinances subjected Africans to conscription 
for the Pioneers and Military Labour Service. In August 
a conference at Cairo discussed the recruitment of West 
and East Africans for service in the Middle East. 
31 The 
following month an African manpower conference was held 
in Nairobi to discuss methods of conscripting the projected 
100,000 recruits needed by the end of 1943 in the Middle 
East. 
Once again, military requirements had a 'knock on' effect 
on East African agriculture. In Bukoba province, Tanganyika, 
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young men welcomed the chance of well paid service in the 
army because it freed them from obligations to work on the 
family shamba. In particular this influenced coffee pro- 
duction in the province. The Provincial Commissioner, 
E. K. Lumley, sought to readjust this balance and investi- 
gated cases where chiefs, sub-chiefs and village headmen 
had taken the opportunity to put forward men they disliked 
for conscription. Lumley set up an unofficial tribunal 
for those who thought they or their sons had been unjustly 
treated. The military authorities devolved the task of 
conscription to the Native authorities but the civil 
authorities reassumed some responsibility and returned 
several conscripts to their homes. Lumley describes a typical 
case; 
'A father had been conscripted along with his son, 
leaving the mother alone to look after the shamba. I 
released them both. It was my policy to see that at least 
one son remained with the father on the shamba. If the 
father were dead, then two sons at least had to stay at 
home'. 32 
In Uganda, more care was taken that recruits for the army 
came from the less productive areas, especially the West 
Nile, but it was still difficult to resolve the conflict 
between military recruitment and the production of essential 
products; sugar, sisal and timber. The introduction of 
conscription to the AAPC and EAMLS aggravated the problem 
in 1942. It was also necessary to produce food supplies 
for the migrant workers on the estates and therefore important 
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not to strip the country of the manpower it needed for this 
purpose. 
Young men who were allocated to the production of food or 
other important crops may have envied their brothers who 
returned on army leave, fit, well fed,. smartly kj. tted out 
and with money in their pockets. In October 1942, an article 
in the Tanganyika Standard proclaimed; 'Africans Enjoy 
Life in the Army'. Tanga district had provided twice the 
number of recruits required of it and had only had to use 
conscription earlier in the year. Men returning on leave 
loudly praised army food and conditions. In the Lake Province, 
Tanganyika, the Provincial Commissioner claimed that the 
soldiers' air of pride in their units had encouraged several 
more men to join the Pioneers. 
The dangers which askaris in North Africa faced were not 
necessarily a good advertisement for army life, and much 
depended on the attitude of the audience. As in any society, 
there were those who yearned for excitement and those who 
preferred a quiet life. 
The work of the AAPC and EAMLS in the Middle East was rigor- 
ous and varied. William Wilberforce Nadiope, (later Sir 
William), son of the paramount chief of the Kamolin and 
from the Soga tribe of Uganda, completed his education in 
England in 1939. Immediately he became a sergeant and saw 
service with the pioneers at Tobruk. Although not apparently 
aVi. wholly reliable - witness, because* of his tendency to exag- 
gerate, he was firmly of the belief that the Pioneer Corps 
were subjected to greater danger than the KAR. Only the 
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dangers of the Burma, war, he claimed with hindsight, matched 
those faced by the pioneers in North Africa. 
33 
One task of the Pioneer Corps was to build a railway in 
the Western Desert. When Rommel attacked on 26th May 1942, 
lorries were sent to evacuate these pioneers. As they 
retreated eastwards they met the guards brigade and withdrew 
through its front line. Then they met with a German Panzer 
division and some were taken prisoner and sent to prisoner 
of war camps in Germany. Eventually, at the end of the 
war, these Africans ended up in High Wycombe. 34 
The Base Depot of the Pioneer Corps at Quassassin was only 
100 miles from the German line at El Alamein. Here supplies 
were built up for the Allied offensive. The work of the 
Pioneers also involved shifting bombs and ammunition. They 
formed garrison companies for guarding vital installations 
and so released European troops, which was considered one 
of their most vital functions. They helped the Royal Engineers 
to build the railway for the 8th Army and were employed 
to dig the second defence line behind El Alamein, in June 
1942, after the fall of Tobruk. The AAPC also worked along- 
side the Royal Engineers in laying mines, fortifying gun 
positions, guarding ordnance depots and hospitals, guarding 
the underground telephone exchange north of Suez and the 
docks and petrol refinery station in Suez. There was no 
reliable local labour and so East and West Africans were 
considered the obvious choice and they were far more amenable 
than Egyptians or Arabs. 
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Pioneers were issued with rifles, bayonets and ammunition, 
mainly those previously captured from the Italians, and 
they were given rifle training and drill. If a labour comp- 
any changed status to become a garrison company, troops 
did a month's intensive training in guard duties and drill. 
For example, 8999 Company from Uganda underwent this training 
before moving to Cairo to guard about twenty different 
military installations from sabotage. Feeding the Company 
was awkward because the men were scattered all over the 
city. The problem was solved by the introduction of a 'meals 
on wheels' system. A well-fed askari was more likely to 
carry out his duties efficiently. A British officer with 
8999 Company, recorded; 
'Here and there, of course, individuals failed to come 
up to the mark, and an odd sentry would be found asleep 
or unalert at his post, but I doubt whether troops of any 
other race or colour would have achieved a much better 
record at this job in the same conditions. '35 
The same Company moved to Kantara in July 1943, on the Sinai 
side of Suez where they guarded military installations and 
a big ammunition dump in the middle of the Sinai desert. 
The work of these askaris was arduous and undertaken in 
adverse conditions and it is to their credit that they were 
nicknamed the 'smilers' by the South Africans who, for some 
of the campaign, served alongside them. 
Good morale was essential for maintaining the quality and 
quantityyof recruits. East Africa Command and the Governors' 
Conference firmly resisted the employment of East Africans 
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in what were termed dilution roles. African Pioneer com- 
panies were to be kept intact and not divided into drafts 
to dilute European units. This role would be reserved for 
troops from the High Commission territories of Bechuanaland, 
Basutoland and Swaziland. East African units were not broken 
up in this way because of the problem of language and communi- 
cation. The diversity of African languages within the AAPC 
was enough for the European officers to cope with through 
the medium of Kiswahili. This was also the reason why 
Europeans with experience of East Africa were preferred 
to command AAPC companies. This policy was designed to 
minimise the feelings of bewilderment of the African askari 
on travelling so far from his home. He was often among 
strangers when with other East Africans but he would feel 
more of an alien if employed in a dilution role, taking 
orders from unfamiliar officers. In one pioneer company 
only five out of 350 Africans spoke English; the African 
Company Sergeant Major (CSM) from Uganda, two clerks from 
Nyasaland and two medical orderlies from Kenya. These 
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five men could be effective as translators provided their 
company was not dispersed. 
A welfare fund was set up with the assistance of Middle 
East Command. Each territory (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika) 
contributed £1,000 a month. The fund provided extras to 
normal rations and looked into matters such as entertainments 
and newspapers. Rations provided by the AAPC and EAMLS 
included maize meal, maize beer, meat, vegetables, bully 
beef and cigarettes. Each company had six or seven cooks 
from within its ranks. In some companies food caused problems. 
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D. H. Barber, a British Officer with the pioneers, complained 
that the food was mainly 'mealie meal' and second grade 
meat - nearly all fat. Apart from grievances relating to 
the quality of food, some Africans objected to certain foods 
because of tribal custom. For example, the people of Ankole 
would not eat the flesh of any small animal such as pig 
or sheep. An attempt was made by Barber to replace the 
mutton issue with some alternative meat but as the Nyankoli 
were said to have objected on tribal rather than religious 
grounds, their protest was ignored by the Commanding Officer. 
Other pioneers were more satisfied. One group, camped near 
to Indian troops, asked for curry. The request was granted 
and the curried'stew proved so popular that it was adopted 
permanently as the main meal each day. 
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Lieutenant Colonel E. Brooke Anderson suggested that visits 
by East African officials would help keep up the morale 
of the pioneers. In May 1942, Mr Fazan, Provincial Commis- 
sioner of Kenya's Nyanza province, from which many pioneers 
originated, was despatched to North Africa. Fazan's report 
of 28 May 194238 shows that many pioneers were very fit 
and were putting on weight. Their main concerns were domestic 
ones such as unfaithful wives, neglected huts and a lack 
of letters from home. One British officer had foolishly 
posted a notice advising the curtailment of family remit- 
tances if a man did not receive any acknowledgement of his 
letters from his wife. This action worried Fazan who 
reported; 
'We have always regarded the family remittance as 
our best recruiting agent. ' 
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Many African wives could not write and their lack of communi- 
cation aroused distrust in some British officers. However, 
as Fazan pointed out, discontinuing payments to wives or 
other dependent females could cause hardship and distress 
on the home front. Such remittances had been part of the 
agreement between civil and military authorities when the 
service of the East African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps in the 
Middle East, was first broached. The military authorities 
were aware that stoppages of remittances could give the 
wrong impression back in East Africa and have an adverse 
effect on future recruitment. The welfare fund for Africans 
serving with the pioneers in North Africa, was also set 
up with the view of encouraging letters home and safeguarding 
the payment of family remittances. As for the civil authority, 
they wanted some kind of guarantee that army wives and 
soldiers' families would be provided for out of army funds 
and not left unsupported. 
Fazan's visit to the Middle East was reported in the East 
AfricaniStandard which emphasised the chief grievance of 
the askaris, that they did not receive enough letters from 
home. The East African Standard said that askaris needed 
home contact and that many letters never reached them because 
they were illegible or badly addressed. This problem was 
tackled a few months later when a free letters scheme was 
inaugurated. Schools, missions and district commissioners 
received the 100,000 printed letter forms for distribution 
to soldiers' families in Kenya. It was hoped that the scheme 
would extend to Uganda and Tanganyika. The free letter 
scheme was also useful for those askaris who had recently 
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embarked for Ceylon, official news of which was received by 
the press in May 1942. 
'Already East African natives are employed in the 
Western Desert and the latest announcement will encourage 
the forces throughout the whole command in the knowledge 
that, from their ranks, men are being called to new res- 
ponsibilities. r39 
Recruiting was a continual process and matters of welfare 
were very important if Africans were to accept the new res- 
ponsibilities of serving, for the first time, outside the 
continent of Africa. 
Fazan's second main concern was that of leave for the troops 
in North Africa, especially home leave. Not only would 
this boost the morale of men already in service, it would 
also provide visual evidence to potential recruits back 
home that enrolment in the pioneers could be survived and 
might even be enjoyed. Unfortunately, some EAMLS personnel 
who had transferred to the pioneers before leaving East Africa 
had been away from their homes for 18 months. Most men had 
been in service for 6 months without home leave. Rumours 
about the cancellation of all leave spread panic through 
the African ranks. Fazan believed this problem would be 
resolved when the first group of men were granted leave and 
then returned. This would placate the askaris already in 
service, dispel rumours and might encourage recruitment. 
Regarding this last point the authorities did not always 
have cause to be optimistic. Back in 1940, in Ujiji, 
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Tanganyika, KAR men on leave thrilled large crowds with their 
stories; of. army life but were so imaginative that young men 
in the audiences vowed never to join! 
40 
The pioneers were 
entitled to leave after two years service in the Middle East 
and D. H. Barber's platoon went home to Uganda. The African 
N. C. Os were not so lucky. They were in short supply in the 
Middle East and their names were taken off the leave list. 
Many of them tried to get reduced to the ranks in consequence. 
Home leave was obviously a priority if troops were to remain 
in reasonably good spirits. 
Early in 1943 the first 400 askaris of the APPC to get home 
leave were given a special welcome at their port of disem- 
barkation in Kenya. Here they were greeted by chiefs of 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, including the Katikiro of 
Buganda. Their arrival was reported by the East African 
Standard 
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which appealed once again, on behalf of the askaris, 
for more letters from home. Although the readership of the 
newspaper was largely European, those who had contact with 
soldiers' families might help with the writing and correct 
addressing of mail. 
Middle East Welfare also stretched to sponsoring tours of 
the Middle East by African chiefs. This was one way of getting 
home news direct to the askaris. In February, six chiefs 
representing all three East African territories with soldiers 
in the Middle East, went north to tour from Libya to Palestine. 
From Uganda came the Katikiro of Buganda, Enosi, Ejok of 
Teso and Amoth, Owira of Central Kavirondo; all areas from 
which many pioneer recruits were drawn. From Kenya came 
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Kasina, Ndoo of Kitui and from Tanganyika Mtemi Bele Masanja 
of Nera and Abdiel Shangali of Machame. The chiefs commented 
on the improved physique of their people and heard the praise 
which many British officers gave for their African troops. 
The Kenyan chief, the Ndoo of Kitui, had been a Regimental 
Sergeant Major in World War One, with 1/3 KAR and 2/6KAR, 
and displayed a chestful of medals. Once more the askaris 
made a plea for more letters from home and this was some 
time after the free letters scheme had been introduced. The 
scheme had only had a limited success. 
The two Tanganyikan chiefs were photographed for the Tangan- 
yikan Standard, chatting informally to two askaris. Mtemi 
Balele Masanja was from the Lake Province and represented 
the Sukuma among other tribes. Mangt Abdiel Shangali repre- 
sented peoples of the Northern Province, including the Chagga. 
On their return to Dar es Salaam the latter chief addressed 
Africans in the city, stressing the favourable treatment 
of African askaris in the Middle East. It was the task 
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of the native authorities to enforce conscription and produce 
quotas and the attitude of the chiefs probably reflected 
their own interest in this direction. 
There were problems in finding men of suitable temperament 
and physique for the pioneers. This unit was never so popular 
as the KAR regular infantry battalions. It was still too 
often associated with the Carrier Corps which had suffered 
such terrible casualties in World War One without the status 
and recognition of a uniformed unit. Among 
the first intake of recruits to 7KAR, an infantry battalion, 
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were five men who deserted because they had been issued with 
khaki instead of blue puttees and they thought they were 
being tricked into the Carrier Corps. 
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Attempts were made 
to improve the appeal of the pioneers by issuing a Uniform 
and dropping the derogatory term 'carrier'. Nevertheless, 
it became necessary to conscript a number of pioneers and 
the quality of recruits dropped. The chiefs found their 
task more difficult and began to send more men who were 
physically unfit for labour. The able bodied men still in 
civilian life were needed for the production of food or were 
working on the expatriate-owned estates. The chiefs would 
need to keep some fit people to run the local community and 
by 1943 there were not so many fit men available outside 
the army. Disquieting facts were revealed about African 
health by labour conscription and military recruitment. 
The Annual Report of the Tanganyikan Medical Department showed 
concern in this field. Malnutrition was fairly widespread 
and bad diet caused poor eyesight, a common reason for a 
potential recruit to be turned away. It was a sad reflec- 
tion on colonialism that the subject peoples' health only 
became a matter of concern when large numbers of physically 
fit labourers and soldiers were needed. 
In addition to the problem of unfit recruits was that of 
desertion and indiscipline. There were difficulties in con- 
trolling large numbers of conscripts, back from leave, waiting 
to embark at Lindi in Tanganyika. On two occasions at least, 
there were problems in getting the men on board ship. In 
Bukoba province, Tanganyika, where conscripts had to await 




Conscripts on leave also frequently sold articles 
of uniform for beer money. The poor standard of recruits 
in Bukoba was attributed to the weakness of the chiefs in 
that province and to the fact that certain coffee growers 
had bribed the chiefs not to send their workers. Among the 
peoples of Bukoba were the Haya who were banana eaters and 
thought to be similar to the Ganda of Uganda in temperament; 
'barrack room lawyer' types. The Wenye were caught between 
the civil and military authorities and the wishes of their 
own people. They chose to send very young men who were un- 
married in order to avoid the responsibility of looking after 
wives and children. The chiefs in Tanganyika were the inheri- 
tors of Cameron's policy of indirect rule and might have 
welcomed the assistance of a British recruiting sergeant 
to take away the odium of the unpopular task of providing 
quotas. The civil authorities responsible for these con- 
scripts on leave soon learnt the wisdom of spreading a man's 
ration money over the period of leave rather than giving 
it to him in advance, to squander on beer. Conscripts had 
a different status to regulars and a good conduct record 
was of no interest to them as they automatically received 
a gratuity at the end of their service. In Dar es Salaam 
all the bars were closed while the conscripts were in town 
awaiting embarkation. 
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Barber46 recalled in 1943 how, 'Throughout the E. A. pioneer 
corps, except in certain companies, there had always been 
a certain amount of disciplinary trouble and the percentage 
of "crime" had been very high. ' . 
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There were some serious discipline problems among the pion- 
eers regardless of whether or not they had been conscripted. 
Such incidents should not be unduly emphasised, yet in 1942, 
two platoons of men from Toro actually refused to go to the 
Western Desert and had to be spoken to by the Area Commander. 
Even under threat of court martial they persisted in their 
refusal to go. Then Colonel East King, specially sent from 
Cairo, came to speak to the men who still remained defiant. 
The officer directly in charge of the men refused to command 
them any longer and was transferred to another unit. The 
rebellious pioneers went unpunished. 
' 
Such behaviour was 
widespread at the time of the retreat to El Alamein when 
it appeared that the Germans were winning. Having built 
up an unpleasant picture of the Nazis through British prop- 
aganda and having been warned of the atrocities the Germans 
might commit in Africa if they created an Empire there, it 
was no wonder that the askaris were reluctant to get them- 
selves captured. Their fears on this occasion were natural 
in view of their otherwise creditable reputation. 
All such incidents are liable to different interpretations 
and none more so than that which had occurred among the ranks 
of the East African Pioneers at Garba Tula in 1939. During 
a parade, a large sector of the 1st Battalion refused to 
do road work and produced a list of grievances including 
low pay, badly cooked food, poor washing facilities and too 
much road work. Despite being cautioned by the Commanding 
Officer, who agreed to look into their complaints, 500 men 
persisted in their refusal to do road work the following 
114 
day. Their officers took disciplinary action, herding the 
rebels into a wired camp at Isiolo, removing the ringleaders 
and bringing in 1KAR to divide the rebels into easily manage- 
able groups. A disturbance ensued in which the pioneers 
rushed the entrance and came into conflict with the KAR, 
who were armed with sticks. Seventy prisoners suffered head 
injuries and one man subsequently died. 
The main concern of the authorities was not so much to justify 
the strict disciplinary action meted out to the rebels, or 
to inquire into the death of one pioneer; it was to make 
it clear that such disobedience did not represent a more 
general disaffection in the armed services or the military 
labour service. Emphasis was placed on the prompt restoration 
of order, on the loyal action of 1KAR and, paradoxically, on 
the loyalty of the malcontents themselves. In protesting 
against their conditions of service they were deemed to be 
expressing a desire to serve in His Majesty's Forces in a 
less humble role. 
'The desire of the malcontents to play a proper military 
part is altogether admirable and is in keeping with the 
regular African forces and those now in their augmented 
ranks. ' 
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Fears that German propagandists might use this incident to 
undermine East African morale were unfounded and, apart from 
the ringleaders, the rebel pioneers returned to their work 
with no further protests. In future the British authorities 
planned to mix the tribes within the units so that subversion 
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was less easy to organise. Blame was attached to the short- 
age of European personnel, and unsuitability of some of the 
officers, to the Sudanese N. C. Os who stirred up trouble and 
to the fact that the askaris all came from one group of 
peoples, the Kavirondo. At first it was thought that 50% 
of the malcontents would have to be replaced by degrees but 
they soon settled down again. It was planned to dilute the 
Kavirondo with men from other tribal groups in future. 
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It might have been feared that the incident at Garba Tula 
would act as a dress rehearsal for more serious trouble among 
the ranks of the pioneers and the infantry once the KAR and 
its auxiliary forces began to serve overseas. However, in 
the event, most protests were isolated and related to specific 
grievances rather than to the spread of mutinous opinions 
throughout the forces. 
One of the major reasons for dissatisfaction in the African 
ranks was dislike of foreign service. Many African pioneers 
experienced a long stretch of foreign service; some were 
in North Africa for two years without home leave. Contingency 
plans for Africans to serve outside East Africa itself had 
been made after the First World War. Traditionally one of 
the Nyasaland battalions had been stationed in Tanganyika 
because the League of Nations mandate restricted the use 
of Tanganyikan askaris. By 1940 the terms of the mandate 
were given a more liberal interpretation so that Tanganyikan 
Africans could serve outside Tanganyika for the defence 
of the territory'. 
50 Eventually some Tanganyikans defended 
the Territory by going to Burma. 
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Tanganyikans and other East Africans demonstrated their dis- 
like of foreign service and their fears of travelling over- 
seas. In March 1942 the 21st East African Brigade went to 
Ceylon, prior to embarking for Burma. In Ceylon, shortly 
before 3/6KAR was due to go to Burma, all personal servants 
of British personnel, were given the choice of enlisting 
as askaris or being repatriated to Africa. Of the 50 servants, 
46 elected to return to East Africa. That so few chose to 
join up is significant. These servants must have seen some- 
thing of the jungle training going on in Ceylon in preparation 
for Burma and had witnessed other aspects of KAR life abroad. 
They were also aware of the possibility that they might get 
killed. These reasons were sufficient to deter them from 
joining the KAR and accepting better pay and status. Instead 
they went home. 
51 
Perhaps they were wise to do so as 3/6KAR went to the Kabaw 
Valley where one of the four servants who did join up later 
died in action. 
While the 21st East African Brigade was training in Ceylon, 
the 25th East African Brigade should have set out for Mada- 
gascar from Abyssinia but this Brigade defected52 and had 
to be replaced by the 22nd East African Brigade, which embarked 
in May 1942. The 25th Brigade, consisting of 2/3KAR, 2/14KAR 
and 3/4KAR was a relatively new formation which had seen 
recent action in the operations against Gondar. It was the 
last brigade to leave Abyssinia, having stayed on to complete 
the evacuation of prisoners. The other Brigade involved 
in the Gondar operations 26(EA)Brigade, had already moved 
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south. The 25th (EA) Brigade had assumed that they were 
due for leave in Kenya, but instead they were told to await 
embarkation overseas. Whether or not their assumption was 
correct, it is hardly surprising that this news concerned 
them. One minute they were anticipating a reunion with their 
wives and families, and the next they faced the prospect 
of further fighting overseas and the chance of death in action. 
Casualties in the Abyssinian campaign had been low but there 
were enough for the fear of death to be a reality to those 
who survived. The askaris of the 25th(EA) Brigade began 
to claim that they had joined the KAR solely to defend their 
homelands and not to fight abroad. By now, knowing something 
of the importance of written documentation to the European 
mind, the askari's best tactic was to challenge the validity 
of his original attestation papers. They demanded the 
opportunity to volunteer afresh for service abroad, and at 
the same time, took the opportunity to complain about their 
pay and lack of home leave. 
Although Pioneers received 32/- a month, good pay compared 
with wages at home and a positive incentive for joining in 
the first place, the cost of living in Egypt was high. For 
example, a tin of good boot polish was Lt/-, a bottle of beer 
was 1/-, the 'civvy' cinema was 1/- and a daily paper was 
21d. With 10/- deducted for a wife or relative, the remain- 
ing 22/- did not go very far, especially as many Africans 
had other responsibilities at home such as children in 
school. Some conscientiously sent as much as another 10/- 
home. 53 The complaints of 25(EA) Brigade were justified. 
Fearing a full scale revolt in occupied enemy territory and 
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with no independent troops to enforce the embarkation of 
the Brigade, the British wisely backed down and withdrew 
25(EA) Brigade from overseas service. They returned to Kenya 
by road, a mode of transport which was reassuring in the 
circumstances. On this occasion, a full scale revolt had 
been organised in a brigade, affecting all three battalions 
and men of different languages, tribes and areas. All were 
united in their understandable desire to return home and 
no doubt they would have continued to prove troublesome if 
their demands had not been met. 
In the Somali units of the KAR this situation was worse and 
ultimately led to the cancellation of plans to form a third 
battalion. In April 1942, War Office permission had been 
sought to raise three infantry battalions in British Somali- 
land. Somalis had already acquired a reputation of being 
'difficult' and it was thought politic to include a Somali 
battalion in each of the three new brigades then forming 
within the command. By tradition the Somaliland Camel Corps 
was diluted with Nyasas to try and curb the rebellious nature 
of the Somalis. The first of the new battalions, 71(Som)KAR 
and 72(Som)KAR were placed in brigades of mixed tribes. 
Desertions began in 71(Som)KAR as soon as the men knew they 
would leave Somaliland. Later in the war the situation 
escalated. 
The attempt to recruit Somalis in 1942, despite their reputa- 
tion, shows that the authorities were casting around for 
new sources of manpower. Recruitment began to prove more 
difficult in the year when conscription had to be introduced 
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for the pioneers and the 25th(EA) Brigade refused to serve 
abroad, at least until leave in Kenya had been granted. 
Increasingly, the recruiting officers were forced to try 
new areas and a gradual move away from the traditional areas 
of recruitment was accompanied by the introduction of new 
recruiting methods. In July 1942 a military convoy left 
Nairobi for Tanganyika. It was openly admitted that a sophis- 
ticated propaganda operation was being launched, quite 
different from the recruiting safaris which had sufficed 
in the 1930s and at the outbreak of war. The need for re- 
cruits was now urgent, for reinforcements abroad and as 
Pioneers in the Middle East. The fear of a Japanese attack 
on East Africa's ports meant that men were needed to fight 
on a new front, one which faced east. The new recruiting 
methods reflected this urgency. 
The convoy aimed at appealing to the African's sense of duty 
and demonstrating the advantages of enlistment. The display 
was noisy and colourful, with a festival atmosphere designed 
to attract the local populace away from their day to day 
tasks and thereby absorb their full attention. The remoter 
the district, the more successful the ploy. Posters, displays 
of medals and hat flashes, photographs, films and live talks 
by British and African personnel were all included. The 
weapons used by African infantry men - rifles, bren guns, 
grenades and three inch mortars - were exhibited. Nine 
African soldiers accompanied the African mobile Propaganda 
Unit to give first hand accounts of their lives in the army. 
The treasure trove of materialism presented to the potential 
recruits had its impact but was more effective when linked 
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to African faces. The nine Africans represented the KAR 
infantry, the Pioneers, the Artillery, the Medical Corps, 
the Signals, the EAMLS and the EAASC. The senior NCO was 
a Company Sergeant Major in the Signals, a figure of some 
importance, who, though only 25 years old, had spent 16 years 
in the army because he was born in the 'lines'. The pioneer 
was a "Masai , 
54 from Arusha. To add further interest, a 
photographic record of his career was on show, tracing his 
progress from the day he volunteered at his District Commis- 
sioner's office. This record later became available in the 
form of a glossy booklet of photographs and simple narrative, 
published by the East African Ministry of Information in 
Nairobi. The hero was Kisarishu, the title 'A Spear for 
Freedom'. He was born when Tanganyika was under German rule; 
'In,. Kisarishu's village, the brutality of the German 
occupation is still remembered. ' 
Whether or not Tanganyikan Africans had hated the Germans, 
they were encouraged to do so in future. They were taught 
to fear a repetition of the German occupation and the Germans 
were portrayed as monsters who would have no scruples in 
committing atrocities, particularly against peoples they 
thought of as racially inferior. This attitude was not just 
the German prerogative and some propagandists strove to avoid 
criticisms of German racist policies, fearing that it would 
backfire on them. Fortunately most of Britain's African 
subjects in East Africa were more concerned for their material 
well being itself than about achieving that end through 
politics. Anti Nazi propaganda frightened the more simple 
121 
minded, but it was wordly motives which spurred the majority 
of recruits. The account of Kisarishu-'-s career in 'A Spear 
for Freedom' concludes, 
'Kisarishu's accounts of army life must have been 
pleasant, as his brothers followed him into the army. ' 
New recruits joined the KAR because of the promise of a better 
life rather than a desire to avenge themselves on the Germans. 
The simple emotive appeal of the propaganda booklet 'A Spear 
for Freedom' is typified by the last page which shows a smart, 
well fed and upright Kisarishu with rifle and uniform on 
sentry duty, guarding his own African shores; 
'He is soon due for promotion to corporal and, like 
men from other parts of the Empire, of many creeds, races 
and tongues, Kisarishu is on active service for His Majesty, 
King George VI'. 
This material would bring tears to the eyes of a British 
expatriate admiring the ultimate colonial product. However, 
its school text book English was intended to appeal to the 
semi-educated and younger men of a village, who sought advance- 
ment and a chance to escape the rigid discipline of their 
elders, albeit for a new type of discipline in the army. 
An appeal was made to their spirit of adventure, their material- 
ism and desire to ape the Europeans and their romantic notions 
about serving the Empire and protecting their homeland. 
It did not give them credit for having much intelligence. 
However, the emphasis of all the propaganda was on the career 
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prospects for individuals and the radical changes that the 
army could make to a man's life. The recruiting campaign 
was carried to the remoter districts where previously, 
European contacts had been minimal and where, as a result, 
there were many who took the claims at their face value and 
were willing to be convinced of the army's attractions. 
'White man's Magic' in the form of two field wireless sets, 
impressed the local people when their chief was able to talk 
to them from the other side of the village. 
The recruiters were proud of their audio-visual aids, which 
included an epidiascope, loaned by the Prince of Wales School 
in Nairobi. Such novelties added to the general spectacle. 
Film projectors showed war films, such as Dr Guy Johnson's 
War came to Kenya and With Our African Troops in Action. 
Charlie: Chaplin films proved popular and although not alto- 
gether relevant to the business in hand, they drew the large 
audiences the recruiters wanted in order to present more 
subtle propaganda. A film about a mongoose killing a snake 
went down well with African audiences even if they did not 
always register the intended military allegory. 
Songs and popular KAR marches were played on gramophones, 
as in many other cultures, stirring the listeners to strut 
in time to the music. Noise travels further than a static 
exhibition and draws in the curious. As Goebbels had shown 
in Germany, the individual dissenter could not be heard above 
the music blaring from the loudspeaker. Military insignia 
was another useful propaganda weapon and display boards 
carried every hat badge and flash in the command and all 
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badges of rank, with their corresponding rates of pay, and 
the medals which Africans could gain. Last, but not least, 
the display included an exhibition of an askari's daily 
rations! 
Audiences of up to 3,000 assembled to see the African Mobile 
Propaganda Unit at the centres it visited in Moshi and the 
Kilimanjaro region and recruits began to come forward. The 
Propaganda Unit provided a useful supplement to the recruit- 
ing work of the civil officers who retained certain recruit- 
ing responsibilities, while being hard pressed by other war 
time commitments. The civil administration could not find 
time to explain the difference between the Carrier Corps 
of World War One, which many Africans recalled with dread, 
and the better paid EAMLS and AAPC of World War Two. 
A Kenyan Provincial Commissioner during the period 1915 to 
1918 noted that thousands of Africans served as carriers in 
the Great war. Many of them died. 
'The natives of British East Africa naturally succumb- 
ed to the unhealthy climate and strenuous war conditions 
in German East Africa and the return of our Kikuyu survivors 
to their homes in the Native Reserve, broken both in health 
and spirit, was not the least of the tragedies caused by 
the Great War', 55 
This was a matter of concern to Africans which the Mobile 
Propaganda Unit dealt with successfully. The East African 
Standard concluded; 
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'The truth in pictures and personal display will prove 
beyond doubt the most lasting appeal to the peoples of 
Africa. '56 
The mobility of the Unit was certainly significant in taking 
information direct to the people in territories where com- 
munications were primitive. In seeking out recruits the 
Mobile Propaganda Unit 'blazed a trail' through northern 
Tanganyika and created its own publicity by becoming the 
talk of the areas it visited. 
Propaganda was also spread by mobile cinemas, independently 
of the African Mobile Propaganda Unit. Commentators gave 
prominence to the concept of Empire and the two major adver- 
saries, as they saw it, Churchill and Hitler. One of the 
most popular films showed a British office worker returning 
from the city to spend the evening digging his allotment. 
It was hoped that the film would encourage Africans to work 
harder producing food for the Imperial war effort. 
Propaganda also permeated the KAR from within and in June 
1942 it was proposed to recruit African schoolmasters for 
the KAR S? They were to train at Jeanes School in Kenya 
and be posted to battalions as Sergeant Teachers. Their 
first job was to teach Africans English. Their other task 
was to pass on the knowledge they had gained as part of their 
course at Jeanes on topics such as the importance of Madagascar 
and the danger of the Japanese threat in the Far East. For 
indoctrination to be successful it had to be constant and 
to continue when the new recruit had joined the army. 
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The new style recruiting drives of 1942 were successful, 
but also very necessary if the KAR was to continue in its 
rapid rate of expansion. All the infantry and regular KAR 
soldiers were volunteers and so were all but a few of the 
pioneers and labourers. This seems evidence enough that 
recruiting improved following the exertions of the Mobile 
Propaganda Unit and the mobile cinemas. By May 1942 the 
KAR had 28 battalions, twenty-one had been added to the 
original seven. In May 1942, East African Brigades, includ- 
ing northern Rhodesians, were to be deployed as follows: 
25 EA Brigade - Mobile defence of Tanganyika 
26 EA Brigade - evacuation of Italians from Abyssinia 
27 NR Brigade - reconstituted with KAR units to become 
27 EA Brigade - Madagascar 
28 EA Brigade - blockade of French Somaliland 
29 EA Brigade - Somalia and reserved areas of 
Abyssinia 
Two more brigades were formed by the end of 1942 and they 
left Kenya for service further north. The two original brig- 
ades of the Regiment, 21 EA Brigade and 22 EA Brigade, were 
already in Ceylon. 
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Such rapid expansion, far beyond the strength of the KAR 
in the First World War, suggested that a new role was being 
proposed for the Regiment. This was to play a part in the 
Madagascar campaign and the reconquest of South East Asia. 
In 1943 a third phase of recruitment was about to begin. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Third Phase of Recruitment 1943 to 1945 
The third major recruiting campaign began in 1943 and con- 
tinued to the end of the war. This operation was intended 
to meet the specific needs of the Burma war. Fortunately 
East Africa was in a better position to divert its supply 
of men in this direction following the surrender of the 
Italians in 1943. The Middle East was described as a 'drain' 
on East African manpower by the East African Governors' 
conference, which was again hoping for a respite from military 
recruitment in order to concentrate African energies on 
food production. While Middle East Command turned to West 
Africa to supply non-combatants for the North African campaign, 
East Africa was called on to provide soldiers to fight in 
a new theatre of war, the Far East. By May 1945 there were 
46,050 East African troops in Asia. 1 These men were drawn 
from a variety of East African tribes, some from the trad- 
itionally war-like tribes, others from tribes new to the 
army. There were two main reasons for the changing tribal 
composition of the KAR. First, the army was being forced 
to cast its net more widely as the supply of manpower from 
traditional areas ran low, and second, the nature of the 
war in Burma created a demand for a new type of soldier. 
During the war in'-Abyssinia, sophisticated equipment was 
not available. Nor did the Italians defend their positions 
with great vigour, so that the KAR did not need, or managed 
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without-modern machines of war. The only KAR battalion 
which could have been described as heavily armed was 1/3KAR, 
the machine gun battalion. Otherwise, those who fought 
the Abyssinian campaign were lightly-armed infantry. In 
barren and desolate territory, the South African Airforce 
and the 40th South African Armoured Car Squadron provided 
some back-up for the foot soldiers, who were rapidly covering 
ground in pursuit of a sometimes elusive and even reluctant 
enemy. Other mechanised support came from the East African 
Armoured Car Regiment, which played an important part in 
the campaign. The East African Armoured Car Regiment recruit- 
ed Africans from the existing army units or from those train- 
ing as soldiers, not direct from the civilian population. 
The Africans employed on armoured cars at this stage, were 
given the more humble role of batmen or drivers of the second 
line transport lorries. In time they were employed as gun- 
ners. 
By 1943 the situation had altered and the role of an askari 
in the KAR became less restricted. During the North African 
campaign the distinction between combatant and non-combatant 
askaris had become blurred. East Africans had proved them- 
selves more capable than had been anticipated. Although 
some British officers and civilian officials were reluctant 
to give Africans credit for much intelligence or initiative, 
the facts of the North African campaign and the urgentrequire- 
ments of the Burma war forced them to improve their opinion 
of the askaris' military value. Opposing the Japanese was 
an entirely new proposition for the KAR and in terms of 
arms and equipment the askaris were given more responsibility 
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than they had had earlier in the war. Financial aid from 
America helped to provide more machine guns, mortars, artil- 
lery, wireless sets and motorised transport. It was for 
this reason that recruiting policy changed and men from 
the traditionally less war-like areas were selected because 
their education fitted them for service in roles which were 
described as "skilled" and were consequently more attractive 
to them. The "heshima" or prestige of working at tasks 
previously reserved for Europeans enticed a different type 
of person into the army. Old prejudices which labelled 
certain groups as poor soldiers had to be abandoned. New 
prejudices took their place as more technical roles were 
envisaged as being suitable for the semi-educated, tempera- 
mental and difficult to handle, Ganda and Kikuyu. Before 
1943, the Ganda and Kikuyu had been enlisted as drivers 
and medical orderlies but in that year they were recruited 
in greater numbers to be signallers, ambulance drivers, 
machine gunners or members of mortar platoons. 
The Armoured Car Regiment was reconstituted as the Kenya 
Armoured Car Regiment in 1943, and the commanders were forced 
to recruit greater numbers of Africans to carry out responsible 
tasks. This worried some officers, worried about undermining 
white authority or convinced that Africans were completely 
incompetent. Others altered their attitudes to suit events 
and saw the so-called "Africanisation" as a form of progress, 
resulting from the need to disperse white officers more 
widely throughout the force. For the enlightened, the new 
recruiting policy made sense, while giving new opportunities 
to patronise Africans for their limited qualifications and 
129 
experience in the European style of warfare. While recog- 
nising the need for change the reformers could control its 
rate and did so more effectively than the reactionary die- 
hards, whose narrow-mindedness would have defended the status 
quo whatever the cost. 
In the Kenya Armoured Car Regiment 'Africanisation' reduced 
the number of Whites to one per car. In a troop of three 
armoured cars, one had a wireless and a four man crew, two 
had three man crews. In each car the car commander was 
a white officer; driver, gunner and wireless operator were 
black. Previously, three Europeans had been needed to control 
one African; now only one European was needed to discipline 
three Africans. Unwittingly perhaps, the unruly, semi-educated 
type co-operated with military authorities by accepting 
what he considered a more dignified and prestigious role 
in the army. By subtle, psychological if sometimes uncon- 
scious means the British found a new group of collaborators 
to perpetuate wartime colonialism. 
The new intake of skilled recruits tended to consist of 
younger men, direct from army training establishments. Poss- 
ibly their motivation was defiance of traditions which 
excluded people of their area from the army. Other entice- 
ments were more obvious, such as pay and conditions of 
service. British propagandists remained familiar with the 
old African saying; 
"You catch more bees with mollasses than you do with 
vinegar'. 
New incentives to attract new recruits were important in 
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1943. The demand for men now became very heavy indeed; 
for the Burma war, to garrison the former Italian colonies 
and for Madagascar. In the Western Desert, even after the 
campaign there was ended, pioneers were needed and there 
was still a garrison to be maintained in East Africa itself, 
particularly in the coastal region. In some areas, such 
as Acholi in Uganda, chiefs and District Commissioners com- 
plained that all the young men had joined the army. Workers 
were also needed for food production and consequently some 
areas had to be excluded from recruitment, even to the local 
defence force or homeguard - for example, in the Kenya sugar 
plantation areas. However, in February 1943 labour conscrip- 
tion was suspended because the Kenyan producers had diverted 
their energies from food production to the less labour inten- 
sive occupation of growing tea and coffee. In July 1943 
it had to be reintroduced for the sisal estates and in Novemb- 
ber for essential foodstuffs, including coffee-harvesting, 
which created a seasonal demand for more labour. In 1944 
and 1945 labour conscription increased again and was very 
unpopular in Nyanza. The men of Nyeri and Meru left their 
homes and hid to avoid it. Wherever possible they opted 
for the better paid EAMLS until recruiting for that unit 
stopped. Labour shortages in Kenya at the end of the war 
were desperate due to the heavy demands of military recruit- 
ment. 
2 
Altogether five East African infantry brigades served in 
South East Asia, either independently or as part of the 
11th East African Division, which was itself one of the 
15 divisions of the 14th army. The 11(EA) Division consisted 
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of the 21st, 25th and 26th East African Brigades and the 
Division Protection Battalion; 13 (Ny)Bn. KAR. The 302 
East African Field Regiment (artillery) was attached to 
the 25th Brigade and the 303 East African Light Regiment 
(artillery) was attached to the 26th Brigade. Altogether 
the five KAR brigades which served in South East Asia included 
fourteen KAR battalions. Of these, many were trained in 
the use of more sophisticated weaponry but many also remained 
lightly equipped infantry men. In the Burma war casualties 
were heavy, from disease even more than from fighting. The 
more training a soldier had received, the less dispensable 
he was. Those who contributed only a combination of physical 
strength and obedience were more easily replaced. Thus 
alongside a policy of providing African askaris with new 
skills, the authorities recruited men to serve in the infantry 
and reinforce those battalions as men were killed and wounded 
or laid low by tropical diseases. Official viewpoints had 
differed but ultimately it had been decided that Africans 
would not stand up to the pressures of the sophisticated 
type of warfare involved in fighting the Germans in Europe. 
By using Africans in Burma, white troops could be freed 
to fight elsewhere. Possibly the grand strategists imagined 
that the vast continent of Africa had an enormous population 
which could afford to suffer losses in Burma. Malthusian 
callousness may therefore have triumphed, but in fact there 
was little choice. The Empire had to be stretched to its 
limits to face the relentless onslaught of the Japanese 
on Burma, which could only too easily penetrate to India. 
At the time it was well within the bounds of probability 
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that the 'jewel'in the crown' might be lost to Britain. 
A further motive for using African troops in Burma was a 
belief in their resistance to malaria. This resulted in 
their being sent into the Kabaw valley in mid 1944, an un- 
healthy and disease-ridden region, where their chances of 
survival would be better than most Europeans. Field Marshall 
Sir William Slim, in his history of the Burma war, 'Defeat 
into Victory', explains how he was told that, 
''While East Africans are by no means immune from 
malaria, they are much more resistant to it than either 
Europeans or Indians, and when they do develop the disease 
its attacks are less virulent. ' 
On the strength of this scientific theory, Slim directed 
the East Africans to advance into the Kabaw valley. He 
concluded; 
'The African malarial casualties were not light but 
I doubt if any other of our troops would have kept them 
as low. ' 
3 
Bearing in mind the appalling monsoon weather in August 
and the very thick jungle through which the askaris had 
to advance to reach the Chindwin River, the high casualties 
were not surprising. 
Nevertheless, it was a misconception to assume that Africans 
were used to jungle conditions simply because there were 
jungles in some parts of Africa. Some British officers, 
who had not travelled widely in Africa ignored its geogra- 
phical diversity. Those with greater knowledge appreciated 
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the need for intensive jungle training in Ceylon prior to 
embarkation for Burma. For example, LIKAR underwent jungle 
warfare training from the time the battalion reached Ceylon, 
early in 1942, until August 1944 when it moved to Kazi camp 
near Chittagong in India. It then moved by rail, steamer 
and road to Imphal in Eastern Assam, where the advance down 
the Kabaw valley into Burma started. 
4 Other units had a 
similar period of preparation. 
Coverage of the exploits of the KAR in the East African 
Standard increased markedly after their entry into the Burma 
War. By this stage more readers would have some knowledge 
of individuals who might be serving with the Regiment. Al- 
though the newspaper was intended mainly for Whites, many 
had friends or neighbours who were officers, or servants 
or labourers who had enlisted as askaris. The newspaper 
reflected and encouraged the interests of its readers by 
closely following the campaign. 
In 1943 the KAR actually made front page news, a rare occur- 
rence in a paper which normally devoted its priority space 
to news of the war in Europe or the worrying issue of the 
civil disobedience movement in India, a foretaste of what 
might come in Africa. On 22 October a photograph of African 
askaris handling a Bofors gun was included. The writer 
also explained5 how the Field Artillery of the East African 
force was now Africanised, although some N. C. Osand all officers 
were British. In fact, Africanisation was a deceptive term 
which implied gradual but real progress. It always had 
its limitations, more so than Indianisation. As long as 
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Africans were excluded from higher responsibility, they 
lacked the opportunity to demonstrate their aptitude for 
it. Africanisation measured success in European terms and 
assumed that Africans would aspire to similar goals as European 
soldiers. In practice many Africans saw more status in 
possessing countless cattle and wives and they may have 
seen a well-paid army job as a means to that end. At least 
the white East African press was giving more credit where 
it was due, unlike the BBC which had misreported certain 
incidents in the East African campaign, giving white South 
Africans credit for East African achievement at Gallo Sidamo 
after the fall of Addis Ababa. 
6 
The Burma war saw changes in the promotion pattern in the 
KAR because of the shortage of European officers and N. C. Os. 
There were no commissioned ranks for Africans although Prince 
Suna and George Mawanda of the Kabaka's family were commis- 
sioned as subalterns. During that war the new rank of Warrant 
Officer Platoon Commander was made available to Africans. 
The idea was first mooted in 1942 when General Platt pointed 
out the need for Africans to be given the chance to develop 
responsibility. The number of white personnel per battalion 
had increased during the war to 37 officers and 43 other 
ranks. Platt considered it a 'farce' to have both a British 
and an African sergeant, particularly when an influx of 
poor quality N. C. Os arrived from Britain with no experience 
of commanding Africans. Although Platt expressed reluctance 
to introduce commissions for Africans, even on a local basis 
like the subadars and jemadars of the Indian army, he believed 
the KAR's part in the East African campaign deserved some 
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reward. The new rank would be junior to an African RSM 
but senior to a CSM and Platt proposed four per battalion. 
The Colonial Office agreed that it was; 
'A stage towards the granting of commissions if these 
Africans prove themselves successful as platoon commanders. '? 
Platt argued that the rank of Warrant Officer Platoon Command- 
er had the advantage of being a gradual step forward, would 
give senior Africans some advancement and would reduce the 
number of British personnel. The idea of minimising the 
number of whites became increasingly important in the Burma 
campaign. 
Nelson Kusambiza, an African journalist, became a Warrant 
Officer Platoon Commander in 7KAR and is mentioned in Moyse 
Bartlett's The King's African Rifles for leading a flanking 
patrol which captured useful documents from the Japanese. 
After the war he became a labour officer, which is a further 
indication of his educational standard and of his qualities 
of character. It is possible that the introduction of this 
new rank for Africans was part of a deliberate campaign 
to attract better qualified men into the KAR. 
In October 1943 the East African Standard announced the 
embarkation of another large convoy of Africans for Indian 
and Ceylon. Some were newly trained and many of the gunners 
had been specially selected for the artillery because they 
had done well at school and understood trigonometry and 
logarithms. Such educated personnel were to be found mainly 
among the Ganda of_. Uganda. The majority of the infantry 
136 
on this occasion were from the Upper Nile area of Uganda, 
a traditional recruiting ground, and there was a gunners' 
battery of the much favoured Nyasas. Recruiting policies 
led the authorities to look for both educated and uneducated 
peoples to fulfil specific tasks in the KAR. 
The article in the East African Standard of October 22nd 
1943, served a useful propaganda purpose in making it clear 
that a good standard of African recruits was still forth- 
coming. Simultaneously, it patronised the askaris by drawing 
attention to the limited standard of their education in 
mathematics which had provided them a passport to success. 
Nevertheless, by stressing that to join the army was a genuine 
achievement for Africans, the British were assured a con- 
tinuing flow of recruits from new sources, though their 
tactics relied on the assumption that Africans would measure 
success in European terms. 
Contact and co-operation with the head teachers of government 
secondary schools for Africans was improved and in Uganda 
circulars were sent to the schools by the army Education 
Officers. Potential recruits reported to their District 
Commissioner on a fixed date and were duly interviewed. 
In Tanganyika recruiting was also carried out through the 
Principals of schools. Tests included 'Kim's Game', writing 
a letter in English or Swahili and simple arithmetic. 
In 1944 a major propaganda exercise was launched in Nairobi, 
where a large scale exhibition was staged. This showed 
the achievements of the KAR in the war against Japan and 
demonstrated army vehicles and weapons. Schoolchildren 
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of all races visited the exhibition which was intended to 
encourage those about to leave to consider a career in the 
KAR. The exhibition was also open to the general public. 
Emphasis was placed on skills which could be acquired in 
the army and might prove useful in civilian life after the 
war. The army was portrayed very much as an educational 
institution and as providing an opportunity for the semi- 
educated to increase their knowledge. The new units, calling 
for machine gunners, armoured car drivers and similar occupa- 
tions appealed to the Ganda in particular for another reason. 
The N. C. O. posts in the regular KAR infantry were held mainly 
by men despised by the Ganda as being still primitive. This 
had been another factor in discouraging the Ganda from en- 
listing in the infantry. The British officers believed 
that they would never accept discipline from the Acholi, 
a generalisation which their belief itself helped to perpetuate. 
Pay was not significantly higher in the skilled units such 
as the Signals, but in a new unit of that kind, opportunities 
for promotion were much better and career prospects had 
their appeal. During the 1930s and the early 19140s a pattern 
of promotion had been established in line with the opinions 
of the time. The men most commonly promoted were the Nubi 
and Acholi of Uganda, the Kamba, Nandi and Luo of Kenya, 
the Nyamwezi, Hehe and Chagga of Tanganyika and the Ngoni 
of Nyasaland. Given responsibility Africans acted with 
responsibility but this had been generally attributed to 
their tribal characteristics rather than to their qualities 
as either individuals or Africans. A Nubi was a good N. C. O. 
because he was a Nubi and likewise a Ganda was a bad N. C. O. 
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because he was a Ganda. These ideas were adjusted as dif- 
ferent peoples filled the non-commissioned ranks of the 
newly formed units. 
The African Mobile Propaganda Unit continued to tour Uganda, 
Nyasaland, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. Constant propaganda 
was thought necessary to combat the reluctance of the more 
primitive tribes to leave their homes in time of war. Non- 
combatants were still required in 1943, when conscription 
for those units had already been in operation for a year. 
In southern Tanganyika the authorities had to keep secret 
the ordering of lorries for the transport of troops, and 
the Jumbes (village headmen) were given very short notice 
that non-combatants were to be conscripted so that rumours 
did not frighten people away. Some young men hid in the 
huts of those unlikely to be bothered by conscription, such 
as old people or widows. The Propaganda Unit also sought 
to encourage hard work and those who were usefully working 
on their own land were not conscripted for the military 
labour service. 'Loafers' were checked on constantly and 
tax defaulters in Dar es Salaam were conscripted as non- 
combatants. In Tanganyika, in January 1944, the Propaganda 
Unit staged a major display at the native stadium near Dar 
es Salaam for 8,000 Africans, mainly civilians. In the 
physical training display a human pyramid, fifteen feet 
high, was constructed. The crowd also enjoyed the demon- 
stration of an electric mine detector, operated by a blind- 
folded askari. The parade of troops was taken by the youngest 
African CSM in the East African Command, 22 year old CSM 
Okech, an Acholi who joined the Uganda battalion in 1931 
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as a bugler, at the age of nine! 
The expansion of the KAR had, in the opinion of some British 
officers, reduced its standards of discipline. A proportion 
of non-combatants also were reluctant conscripts and although 
combatants were volunteers, some of these had been forced 
to join up by their chiefs who had to meet the imposed quotas. 
If the chief was opposed to recruiting because it would 
deprive his community of younger men, he would deliberately 
send the old and infirm. Other chiefs used the quota system 
to get rid of trouble-makers. KAR standards were also 
thought to have deteriorated because the Regiment no longer 
recruited solely from the traditionally martial peoples. 
Brigadier G. H. Cree, who returned to command the 25th East 
African Brigade in Burma in 1944 after having last served 
with the KAR in 1941, complained of too many "semi-educated" 
askaris in the services, their little knowledge being a 
dangerous thing for those who had to command them. 
9 
In South East Asia, the KAR askaris became more aware of 
their inferior status in comparison with British, Indian 
and West African Regiments. Rates of pay differed because 
they related to standards of living in the soldier's country 
of origin. Consequently, East Africans were paid consider- 
ably less than Indians when it appeared that they were doing 
the same work. In other situations too, their grievances 
were justified. In Ceylon, where there was no colour bar, 
some hotel bars were open to those of the rank of Warrant 
Officer or above. This meant that the African RSMs and 
CSMs could go into the hotel bars and British Sergeants 
140 
and Company Quarter Masters could not. When British NCOs 
complained, the Africans were banned from the bars and a 
1 beer tent was provided for them back at the leave camp. 
0 
Africanisation, it seemed, was a hollow promise which was 
not to be effected socially. Africans still had to learn 
their place, determined on their behalf by the British. 
This did not mean that their welfare was uncatered for. 
It was necessary to boost morale when the askaris were so 
far from home. In 1943 the GOCEA urged a monthly expatria- 
tion allowance of five shillings for KAR and RWAFF Africans 
serving in India,. Ceylon: and beyond and of two shillings 
for those serving in North Africa. 
11 
Increased pay did not necessarily improve the performance 
of the askaris in Burma. Poor morale eroded discipline 
in spite of expatriation allowances. In November 1944 Brig- 
adier G. H. Cree12 took up command of the 25th East African 
Brigade in the Kabaw Valley. Operations there were drawing 
to an end and the KAR approached the Chindwin River and 
waited for the 2nd British Division to join them. The lead- 
ing troops refused to cross the river and form a bridgehead 
as this was contrary to their original orders to advance 
to the Chindwin only. A few askaris were encouraged to 
cross the river at points where they would meet little oppo- 
sition but the majority remained obdurate. Having endured 
the difficult conditions of the Kabaw Valley while being 
relentlessly pushed forward against a wily and determined 
enemy, their reaction was not surprising. Troops of any 
nationality might have responded in the same way. However, 
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an attempt was made to find ringleaders in the face of passive 
non co-operation from the African N. C. Os. At last the African 
RSM, a "lone Somali", was able to apprehend a number of 
men but the punishments inflicted were purely nominal. Brig- 
adier Cree found the whole incident disturbing and he also 
describes other minor occurrences of a similar kind. 
On returning to Assam, the GOCEA was due to inspect the 
25th East African Brigade. The tour was organised so that 
the GOCEA should see the best battalion first and the recal- 
citrant battalion whose men had refused to cross the Chindwin 
last. On this occasion the 'best' battalion initially refused 
to go on parade and the schedule had to be rearranged 
so that in the meantime they could be persuaded to conform. 
As well as refusing to parade, groups of Africans in the 
11th East African Division, refused to dismiss. Grievances 
were frequently expressed through mass disobedience and 
the British officers sometimes found it difficult to discover 
what specific grievances were. By 1944 many askaris had 
spent several years away from their homes, either serving 
in parts of East African unfamiliar to them, or in Abyssinia, 
North Africa or Madagascar as well as in India and Burma. 
For those who travelled by sea for the first time, it must 
have been an exciting but bewildering experience and the 
new way of life to which they had to adapt was confusing. 
It;; was not possible for any troops to be granted home leave 
from Burma until the war was nearly over. In May 1945 there 
were 150,344 East African troops in the home command, includ- 
ing a large number of reinforcements and units which were 
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to be sent complete to South East Asia to carry out a leave 
exchange scheme. 
13 This scheme was too late to combat poor 
morale effectively, and only served to answer press allega- 
tions that the welfare of askaris in South East Asia was 
not properly catered for. The South East Asia Command Wel- 
fare Fund spent about £5,000 a month on facilities for Africans 
such as canteens, cinemas, beer, reading material and sports 
gear. In addition, voluntary women's organisations aimed 
to send each African a parcel a year. News in the form 
of local papers and newsletters was sent to Nairobi from 
all the East African territories for distribution to the 
troops. Circulars were issued asking chiefs and headmen 
to write personal letters to the askaris giving news about 
matters of concern such as crops, the weather or cattle. 
Letters from home were few and far between. After 1944 
a Swahili newsheet, Nyumbani, (At Home) was distributed 
and there were frequent lectures on the course of the war 
from African Education Sergeants. Throughout the Burma 
campaign the troops had access to Askari, a weekly Swahili 
newspaper published by East Africa Command and distributed 
free to the soldiers. Kenyan Africans also received Kenya 
Kwetu, (loosely translated as Kenya Back Home), a monthly 
magazine in Swahili which contained articles on new schools 
and hospitals, agricultural developments and the marriages 
of important Africans. It was official policy to encourage 
contact between Africans and their families and communities 
rather than between Africans and the local population over- 
seas. 
1 The authorities feared the spread of Ceylonese 
political ideas and the potential reaction in Africa once 
the askaris returned. 
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Problems of indiscipline and low morale were typified 
by the troubles with the Somali infantry battalions. The 
Somalis had long had a reputation for rebelliousness and 
by tradition the Somaliland Camel Corps had been diluted 
with Nyasas. The two Somali infantry battalions formed 
in 1942 were 71. (Som) KAR and 72(Som) KAR. These battalions 
were destined to join KAR brigades designated for service 
in South East Asia. Not surprisingly, desertions in 71(Som) 
KAR began as soon as the men knew they were to leave Somali- 
land. In February 1944,71(Som) KAR sailed for South East 
Asia. Many of the askaris were very young and were thought 
by their officers easy prey for so-called older trouble- 
makers. Twenty-seven men, deemed to be instigators of dis- 
satisfaction were weeded out and transferred to 72(Som). 
KAR and were then blamed for the heavy desertions which 
occurred in that battalion when it left Somaliland early 
in 1944. In September 1944,72(Som) KAR was posted to Moshi 
in Tanganyika to function as a reinforcement battalion for 
71(Som) KAR, which was by then serving in South East Asia. 
The same 21 trouble-makers were blamed when 63 men, detailed 
for draft to 71(Som) KAR, refused to obey orders and instead 
disappeared into the bush. Although most of the deserters 
returned to be arrested, the battalion was temporarily dis- 
armed. It was disbanded in February 1945 in line with plan- 
ned reductions in the establishment of East African troops. 
15 
The reaction of the Somali youngsters to the bewildering 
and frightening prospect of foreign service is understand- 
able. Blame for disruption in the Somali battalions could 
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be attributed to the defiance and insubordation of certain 
individuals but it must also be appreciated that by the 
time of the Burma war, more was being expected of East African 
troops than ever before. The British Empire was making 
far greater demands upon its peoples when service outside 
the African continent was required and the casualty lists 
in the newspapers were more lengthy. 
The fear of serving abroad also caused trouble in the Somali- 
land Camel Corps when serious rioting broke out on the night 
of June 5th 1944.16 Indiscipline at this level caused the 
British to consider whether there was any loyal element 
in the Camel Corps. It would seem that Africans would give 
their loyalty up to certain limits, as is universally true 
of all but professional soldiers. In expanding into new 
areas of recruitment, the British faced a serious challenge 
from men who were not prepared to leave their homelands either 
for the money or for a sense of duty inspired by British 
propaganda. 
It was not altogether 'Somali treachery' that brought about 
the failure of the new recruiting exercise to form two Somali 
infantry battalions. Bad timing was also a factor. If 
Somali recruits had had the chance to develop military experi- 
ence, as had the Kamba, Nyamwezi and Acholi, for example, 
they might have been better prepared, psychologically, to 
participate in the Burma war. As it was, they were not 
only new to the army, they were new to manhood and they 
were new to foreign service. Also, the officers dealing 
with them were probably nervous of potential subversion, 
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a fear which their young recruits would have sensed. The 
attempt to recruit Somalis had to be abandoned because the 
British blamed the disturbances on the Somalis' character- 
istics as a racial group. Even the N. C. Os could not be trusted, 
it was claimed, and they had encouraged and collaborated 
with the dissidents. What was worse, in the incident with 
the Camel Corps on the night before 'D' Day, the soldiers 
not only refused to fight for the British, they seemed likely 
to turn their guns against the British. Moyse Bartlett 
wrote of the situation in his King's African Rifles; 
'.... about 150 askaris broke into the magazines and 
armouries at Burao and looted arms and ammunition. Seeing 
what was occurring, other Somalis in Burao joined the rioters 
and among the general confusion, equipment, clothing and 
rations quickly disappeared. A great deal of indiscriminate 
firing took place but no casualties were reported. 
'In the morning, order was gradually restored. Armoured 
cars were despatched to Odweina for use if needed. Investi- 
gation showed that about 140 men were missing, and that 
233 rifles, one light machine gun, seven Sten guns and three 
pistols had disappeared from the magazines. Demands for 
the surrender of these absentees and arms were made upon 
the tribes. Some of the men came in, but a fortnight later 
69 deserters and 185 rifles were still missing. '17 
To many this must have looked like revolution. Swift and 
decisive action had to be taken. The Somali askaris could 
not be forced into submission when many of-the most experi- 
enced and loyal battalions of the KAR were already serving 
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overseas. There was no guarantee that the rebel askaris 
would reform if they were punished and it was difficult 
to isolate individual culprits. Thus it was that the Somali- 
land Camel Corps came to an end. The Somalis who remained 
in the KAR as members of other units had to live down the 
doubly confirmed reputation that their people had attained 
for rebelliousness. 
It is often simpler to judge in retrospect the reasons for 
outbreaks of dissidence when more facts are available, and 
a variety of viewpoints can be assessed. At the time, the 
British officers often failed to appreciate the origin of 
indiscipline and the most appropriate means of punishment. 
In South East Asia, unto-operative askaris were punished 
by being sent to load planes in the dangerous forward zone 
while their comrades were thought to be enjoying themselves, 
drilling in Assam. The punishment was ineffective because 
plane loading proved very popular and seemed like a reward 
for unto-operative behaviour, eminently preferrable to parade 
ground drill. 
It was difficult to predict African reaction to punishments 
meted out on their fellows. None seems more surprising 
than that of a firing squad assigned for execution duty 
in Ceylon. The Chaplain of the 26th East African Brigade, 
the Reverend J. E. Gregory was aware of the apprehension 
of those in command as to whether or not the squad would 
be willing to carry out their task. Gregory spoke to the 
firing squad before the execution and was surprised at the 
only question which was raised. Instead of asking the offence 
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of the accused or why the British required others to do 
their dirtyt, work, the askaris simply wanted to know if they 
would have an opportunity to iron their uniforms before- 
handl17 Gregory gives no explanation for the matter of 
fact attitude of the firing squad but it is possible that 
those to be killed were of a different tribe to that of 
their executioners and consequently of little concern to 
them. 
In East Africa itself, troops of the home command lined 
up as reinforcements for Burma, had become less amenable 
to discipline. In 1944 a review of punishments at the East 
African Signal Training Centre examined the problem of 
Africans going absent without leave. Africans returning 
to their villages and abandoning their army training were 
liable to have an adverse effect on recruitment. The use 
of the cane or 'kiboko' was revived as a temporary experi- 
ment to replace pay stoppages and detention. For many 
Africans, corporal punishment was considered more manly 
but some British officers were hesitant about its use and 
its ultimate justification in terms of the British presence 
in Africa. British war aims and British practice in the 
KAR were contradictory; the Adjutant of the East African 
Signals Training Centre wrote; 
'You cannot talk to a man about fighting for freedom 
and justice and then deny him both. ' 
18 
Colonial philosophy argued in favour of paternalism as the 
means of civilizing the barbaric African. Unless this was 
done by example, however, paternalism became oppression. 
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On the other hand, in terms of African preference and per- 
ception, the use of the Kiboko was the most appropriate 
and effective punishment. Before caning had been banned 
in 1942, many Africans opted for it because it meant they 
could keep a clean conduct sheet. During the Burma campaign, 
Lieutenant Colonel G. G. Robson19 of 3/6KAR used caning on 
active service, thinking Africans preferred it. However, 
the African RSM requested that it should be stopped because 
it was not used by Indian or British Regiments. Robson 
readily complied. 
In the opinion of some officers the British did well to 
avoid a full scale revolt in the KAR while it served in 
Burma. It was just as well that the Somaliland Camel Corps 
never reached the Far East as their attitude and the behaviour 
resulting from it might have proved infectious. Brigadier 
G. H. Cree who commanded the 25th East African Brigade in 
Burma and Assam from 1944 to 194520 believed the British 
were fortunate to get away with a few "minor flare-ups". 
Differences in conditions of service for Europeans and 
Africans were marked, Europeans appeared to have better 
rations and a more liberal alcohol allowance than Africans. 
There was no promise of loot as there had been in Abyssinia 
and because they had travelled so far from home, African 
morale was low. The 22nd East African Brigade first went 
overseas in May 1942 when they embarked for Madagascar. 
The effect of the inspiring propaganda speech delivered 
to them on this adventurous occasion had worn off by the 
time they reached Colombo in July 1944. By December the 
Brigade was in Chittagong in India from whence they advanced 
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to patrol the knife-edged ridges of the Arakan hills. Here 
they came across thick jungle and dense bamboo which they 
had not experienced in their training. It is unlikely that 
many recalled the words of the GOCEA, General Platt, communi- 
cated to the troops of all ranks once they had set sail 
back in May 1942; 
'You have earned a high reputation in your actions 
that resulted in the destruction of the Italian East African 
Empire. You are now moving to another field of action. 
Difficult tasks lie ahead of you. In facing these, remember 
that not one of your homes, not one of your people, will 
be safe to lead a life of peace and liberty, until the forces 
of evil are finally subdued. The future of your children 
depends on you. Go forth, knowing that your cause is right 
and that the best wishes of all the forces in East Africa 
accompany you. ' 
21 
This was small consolation for an askari attacking a 'formid- 
able and fanatical enemy strongly posted in well-armed 
positions of his own choosing'. 
22 The great distance between 
Burma and Africa would have led some to question whether 
the peace and liberty of their family was under threat from 
the Japanese. 
On top of these grievances, askaris from the grass uplands 
of East Africa had to live with the reputation attributed 
to them by Higher Command of being, 'the finest jungle 
fighters in the world'. Such proclamations did not frighten 
the Japanese and only meant that many Africans were bound 
to fail to measure up to that image. It was not surprising 
that Africans were thought to have little initiative and 
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were subject to mass hysteria. They were also criticised 
for moving too slowly in attack and abandoning positions 
too readily in defence. 
Further problems arose when European officers with no fam- 
iliarity with Africa, were sent to command African troops. 
They may have had high expectations of guerilla-type jungle 
fighters when in reality the Africans found their surround- 
ings as alien as did the Europeans themselves. No doubt 
those in immediate contact with African troops could become 
frustrated when their men did not behave in the manner they 
had been led to expect. Individual askaris too might have 
felt confused or insulted by the insensitivity of officers 
unused to relating to Africans. Combined with the appalling 
conditions in the swamps of the Kabaw valley, the difficulties 
in transporting equipment without mules (until 1945), the 
prevalence of malaria and scrub typhus, infrequent contact 
with home and the fraying patience of British officers forced 
to push themselves and their men to the limit under the 
orders of Higher Command, it was no wonder that some blame 
was attached to troublesome Africans. In fact the majority 
must have shown endurance, courage and fortitude equal to 
that of their European commanders. It took a different 
type of British officer. to realise such qualities, often 
one who had some fore-knowledge of East Africa. Moyse 
Bartlett commended the Africans of the KAR for their cheerful- 
ness in times of difficulty, their good hearing and eyesight, 
their ability to lie still for long periods without making 
a noise and the agility which, he said, made them preferable 
to Europeans on reconnaissance expeditions, in spite of 
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their lesser intelligence. General Slim praised the achieve- 
ment of the 11th East African Division in advancing down 
the Kabaw during the monsoon, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. 
Carbonell went so far as to pay tribute to the Somali Bat- 
talion which did reach Burma; 
'Awkward they may have been, but fight they did, and 
what is more to the point, being the ultimate object of 
infantry, they killed. 1,23 
Reinforcements and new formations to serve in South East 
Asia were in constant demand until Japan was defeated. 
At the height of the Burma campaign, recruitment in East 
Africa was stretched to its limits. Casualties were far 
greater than those previously suffered by the KAR and the 
weekly casualty lists, published in the East African Standard, 
filled whole columns. The operation of crossing the Chind- 
win, for example, cost the 11th East African Division: 
26 British ranks killed 
95 British ranks wounded 
7 British ranks missing 
233 African ranks killed 
976 African ranks wounded 
35 African ranks missing. 
24 
Some British officers adopted the habit of blacking their 
faces because the Japanese marksmen naturally tried to pick 
off the leaders. The 6th (Uganda) Field Ambulance helped 
to deal with KAR casualties and in 1944 a Casualty Clearing 
Post was opened at the 67th mile post on the Tamu-Kalewa 
road in Burma where casualties were received and evacuated. 
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The 6th Field Ambulance also provided many other medical 
units for the numerous casualties suffered by the KAR. 
25 
It had been envisaged that one East African infantry division 
would be maintained in the field, while two East African 
brigades would provide bulk reinforcements in drafts from 
platoons to brigades. Reinforcements waited and trained 
in Ceylon and India before they were despatched to Burma. 
In October 1944 the 28(EA) Brigade was called to join the 
14th Army in Burma. Soon afterwards the whole of the second 
reinforcement brigade, 22(EA) Brigade, departed to join 
the 26(Ind) Division in the Arakan. At this point, South 
East Asia Command had to be informed that East African rein- 
forcements simply could not maintain five brigades on active 
service. It was 28(EA) Brigade which was to suffer the 
heaviest casualties of an East African brigade in battle. 
There was no one to reinforce the reinforcement brigades 
and Supreme Allied Command South East Asia had to bear in 
mind that the role of the 22nd and 28th Brigades was primarily 
that of relief brigades. East Africa could not provide 
any more. By 1944 the influx of trained East African soldiers 
to Burma was slowing up. Despite new drives in recruiting 
and new propaganda exercises in East Africa, it became 
increasingly apparent that the supply of fit young Africans 
was dwindling. In fact recruiters no longer looked for 
fit men; they assumed that army training would be sufficient 
to build up the strength of the weaker men they were now 
forced to recruit. Fewer men were being left at home to 
work the farms in Kenya and the plantations in Tanganyika. 
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Short of introducing full scale conscription to replace 
the quota system, the KAR's recruiting campaigns had almost 
come to a full stop. Foreign service was unpopular and 
for those responsible for recruiting for the KAR, the defeat 
of the Japanese in 1945 came as a particular relief. 
Meanwhile, back in East Africa KAR troops were still required 
to defend Kenya's Northern Frontier District, to hold the 
, conquered territory of Abyssinia and, if need be, to defend 
the East coast of Kenya and Tanganyika against potential 
Japanese attack. A large force was also required to garrison 
Madagascar after the successful campaign there, in order 
to protect the straits and ensure the safety of supply ships 
for East Africa and the Middle East. 
As well as its military role in, the war, the KAR was still 
regarded as a bastion of civil 
order 
in East Africa itself. 
As the Burma war drew to a close, ýcivil disturbances in 
Uganda diverted the attention of the colonial governments. 
The crumbling Empire in India was' of particular concern 
in Kenya, where the large Indian population was thought 
to be widely influenced by Indian nationalist politics. 
The local police forces were inadequate when it came to 
widespread public disorder and the loyalty of the KAR came 
to be tested once more. The subsequent actions of the askaris 
shows clearly how it was foreign service that was detested 
and which shook the loyalty of their compatriots in South 
East Asia. There the tendency towards mass disobedience 
was not indicative of feelings running throughout the Regi- 
ment as a whole and, despite discontent in Burma, there 
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was no African equivalent of Subhas Chandra Bhose's Indian 
National Army. 
However, among the civilian population in Uganda, there 
was a growing restiveness. Intrigue among the Ugandan 
chiefs was not new and they continued to be as much the 
target of those who harboured grudges as did wealthy Europeans. 
In 1945, a series of strikes for higher wages, accompanied 
by accusations of corruption against the Omuwanika of Buganda, 
led to commotions in Uganda's towns. The centres affected 
were Kampala, Entebbe, Masaka, Koja and Mubende, all in 
Buganda; Jinja in Busoga and Mbarara in Ankole. 
26 Jinja 
had a long association with the KAR as a recruiting centre 
and as the H. Q. of the KAR in Uganda. A company of KAR 
from the Jinja Infantry Training Centre had to be sent to 
Kampala to restore order because many of the local police 
force had been transferred to Karamoja to deal with cattle 
raiders. A route march through Kampala seemed enough to 
quell the riots. 
Then in Koja, trouble flared up when rioters held up a lorry 
taking milk to the Polish refugee settlement. A platoon 
of the KAR fired on the mob to disperse them. In Jinja 
itself the KAR backed up the police in their control of 
demonstrators and were reinforced by a troop of armoured 
cars which eventually arrived from Kenya. Their wireless 
detachment proved invaluable. 
The KAR were commended for their prompt action, particularly 
as they were only young recruits in training. There was 
no question that they might disobey their orders. There 
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was, in fact, little sympathy among the non-Ganda askaris 
for disturbances which were essentially due to internal 
power shuffles among the Ganda and which only incidentally 
involved the British administration. This was probably 
very fortunate for the British authorities because the Uganda 
police force was seriously under-manned; there was only 
one policeman to every 3,500 of the population. 
27 There 
was no means whereby the police force could be expanded 
at a time when so many young men were wanted by the army. 
That the only forces available to back up the police were 
young recruits in training indicates the serious effect 
of the Burma war. The trained soldiers had gone abroad. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Demobilisation and Resettlement 
'When the war is over' was a catch phrase which raised many 
questions for those responsible for the ultimate repatriation 
of East African troops. Fears for internal security, the 
main role of the KAR after the cessation of hostilities, 
were expressed by the Governors of the East African terri- 
tories. 1 The continued political tension in Buganda was 
also a matter of concern although the official report had 
concluded that anti-British feeling was not widespread in 
Uganda and that the riots had been stirred up by a minority 
of political agitators. 
2 It was thought that soldiers return- 
ing to East Africa might contribute to such disturbances 
when released from the army and that those retained in the 
force might not be reliable in quelling civil unrest. It 
was generally thought by Europeans that the war would have 
a profound effect on the expectations and political con- 
sciousness of their colonial subjects who had taken part 
in it. The returning askari would have an enlarged horizon 
and would require careful consideration when demobilised. 
The issue of welfare for East Africans serving overseas 
was related to post-war reactions when they returned home. 
The authorities tried to avoid contacts between Africans 
and Asians because they feared the askaris might be stirred 
to thoughts of revolution. 
As early as January 1941, when there seemed little hope 
of a prompt conclusion to the war in Europe, North Africa 
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or the Far East, Whites in authority were already worrying 
about 'when the war is over'. On 3rd January 1941 the 
Tanganyika Standard reported on a question raised in Kenya's 
Legislative Council on what to do with the large numbers 
of askaris returning to civilian life after the war. Europ- 
ean officers had been guaranteed work by the government 
but no provision had been made for askaris as yet. The 
Kenyan Chief Secretary replied; 
'The discharge of large numbers of askaris from East 
African units at short notice would clearly raise difficult 
problems which are fully realised but difficult to antici- 
pate before the event. '3 
A similar question was framed later in the same year by 
the member for the Coast in Kenya's Legislative Council. 
It was explained that the government had appointed a committee 
to examine the problem. 
4 
It was a serious matter and one 
which could not be ignored. As well as collecting political 
ideas and a new knowledge of the world, African soldiers 
employed in Burma had been taught new skills and trades. 
It was assumed that Africans would want to utilise these 
and that ex-soldiers might flood the towns looking for skill- 
ed employment. Askaris had also become accustomed to a 
better standard of living compared with the civilian popula- 
tion. Once discharged from the army, lack of money could 
become a grievance. In Tanganyika in April 1943, the govern- 
ment was considering a 'native' housing scheme which could 
employ ex-army blacksmiths and carpenters. Finding sufficient 




It had been a deliberate policy to train Africans in prac- 
tical skills rather than academic skills. The Native Indus- 
trial Training Depot had been set up for this purpose in 
1924. The colonial powers wanted skilled labourers rather 
than office clerks; too many literate Africans were anathema 
to colonial theorists who believed in very gradual change 
only. During the war the Depot became known as the Native 
Artificer's Training Depot and undertook such tasks as build- 
ing camps, lorry bodies and furniture for the army. In 
May 1941 the N. A. T. D. was taken over by the East African 
Army Service Corps and became a military unit training 
carpenters, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, tailors, fitters, 
electricians, sailmakers, painters and bricklayers. 
The N. A. T. D. did not transform a rural agricultural labour- 
ing population into a sophisticated urban service industry, 
but at the time, many Europeans felt that mechanical know- 
ledge did have an impact on the Africans who joined the 
army. After all, very few African recruits had had any 
training before they joined up. A few personal servants 
of whites could drive and a small number of Africans were 
working as garage mechanics before the war. However, most 
recruits arrived at the recruiting depot with a very limited 
experience of anything beyond cattle herding and village 
life. Inevitably, Europeans, trying to assess the 
effect on simple askaris, of having learnt skills, 
tended to put themselves into the place of the African. 
They saw the African as a simpler version of themselves, 
who would be fired by ambition and the wish to emulate 
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Europeans. Colonialism sought to teach Africa what success 
was in terms of careers, social advancement and materialism. 
If a European had a particular talent he would like to think 
that he would use it for the good of the community and to 
gain personal success. Africans did not always see life 
in the same terms. The authorities were wrong to expect 
returning askaris necessarily to be looking for skilled 
work, but this judgement can only be made with hindsight. 
At the time, the assumption was made and other suppositions 
were based on it. 
British trepidation about the civil reabsorption of African 
soldiers after the war was not altogether without substance. 
There were good reasons in the early 1940s why it was thought 
some difficulty might be encountered. In the case of ex- 
army drivers it was certainly true that they were looking 
for work even before the war was over. Many Africans who 
had learnt to drive, enjoyed the status of being behind 
the wheel of a motor vehicle, a position from which they 
could look down on those on foot or holding the reins of 
a bullock cart. Although some wealthy and influential chiefs 
had expensive motor cars, in both town and countryside an 
African who possessed even a bicycle was widely envied. 
A soldier driving a lorry or truck was looked up to, literally 
and metaphorically. Their enthusiasm often prevented Africans 
from being good drivers in terms of the highway code and 
many had the disadvantage of having learnt to drive military 
vehicles away from the hazards of town traffic. In East 
Africa itself, Africans had a poor reputation as drivers 
and the main causes of dispute between soldiers and civilians 
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were road accidents in which pedestrians were knocked down 
and killed by reckless askaris. 
6 
Of the askaris discharged from the KAR in 1943 and 1944, 
as unsuited for military service, a large number were 
drivers. Drivers tended to come from groups such as the 
Ganda and Kikuyu who were generally thought unsuited to 
military life. Nor did they always make good as army drivers. 
There was no obligation for the government to find work 
for these discharged soldiers in 1943 and 1944 and it was 
noted that there was a glut of drivers who expected to find 
work where they could use their skills.? The fears of 
British officials in East Africa were not, therefore, without 
foundation. Judging by the wishes of ex-army drivers in 
1943 and 1944, they must have anticipated a similar demand 
for work among other skilled branches of the army who would 
return to civilian life in their hundred of thousands when 
the war was over. A Tanganyikan District Officer, E. E. 
Sabben Clare, wrote in 1945, 
'It seems obvious that those with new skills and trades 
will not be content to return to agricultural life. '8 
As this was the notion of many civil officials, plans were 
made to reabsorb askaris into a different role in society. 
Promises had been made that India would be granted dominion 
status when the war was over, and progress towards independ- 
ence was accelerating. Africa was some distance behind 
but some. colonials believed progress there was necessary 
if a foreign presence was to be morally justified. Early 
preparations for the return of peace were encouraged by 
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the British government's Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act 1940 which allocated an annual sum of £5 million for 
development schemes in the Empire. When the end of the 
war was in sight, British finance proved invaluable. 
9 it 
was hoped that demobilisation and civil reabsorption would 
facilitate development and ex-askaris would become involved 
in projects such as land reclamation, tsetse fly clearance, 
irrigation and soil conservation. 
10 
With this goal in view, discharge centres were established 
in each territory. Kenya had several, including Langata 
camp outside Nairobi, Maseno near Kisumu in Nyanza and 
Nyali in the coastal region. Best use was to be made of 
existing training facilities such as military training 
schools and civil training institutions like the Kenya and 
Uganda Harbours, the Education Department and the Public 
Works Department. As well as capitalising on trades which 
they might have learnt in the army, some askaris were expect- 
ed to retrain after a period had been allowed for psychological 
readjustment to civilian life. Demobilisation did not 
seek to reverse the process of recruitment by stripping 
the askari of his boots and uniform and sending him back 
to his people clad only in a blanket. 
"A" releases of Africans, that is of those who were in good 
physical condition, began on 7th September 1945 but the 
discharge of sick or injured soldiers began much earlier 
in the year. African ex-service men were to get free 
medical treatment whether they needed it as a result of 
their military service or not. Disabled soldiers were 
162 
dispersed to the civil hospitals in their home areas follow- 
ing transfers from military hospitals. Public spending 
on hospitals and the extension of the Nairobi rehabilitation 
centre was thought necessary and a generous grant was 
arranged for the Salvation Army to extend their training 
school for blinded ex-soldiers. 
11 On humanitarian grounds 
such measures were vital. On political grounds they were 
advisable and indicated that at least the Kenyan government 
was prepared to take responsibility for those invalided 
in the war. The total number of Africans, recruited by 
the KAR in Kenya, who returned alive was 97,000 and of 
these, 22,000 had been dispersed before the start of "A" 
releases in September. These statistics show that nearly 
one quarter of the surviving askaris returning to Kenya 
were not considered physically fit, although some were dis- 
charged because they were unsuited to army life. This was 
a large proportion whose special medical needs the authorities 
could not afford to ignore without risking their credibility 
among the African population. 
"A" releases took place in the following Discharge Centres 
where each askari was interviewed by a Civil Dispersal 
Officer: 
Athi River Camp - Artillery 
Athi Road Camp - Ordnance 
Camp 'D' Kabete - Engineers 
Karen Depot - East African Electrical 
and Mechanical Engineers 
Killarney Camp - Signals 
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Ruiri Camp - Pioneers and Labour 
Kabete Depot - East African Education 
Corps 
Mbagathi Depot - East African Army Service 
Corps 
Medical Corps Depot- East African Medical Corps 
Gilgil Camp - Infantry 
From September to December 1945,18,895 men were released 
from these centres and at the beginning of 1946,56,100 
remained. 
12 This illustrates another characteristic of 
civil reabsorption, that it was to proceed with caution 
so that large numbers of ex-askaris were not suddenly un- 
leashed on the civilian population. This slow process was 
implied in the use of the word 'absorption'. The operation 
also took time because of the gradual termination of the 
campaign in Burma. The last battalions to leave that region, 
5KAR and 13KAR, did so at the end of 1945 and then only 
for the rest camp at Dimapur. They had to wait much longer 
before they were shipped home. Another battalion, 4/1IKAR 
was at Ranchi when the war came to an end but did not return 
to Kenya until May 1946. It was stationed at Gilgil for 
a short time and was disbanded almost immediately. Other 
battalions from different theatres of war did not return 
to the Discharge Centres as soon as hostilities ceased. 
The 15th Ugandan Battalion had been helping to garrison 
Somaliland and was not disbanded until March 1946. There 
was still military work to be done after the surrender of 
the Japanese, when the 14th Army occupied former Japanese- 
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held territory. The slow conclusion of the final cleaning 
up operations of the war gave civil authorities back in 
East Africa the valuable time to filter ex-askaris back 
into society. 
In Uganda the Civil Reabsorption Organisation was set up 
by the government to make sure ex-askaris, returning with 
a wider experience would not feel frustrated. The Organisa- 
tion offered all returning soldiers a form of training mainly 
through the artisan training centres. However, askaris 
could also apply to be teachers, medical orderlies, agri- 
cultural assistants, forestry assistants or veterinary 
assistants. One new technical training centre was opened 
for artisans but otherwise training took place within exist- 
ing institutions such as army camps, hospitals and teacher 
training colleges, which were expanded for the short term. 
A classroom and dormitory were also built at the existing 
agricultural experiment station in Uganda. 
13 
The technical school for ex-askaris in Uganda helped to 
train men in a variety of trades which would enable them 
to return to their homes as 'village craftsmen'. Although 
there were few villages in the English sense in East Africa, 
it was hoped that the askaris would use their skills for 
the benefit of the community and that this would lead to 
economic and social progress. The school had two European 
instructors, two Asian staff, 22 African instructors includ- 
ing ex-CSMs, 150 labourers and 200 African trainees. The 
following crafts could be learnt: brick and tile making, 
bricklaying, carpentry and joinery, blacksmith and tinsmith, 
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bicycle repairer, tailor, cobbler and shoemaker and tool- 
maker. Askaris received pay while they were at the school, 
some of which was paid into an account in their home area. 
Training centres in Uganda were sited on a regional basis 
according to where the soldiers had originally been recruited. 
One was at Fort Portal in the Ruwenzoris for the western 
peoples of Uganda such as the Toro, Nyoro and Nyankoli. 
The centre for the Ganda and Soga was in Kampala, for the 
Gisu and Jopadola in Tororo, for the Teso in Soroti and 
for the Langi, Acholi, Madi, Kakwa and Alur in Lira. There 
was also a high grade technical school at Mbale. The system 
was well thought out and efficiently organised. 
Although adequate facilities were provided for ex-askaris 
to find employment, it was not every man who availed him- 
self of these opportunities. On October 1st 1945 an African 
Employment Bureau opened in Kenya to register ex-servicemen 
only and help them to find work. During the period October 
ist to December 31st 1945,382 Africans registered with 
the Bureau. Of these, 106 were drivers. Employment was 
found for 100 men, 282 remained unemployed, while there 
were 737 vacancies. Unfortunately, a large number of the 
ex-service tradesmen, such as the carpenters, were not 
sufficiently skilled to meet the employers' demands. Addition- 
ally, a significant number of Africans discharged from the 
army in October and November 1945 and registering for employ- 
ment, were not physically fit for work. The majority of 
the men who registered with the Bureau were Nubi and Kikuyu, 
mostly drivers who wanted to be paid more than employers 
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were offering. There were vacancies for tractor drivers 
but army drivers were not suited to this. 
14 
In Uganda, the authorities were more successful at settling 
ex-soldiers. Many who had qualified as carpenters or metal 
workers, during or after the war, found jobs in the Public 
Works Department. Others, with clerical skills, joined 
the Civil Service or went into African local government 
as village chiefs; returning askaris became such by local 
concensus. The police and prison services took many askaris 
and low key military recruiting continued after the war 
in Uganda's traditionally martial areas such as the West 
Nile. 
Uganda had less success in producing its new breed of village 
craftsmen. By 1948 few ex-askaris were using the skills 
they had learnt in technical training centres. The excep- 
tion seemed to be the tailors who had been given sewing 
machines. They would set up shop outside an Indian cloth 
merchant's store and offer to make up garments for customers 
purchasing cloth. They were the only group of tradesmen 
who showed the business enterprise the authorities expected 
of them. 
15 On returning to Uganda in 1948, having helped 
to set up the technical training centres there, Colin Campbell 
met several of his ex-pupils. In his capacity as a 'co- 
operative' officer, teaching Africans to set up co-operative 
societies, Campbell realised that many former soldiers had 
settled back into the old way of life, which they had led 
before the war. Quite naturally, those who had survived 
the war began to forget their experiences of distant places. 
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The years they had spent in the KAR, in East Africa itself 
or further afield in the Middle East, Madagascar and South 
East Asia, became a dream, divorced from the reality of 
day to day life back among their own people. For many ex- 
soldiers the war had not had a revolutionising influence. 
In fact, the reverse happened and people felt more reluctant 
to leave the familiarity of their homeland for places further 
afield. This would be the privilege of a new generation. 
Many ex-askaris became respectable conservative citizens; 
they were the same men who had demonstrated their loyalty 
to the British and African authorities by volunteering for 
the KAR in the first place. Those who joined the police 
and prison services were the bulwarks of society. During 
the third phase of recruitment the authorities had continued 
to enrol men from the traditionally martial tribes alongside 
those who were required for more skilled tasks. Post war 
civil reabsorption catered for the majority but there was 
a vociferous . 
dissatisfied minority who claimed to represent 
a larger group of disgruntled ex-servicemen than was actually 
the case. 
In Tanganyika the returning askaris also settled well. Only 
those who were politically conscious before they went to 
war, had assimilated new ideas abroad. Some set up small 
ephemeral associations such as the 'Musoma New Living Boys' 
to demonstrate their modern outlook. Most returned to their 
shambas and picked up life where they had left off. 
16 The 
Tanganyikan government regretted the seeming lack of enthus- 
iasm shown by returning soldiers for new plans to reform 
the administration. 17 
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In East Africa there was less trouble with ex-askaris than 
the authorities had anticipated. They spent their accumulated 
pay on new wives or squandered it on beer. After leading 
a strictly disciplined army life, they were content to 
return to simple agricultural pursuits. 
18 
Ex-askaris may have learnt how to use firearms during the 
war but they did not put this to use in rebellion as the 
authorities had feared. Although Congress party activity 
escalated in India, in Africa, ejection of the European 
governments was far slower. It was not the war itself which 
politicised Africans but subsequent events and parallel 
developments in East Africa which took place independently 
of what tias happening elsewhere in the world. 
Ultimately it was not the people who had gone away to fight 
who protested against the colonial powers. Certainly some 
soldiers, restless at the restrictions of civilian life 
once the novelty of returning home had worn off, joined 
the freedom fighters wanting to throw off the colonial yoke. 
Some soldiers even played a prominent part in nationalist 
politics, but it was not always because of their experiences 
in the army. Other factors were also important, not least 
the sharp rise in prices in the late 1940s in East Africa. 
The Kikuyu who joined Mau Mau had never been recruited in 
large numbers compared to other groups such as the Kamba. 
More Kikuyu had enlisted during the third phase of recruit- 
ment when the KAR was offering more skilled roles. When 
the Kikuyu did enlist, they had avoided the infantry and 
preferred work as medical orderlies, drivers and clerks. 
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As such, their military training in the use of firearms 
would have been minimal. It would not have been significant 
in influencing the training of the members of Mau Mau as 
the military incompetence of the movement demonstrated. 
Kikuyu participation in this political organisation in Kenya 
was due more to the fact that many had stayed in Kenya during 
the war, rather than that a few had acquired a new outlook 
through foreign service in the KAR. That is not to say 
that Kikuyu leaders did not use the events of the war to 
add to the power of their political debate. In urging 
others to fight the British government Stanley Mathenge 
spoke of his wartime experience; 
'I have been in the German and British war since 1940 
..... I have been to India, Madagascar, the Middle East, 
Burma, Rangoon, Kalewa, Singapore, Ceylon, Egypt, Ethiopia 
and Gigagiga. I have seen that thousands of Africans from 
all countries of this continent, including myself have been 
serving the white man. 
'During the period I was in the war I saw a lot of 
injustices being done by the white soldiers to the black 
soldiers. During encounters with the Japanese and Italian 
enemy soldiers, there would be about 10,000 African soldiers 
and only about 50 white soldiers. These white soldiers 
who were supposed to be the leaders were always in the 
rear. ' 
Mathenge also pointed out the difference between the 800 
shillings he received as accumulated pay at the end of the 
war and the Kenyan land and Kenyan government loans received 
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by British ex-soldiers who had fought in the same war. 
19 
Karigo Muchai, another Mau Mau leader, described the four 
years he had spent in the army and how he was disappointed 
and disillusioned in June 1946, when he was discharged and 
found British promises of land and work for Africans unsub- 
stantiated. Muchai was a trained army driver with a trans- 
port unit. It took him some time to find work as a driver 
20 in civilian life in Nairobi. 
Waruhiu Itote, General China, a prominent Mau Mau leader 
describes in his autobiography, how he not only picked up 
new political ideas while fighting abroad for the KAR but 
also the means of military organisation. 
21 Similarly Bildad 
Mwaganu Kaggia, who enlisted as a clerk in the KAR in 1942, 
explained that he acquired a new political outlook which 
led him to become a prominent trade unionist after the war, 
as a direct result of his experiences in the Middle East. 
22 
These are examples of intelligent, educated men who saw 
irony in fighting a war to save British democracy from 
European fascism and Japanese militarism when East Africans 
had no representative institutions of their own. For them, 
the argument that East Africa was not ready for total inde- 
pendence did not hold water. Other Africans thinking along 
those lines tended to be those who had not joined the KAR. 
They were stimulated by both British propaganda which kept 
even the remotest areas in touch with the most recent events 
and a deterioration in living standards. Labour conscrip- 
tion had forced more people to travel away from their homes 
and at the same time, learn and spread ideas. Even the 
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uneducated dockworkers in Dar es Salaam in 1943 could argue: 
'We are being told that we are at war with the Nazi 
German because the Nazi want to enslave the world, how is 
it that an English is making us a slave ...? '23 
The third phase of recruitment, 1943 to 1945, was a difficult 
period when the British had to prophecy the post-war effect 
of their own recruiting propaganda and their attempts to 
expand the KAR by recruiting in the traditionally non- 
martial areas. After the war they had to count the cost, 
but it seems that in Kenya only was it possible to link 
post-war disturbances with the war-time experiences of 




PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS WITH WEST AFRICA 
Troops from other parts of Africa, besides East Africa, 
were widely used during the Second World War, particularly 
from Britain's territories in West Africa. In mid-1939 the 
RWAFF numbered about eight thousand men. 
1 In October of 
the-same year the KAR numbered nearly thirteen thousand men. 
The KAR was understandably the larger force at this time 
because it drew its recruits from a wider area than that 
from which'., the RWAFF recruited. By the end of the war there 
were still less West Africans than East Africans in the 
armed forces and the proportion of West Africans remained 
, the same, roughly 40 per cent of the combined total of men 
serving in the two forces, the KAR and RWAFF. 
By May 1945 West African troops were deployed as follows: 
ASIA 73,290 
MIDDLE EAST 16,472 
HOME COMMAND 56,1002 
A comparison with the deployment of East African troops shows 
that there were considerably more West Africans in Asia than 
there were East Africans, and that there were more East 
Africans in their own home command. The statistics for the 
deployment of East Africans are as follows: 
ASIA ü6,050 
MIDDLE EAST 30,000 
HOME COMMAND 150,344 
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Certain similarities between the recruitment of these two 
groups of peoples to their appropriate regiments can be 
drawn. 
There were three major phases of recruitment in East Africa 
and West Africa during the Second World War. They took place 
simultaneously but for strategic reasons they fulfilled 
slightly different needs. The first phase was from 1939 
to 1941 to recruit both groups for the initial expansion 
of both regiments and for the Abyssinian campaign. Towards 
the end of that campaign less West Africans were stationed 
in East Africa because a second phase of recruiting had begun 
in West Africa to meet the threat from the Vichy French West 
African territories. The second phase of recruiting lasted 
through 1941 to 1942 in West Africa and through 1941 to 1943 
, in East Africa. The Vichy threat to British territories 
in West Africa explains why less West Africans were deployed 
in the Middle East, and why it was necessary to introduce 
conscription for non-combatants and intensify recruiting 
in East Africa to make up for the lack of West Africans. 
Once the Vichy threat was lifted and the Allies had secured 
victory in North Africa, both East and West Africans were 
freed to fight in Burma. However, garrisons were still needed 
in the Middle East and West Africans continued to be stationed 
there. The third phase of recruiting was from 1943 to 1945 
in East Africa, specifically for the Madagascar campaign 
and the Burma war. In West Africa the third phase of recruit- 
ment began slightly later and lasted through 1944 and 1945 
when it was apparent that West Africa was quite safe from 
Vichy. Throughout the war these two supplies of manpower 
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were balanced against each other so that if there was a lack 
of men from one force the other could compensate. The KAR 
and RWAFF were the largest forces of African soldiers employ- 
ed by the British during World War Two but other Africans 
also played a useful part, notably those from the High 
Commission Territories and the Northern Rhodesian Regiment. 
The theory that certain African races possessed qualities 
which made them good or bad soldiers was prevalent in West 
as well as in East Africa. It was perpetuated throughout 
the colonies by European army officers who transferred from 
one post to another. Nor was it only Africans who were sub- 
ject to such categorisation in the theory of the martial 
races. In India Europeans also formed subjective opinions 
as to the military worth of the men in their command, basing 
their judgements on myths which linked martial characteristics 
with religious custom, environment, diet or economic con- 
ditions. The convenient theory of the archetypal martial 
races persisted wherever Europeans recruited colonial sub- 
jects into their armed forces. 
In East Africa the grain eater was considered a better soldier 
than the banana eater. In West Africa, in the Gold Coast, 
. the poorer northern peoples were thought to be more warlike 
than the richer peoples of the south. Coming from a wild 
and more barren area, the northerners were thought to be 
hardy and tough. Their simple, unsophisticated background 
and minimal contact with Europeans made them easier to influ- 
ence and discipline. It was generally felt that these men 
would automatically substitute their white officer for their 
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chief and pay him customary loyalty and respect. This dis- 
cipline was connected with the political organisation of 
the peoples to be recruited and those who had strong chieftains 
were purposely chosen to be soldiers. A further reason for 
this choice was the role of the chiefs in recruiting. A 
powerful and co-operative chief could provide numbers of 
good quality recruits. Successful British propaganda then 
convinced new askaris that in complying with the orders of 
their officers they also served their chief. The most suit- 
able recruits in the Gold Coast tended to be in the remoter 
northern areas where the chief's influence was uninhibited 
by European administration but was still loyal to it. 
European officers, and their wives too, all contributed to 
the store of what came to be accepted common knowledge by 
relating their experiences with particular tribes or indiv- 
iduals. In this way prejudices spread, stereotypes developed 
and ethnic groups gained reputations despite being composed 
of individuals. When European officers serving with the 
RWAFF or KAR met in the East African campaign, the Middle 
East or South East Asia, superficial views of which types 
of men made good soldiers were exchanged. The criterion 
of the "martial race" determined the nature of the army while 
the criteria for rejection of would-be recruits helped to 
shape the social, political and economic outlook of those 
who remained at home. In East and West Africa a parallel 
situation evolved. Soldier and civilian alike mirrored the 
image portrayed to them and if their qualities were not 
innate, they became so through the constant reiteration of 
them. ', ' 
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While a geographical distinction was made in the Cold Coast 
between the martial tribes of the north and the less martial 
peoples of the south, in East Africa such geographical dis- 
tinctions were not so obvious, particularly in Tanganyika 
and Nyasaland. In Uganda, askaris were recruited from the 
Northern, Western and Eastern Provinces although there was 
a predominance from the Gulu and Chua Districts of the Northern 
Province. Recruiting also took place in the South of Uganda, 
in the Kingdom of Buganda, notably in the Bombo area, 23 
miles north of Kampala, where the Nubi settlement was. In 
Kenya, askaris were drawn from a wide area but a large pro- 
portion came from Ukamba Province. It was contact with the 
Atlantic Ocean and foreigners which had made the people from 
the Gold Coast's coastal regions too sophisticated to join 
the RWAFF infantry. However, like the mission-school - 
educated Ganda and Kikuyu, they did opt for clerical and 
more skilled posts in the Frontier Force. 
As the war progressed, the authorities in both East and West 
Africa were forced to recruit in new areas where the people 
did not have a long-standing military tradition. At the 
same time they were looking for a new type of soldier, cap- 
able of handling more sophisticated weaponry, who could be 
attracted into the army by the promise of status and the 
opportunity to acquire new skills. In the Gold Coast, re- 
cruiters turned to the Ashanti who were encouraged to become 
signallers and artisans. However, unlike the KAR, the RWAFF 
had to offer higher pay when recruiting in new areas in the 
south of the Gold Coast, in order to compete with labour 
wages in the gold mines. Army pay was not standardised in 
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the RWAFF until 1942, when all askaris were put on an equal 
financial footing according to rank rather than on the basis 
of their access to alternative well paid employment. In 
Nigeria the situation differed yet again. Nigerian tin pro- 
duction became very important following the fall of Malaya 
and the Dutch East Indies, but the miners were not well paid 
volunteers. Instead, they were conscripts forced to work 
in appalling conditions for very little money. In Nigeria, 
labour conscription for the tin mines was thought necessary 
from 19142-to 1944 because of severe labour shortages aggrav- 
ated by the demands of the military recruiters. 
The competition between labour wages and army pay was a 
significant factor in slowing down recruitment and causing 
desertions in the Gold Coast. Cocoa plantations and mines 
offered pecuniary advance with less commitment than that 
required by the RWAFF. In the southern parts of Tanganyika 
and in Nyasaland, a similar situation had arisen whereby 
Africans opted for well paid work in the mines of Rhodesia 
and South Africa, rather than enlist for military service. 
Eventually the military authorities in East Africa had to 
reach a compromise with the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association in order to limit the number of migrant workers 
going south. 
In Kenya the situation differed from that in both Nyasaland 
and the Gold Coast. In Kenya, men went into the bush to 
hide from the District Officers recruiting and registering 
labourers for the settler farms. In the Gold Coast, Africans 
hid from army recruiting parties. In Kenya, white farmers 
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complained constantly of desertions from the farms and plant- 
ations and by 1942, African labourers on leave for more than 
a month had to carry a pass. 
3 In the Gold Coast, desertions 
from the army were over 15 per cent by 1943.4 They increased 
at times of planting and harvest, and, as was the case in 
East Africa, when embarkation overseas was imminent. 
In Kenya, measures were taken to try and relieve the labour 
situation on settler farms when, in 1941, recruitment to 
the AAPC and EAMLS was temporarily suspended until early 
in 1942. In the Gold Coast, discussions on the conflict 
between military and labour recruitment led to a temporary 
closure of the gold mines in November 1942. This decision 
was similar to that taken in East Africa regarding migrant 
mine workers from Nyasaland and Tanganyika. In Tanganyika, 
labour recruiting operations for privately owned farms and 
sisal estates were curtailed during 19415 but these restric- 
tions were lifted when sisal became an official priority 
following the loss of Malaya to the Japanese. This went 
some way towards satisfying the estate owners who had demanded 
a Native Labour Committee as existed in Kenya. Nigeria was 
similarly affected by the fall of Malaya as the Allies lost 
a major supply of tin and vegetable oils which increased 
the demand for Nigerian groundnuts, palm oil and tin. These 
Nigerian products, along with Kenyan food and Tanganyikan 
sisal were official priorities and government intervention 
to safeguard their production helped to create the rivalry 
between military and labour recruitment in these territories. 
East Africans and West Africans saw the Second World War 
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from different perspectives. Their respective attitudes 
. were shaped by the varying intensity of British propaganda 
and its effectiveness and by the reality of their differing 
strategic situations. For East Africans the reality of the 
conflict was most immediate to Tanganyikans and Kenyans. 
For the former, the far flung and large scale operations 
of 1939 to round up the German settlers brought the threat 
of Nazism to the doorstep of all but those in the remotest 
districts. For the latter, the influx of African troops 
from other parts of the continent and the mustering of forces 
on the northern frontier, also brought home the immediacy 
of the hostilities with the Axis powers. For those Tang- 
anyikans and Kenyans living in the coastal towns, particularly 
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, practice blackouts in case of 
air-raids emphasised the danger of Japanese military expan- 
sion encroaching on Africa's eastern shores. British prop- 
aganda and news of air-raids on London helped to exaggerate 
the constancy and degree of danger. It was important to 
create a sense of urgency in order to get an enthusiastic 
response from the African population and to encourage army 
recruitment. In West Africa official propagandists and broad- 
casters stressed the potential threat of a hostile Vichy 
regime on their borders. Most vulnerable was the Gambia 
whose narrow tongue of territory flanking the Gambia river, 
was surrounded on all sides but the sea, 'by the French colony 
of Senegal. In October 1941 the Gold Coast Regiment was 
recalled from East Africa to meet the possibility of a Vichy 
threat and rapid recruitment took place from then on, until 
late in 1942. For West Africans, there were practice black- 
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outs in Lagos and the internment of German citizens, which 
showed the reality of war to a few, and the siting of Allied 
military bases and airfields to supply the campaign in North 
Africa, which brought the fact of the war to many more. 
Good propaganda was necessary from the outset of the war 
in both East and West Africa but contrasting developments 
in the tone and presentation of material took place in the 
two regions. To begin with it was not aimed at encouraging 
the recruitment of men to the RWAFF and KAR but assumed African 
co-operation with the war effort in general. In both East 
and West there were similar instances of African generosity 
in giving money and food to the authorities. The war gifts 
of the Chagga in Tanganyika have already been described and 
in Nigeria the Native Authorities competed with each other 
in making protestations of loyalty to Britain, while groups 
and individuals donated money or made interest-free loans 
to the government. 
6 
In West Africa the propaganda strove 
to instil a fear of Hitler as an individual and to portray 
the Nazis as monsters who would perpetuate terrible crimes 
against Africans. It was argued that if Britain fell to 
Hitler then the British Empire would be taken over by the 
Germans too, a possibility if not a probability until the 
turn of the tide in Britain's favour after the victory of 
El Alamein. In East Africa the propaganda was less intense 
but in a similar vein. 
In 1942, the East African and West African authorities res- 
ponded to the increased demands for soldiers in different 
ways. In East Africa propaganda was stepped up and a new 
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style of recruiting campaign developed. In West Africa the 
authorities chose to resort to an extension of conscription. 
Although East Africans were conscripted to the non-combatant 
units in some cases, others remained volunteers, as did all 
the infantry. The enterprise of the East African Mobile 
Propaganda Unit helped to prevent the introduction of full 
scale conscription to the armed forces. Mobile cinemas also 
toured West Africa with films supplied by the Colonial Film 
Unit which had been set up to make films to explain the war 
to uneducated audiences, particularly in Africa.? However, 
in the Gold Coast in 1941, conscription was introduced for 
drivers and artisans to serve in the Middle East. The system 
of quotas, administered by District Commissioners in the 
Northern Territories, had proved to be a failure in the 
recruiting drive of 1940. Then the Gold Coast government 
had introduced a National Service Register giving civil 
authorities the power to recruit labourers and soldiers if 
the quotas were not filled. They still remained hopeful 
that this law would not prove necessary. In East Africa 
conscription was avoided, apart from for the Pioneers after 
1942. A large proportion of the East African Pioneers were 
volunteers but many welcomed the opportunity of transferring 
to the combatant units if the chance arose. 
Evasion of the Compulsory Service Ordnance in the Gold Coast, 
was extensive, especially in Ashanti and the coastal regions. 
There were riots at Konongo in 1942 and at Kamawu in 1943, 
involving young men opposed to joining the army. 
8 
There 
is little evidence of similar disturbances over the same 
issue in East Africa. In fact the incident at Garba Tula 
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in 1939 was interpreted by the military authorities as an 
indication that the East African Pioneers involved wished 
to join the army proper. Their protest was against their 
inferior status as non-combatants not infantry. 
However, all Africans were apprehensive of foreign service 
and reacted by evading enlistment in West Africa or by mass 
disobedience in East Africa. For East Africans, service 
in the Abyssinian campaign was less of an upheaval than it 
was for West Africans, although many East Africans still 
travelled by sea to take up active service. West Africans 
had further to travel and saw fewer reasons for ejecting 
the Italians from Abyssinia. For Kenyan Africans this cam- 
paign was practically on their doorstep. Once the Italians 
were in retreat, West Africans were recalled to their home- 
lands. From their point of view they felt as if they had 
'done their bit', and in the event of Vichy France adopting 
an unaggressive policy in colonial Africa, West Africans 
in the RWAFF assumed that their part in the war was over. 
They did not welcome the decision to employ them in the Burma 
War. Neither did East Africans, who had served in the East 
African campaign to its conclusion and had also been sent 
to the Middle East in greater numbers than West Africans. 
The British needed persuasive propaganda to convince the 
-askaris of the RWAFF and 
KAR that they were still defending 
their homelands by fighting outside the continent of Africa. 
Both Regiments sought new ways of improving recruitment and 
training soldiers capable of operating the more modern 
weapons of warfare, used in the Far East against the Japan- 
ese. 
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In East Africa the need for skilled soldier 'tradesmen' led 
the authorities to test new areas of recruitment and enlist 
the semi-educated types, such as the Ganda and Kikuyu, in 
greater numbers. Good chances of promotion to the non- 
commissioned ranks and the added status of belonging to a 
skilled unit attracted more men to be drivers, signallers, 
machine gunners and members of the artillery. Similarly, 
in the Gold Coast, drives to recruit in new areas helped 
to provide tradesmen and specialists for the 81st and 82nd 
West African Divisions. Like the KAR, the RWAFF turned to 
the more sophisticated people of Ashanti and the coastal 
regions. Thus the character of both Regiments altered as 
the war progressed. 
The urgent need for reinforcements to serve in South East 
Asia revealed another parallel between East and West Africa, 
that of the poor state of health of the African population. 
The rejection rate of recruits on medical grounds increased 
as the supply of-physically fit men diminished. Even as 
early as 1941, the poor health of the Ha and Fipa of Tang- 
anyika had been noted and in the East and Central Provinces 
of the Gold Coast from March to April 1941 the army rejected 
40 per cent of African men because they were not physically 
fit. As the need for men intensified at the time of the 
Burma war, so the military authorities consciously reduced 
the required standard of health for acceptance into the RWAFF 
and KAR. The minimum height for recruits was also lowered. 
It was decided that although recruits would not grow any 
taller by joining the armed forces, an improved diet and 
plenty of exercise would help to build up their physique 
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during the training period so that fit men could be sent 
overseas. The authorities did not tackle the question of 
malnutrition and widespread ill health among the civilian 
population but chose to provide good medical facilities for 
those who did join the armed forces. 
East and West African authorities were concerned about the 
problem they envisaged of demobilisation and resettlement 
once the war was over. In each case their fears were largely 
unfounded. In West Africa plans for resettlement of soldiers 
were drawn up by 19k3. It was decided that the men should 
be returned to their homes gradually so that large numbers 
did not hang around the towns. The majority of Africans 
returning to the Gold Coast were farmers and they were as 
willing to settle to their previous way of life as the govern- 
ment was that they should do so. Thus the civil reabsorp- 
tion of men from the Northern Territories was a relatively 
smooth affair. The same situation occurred in East Africa 
where those who had led a simple rural existence were eager 
to return to their homes and families and continue as before. 
In East Africa extensive plans to retrain ex-soldiers as 
village craftsmen misinterpreted the aspirations of the 
returning askaris to play a part in the development to their 
community. The authorities in East Africa showed as much 
concern for the askari who returned from the war with no 
skills, as they did for his skilled counterpart. Demobilisa- 
tion centres sought to equip all ex-soldiers with skills 
before resettling them in civilian life. In contrast, in 
West Africa the authorities aimed to resettle the unskilled 
askaris as quickly as possible, reversing the process of 
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recruitment and returning Africans to the 'bush' without 
any basic education in technical skills. As it turned out, 
the West African authorities had a better picture of what 
the ex-soldiers from the agricultural areas, actually wanted. 
In the case of silled soldiers, both East and West African 
authorities expressed fears that they would want to utilise 
their newly acquired skills in civilian life. In Nigeria, 
the Labour Department was alarmed at the prospect of the 
return of 100,000 servicemen, many of whom had learnt mech- 
anical skills in the army and would expect wage employment. 
In the Gold Coast, the government set up resettlement advice 
centres to assist army tradesmen in finding jobs. As part 
of recruiting propaganda, they had been promised jobs and 
promotion at the end of the war but there were not enough 
jobs for all aspiring tradesmen. As in East Africa, there 
was particular'. difficulty in finding work for ex-army drivers. 
In Nigeria those with experience in the Field Ambulance of 
the West African Medical Corps, found work as drivers, health 
officers and medical assistants in dispensaries. However, 
there was not enough work for every skilled soldier to be 
settled in the job of his choice and some did help to swell 
the ranks of the unemployed in the cities. Ex-soldiers in 
East and West Africa returned to higher prices and found 
their army pay did not go as far as they might have antici- 
pated, but it was not their grievance alone which caused 
post-war unrest in the colonies. 
In Accra, discontent was caused by other issues such as the 
high price of imported goods and high food prices which made 
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many items prohibitive to all sectors of the African popula- 
tion. The authorities in East and West Africa envisaged 
mobs of ex-servicemen hanging around the towns, encouraging 
strikes and disturbances. They over-estimated the political 
role of returning soldiers, whose new skills and experiences, 
it was thought, would make them more worldly. In fact many 
ex-soldiers were the type to conform and sought well paid 
jobs alongside Europeans, rather than attempting to voice 
the grievances of the masses. The majority of soldiers in 
the Gold Coast forces were from the traditionally martial 
tribes even in 1945, and they remained comparatively complac- 
ent and easy to manipulate. In East Africa too, there was 
no widespread unrest instigated by ex-servicemen with a grudge 
against the authorities. In Kenya, while some Mau Mau leaders 
were ex-KAR, many were not; partly because they had been 
too young to join up during the war. Only a few could 
attribute their political ideas directly to their war-time 
experiences and their disappointments on returning to Africa 
when the war was over. 
The conservative nature of ex-askaris is illustrated by the 
fact that many sought jobs in the police force. After the 
war a force of Nyasas were required to police Malaya9 and 
they displayed no lack of enthusiasm to return to foreign 
parts. The Nyasas had always been considered good soldiers 
and they continued in this tradition. Their ancestors had 
formed the first two battalions of the KAR and had fought 
in two world wars. Although the wind of change was approach- 
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Rhodes House Library, Oxford 
Rhodes House possesses a collection of notes and 
reminiscences compiled in response to an Aide Memoire 
circulated to former officers in the KAR. These 
papers are located under the heading Mss. Afr. The 
questions of the Aide Memoire are accompanied by a 
commentary by Miss K. P. Barratt, M. A. Papers of 
individual officers are located in the following 
boxes. 
Box 1 
Colonel D. J. Bannister, M. B. E., M. C., who served with 
1 KAR. 
Lt. Colonel R. C. Frederick who served with 6KAR. 
Box 2 
Major C. F. Broomfield who served with 4KAR from 
January 1941 to March 1958 in British Somaliland, 
Abyssinia, Ceylon, India, Burma, Mauritius and 
Uganda. 
Brigadier G. H. Cree who served with 6KAR in Tanganyika 
from 1931 to 1936, was D. A. A. G. at HQ 11th African 
Division October 1940 to July 1941 and was Brigade 
Commander of 25th East Africa Brigade in Burma and 
Assam from 1944 to 1945. 
Lieutenant E. G. Crews who served with 3KAR from 1944 
to 1945. 
Box 4 
G. Elcoat who served with a Tanganyikan battalion 
from 1942 to 1943,3KAR from 1943 to 1944 and 4KAR 
from 1944 to 1945. 
Box 5 
W. S. Gimber who served with the KAR from December 
1940*to December 1945, as Adjutant with 1/6KAR and 
2KAR and 21/c of 3KAR. 
207 
Lieutenant Colonel H. P. L. Glass, M. C., who served 
with the second Battalion of the KAR from 1939 to 
1940, and later with 18(Nyasaland) KAR in 1943. 
Reverend J. E. Gregory who was chaplain of the 26th 
East African Brigade in Burma. 
Major E. G. C. Haigh who served with 3KAR from July 
1939 to July 1940, when he became Company Commander 
of 2/3 KAR until December 1942, when he was appointed 
2 i/c of 5/6KAR and served as such until January 
1945. 
Box 6 
Lieutenant Colonel H. L. Jenkins who served with 25 
Corps Signals from 1941 to 1945. 
Box 10 
Major R. W. Kettlewell, C. M. G., who was in the KARRO 
in Zomba from 1938 to 1939, served with 1/2KAR from 
1940 to 1942 and with 21st East African Brigade in 
Ceylon from 1942 to 1943. 
Major T. R. King who served with 5KAR from 1939 to 1945. 
Colonel Thomas Leahy, Company Commander of 3KAR from 
1937 to 1939, of 5KAR from 1939 to 1940 and 21/c of 
2KAR from 1940 to 1941. 
Box 11 
Captain R. A. Malyn who served with 4KAR and 44KAR 
from 1940 to 1943. 
Major General R. S. N. Mans who was with 1/6KAR from 
November 1940 to May 19145. 
Colonel J. H. S. Martin, with 1/1KAR7. and 1/6KAR as 
Company 2i/c from 1940 to 1942. 
Box 15 
John Clark Murray was Convoy Commander with 55(SR) 
G. T. Company, then joined 2/1KAR and later the East 
African Civil and Military Police. 
John Hewlett Nunneley who served with 3/6KAR and 11KAR 
in Abyssinia from January to December 1942, was with 
HQ of 25th East African Brigade until December 1943 
and served with 3/6KAR as 2i/c mortar platoon, 
Intelligence Officer, Captain and lastly Adjutant 
in Ceylon and the Kabaw from January 1944 to August 
1945. 
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Lieutenant Colonel George Gordon Robson who served 
with 1/6KAR and Depot 6KAR from 1939 to 1943 and 
then became Chief Instructor at the East Africa 
Tactical School from 1943 to 1944 when he became 
a Lieutenant Colonel with 12KAR. He transferred 
to 3/6KAR later in 1944 and served with that 
battalion in Burma and India. 
Box 16 
Hugh S. Senior joined the KARRO in 1936, was seconded 
to 1KAR in Tabora and then trained with 6KAR in 
Dar es Salaam from May to July 1939. After a period 
of home leave he was posted in the Depot training 
recruits for 6KAR and raising a new battalion, 
2/6KAR. In June 1940 he left Tanganyika to serve 
with 2/6KAR in the East African Campaign. 
Reginald Sheldon who was adjutant at the East Africa 
Signal Training Centre and Depot from 1944 to 1945. 
Alexander D. Shireff who served with 5KAR in Kenya 
and Madagascar from 1940 to 1943 and commanded 'B' 
Company 5KAR in Burma from 1944 to 1945. 
Brigadier C. H. Stoneley was with the KAR's Northern 
Brigade Signal Section from 1936 to 1940. 
Box 18 
Major Henry A. Walker who served with 6KAR. 
Major C. St John Wallis who served with 4KAR. 
Major Arthur S. Watts, medical specialist with RAMC 
from 1944 to 1946. 
Major R. D. West who served with 4KAR. 
Major G. B. Whitworth who served with 5/6KAR and 
6KAR from 1945 to 1946. 
Box 19 
Colonel H. Williams who served with 1KAR and 6KAR 
before the war and commanded 13KAR from 1944 to 
1945. 
Lieutenant Colonel E. C. T. Wilson V. C. who served 
with the Somaliland Camel Corps from 1939 to 1940, 
was 2i/c of 4/6KAR from 1943 to 1944 and transferred 
to 11KAR to serve in India and Burma from 1944 to 
1945. 
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- B. A. Young who was an Instructor in the Kenya 
Regiment from 1940 to 1943 and later became Brigade 
Ihtelligence Officer with the 25th East Africa 
Brigade. 
George Kennedy Young was Intelligence Officer with 
11th African Division during 1941 and by 1943 was 
Chief Instructor at the Command Intelligence School. 
Box 17 
Sir Anthony Swann who served as a Major with 2/3KAR 
and 5/6KAR from 1940 to 1944. 
The biographical information given is only intended to cover 
periods relevant to the thesis and does not give comprehensive 
details of each officer's career. 
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East Africa Ministry of Information 
A Spear for Freedom, HMSO, undated. 
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ORAL INTERVIEWS 
A number of people involved with recruiting in East Africa 
in a civil or military capacity, or who served with KAR 
units during the Second World War, were kind enough to 
give interviews. 
George D. Badger (Stratford on Avon, 3 August 1984) was 
an agricultural officer before the war and served 
with the East African Pioneers in the Middle East 
from November 1941 to January 1944. 
Peter Bleackley, M. B. E., B. A. (Henley on Thames, 25 October 
1982), was a District Officer in Tanganyika during 
the Second World War. 
Colin Campbell (Leamington Spa, 25th April 1984), served 
in the KAR during the war and worked in Civil 
Reabsorption of ex-askaris after the war. 
Brian Kirwan (Cheltenham, 27 March 1982,16 July 1983) was 
brought up in Kenya and was closely involved in 
recruiting for the KAR in Uganda before and during 
the Second World War. 
C. A. L. Richards, C. M. G., (Swindon, 29 May 1982) was in 
close touch with recruiting for the KAR in Uganda 
between 1937 and 1939. He was a foundation member of 
the 7KAR and was involved in expansion recruiting in 
Uganda from August 1939 to March 1941. 
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George Webster (Beckford, 12 November 1983) served with 
the East African Armoured Car Regiment, formerly 
the East'African Reconnaissance Squadron. He 
served in the East African Campaign and then 
trained at OCTU. By 1943 the East African Armoured 
Car Regiment had become the Kenya Armoured Car 
Regiment and was posted to India. Webster, as a 
Forestry Officer in civilian life, had to leave the 
Regiment and help to boost timber production. He 
still kept in touch with the Regiment and closely 
followed its progress overseas. 
Colonel Humphrey Williams (Petersfield, 10 January 1983) 
served with 1KAR from 1931 to 1935, in Nyasaland 
and Tanganyika. In 1936 he transferred to 6KAR 
and served in Tanganyika. From 1944 to 1945 he 
commanded 13KAR in South East Asia. 
In addition to these oral interviews, Mr J. D. Thomson of 
Fochabers, Morayshire was kind enough to write of his 
experiences with the King's African Rifles in a personal 
communication to the author, 6 November 1983. Mr Thomson 
served with 6KAR and then the Uganda Police before the war. 
In 1939 he rejoined the KAR and received the command of 
a recruit company at the Infantry Training Centre, Jinja. 
At the end of 1941 he was posted to a Kenya battalion. 
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